++Groundlaying++ ++Groundlaying++
++toward the++ ++toward the++
++Metaphysics++ ++Metaphysics++
++of Morals++ ++of Morals++
++by++ ++by++
++Immanuel Kant.++ ++Immanuel Kant.++
++Second Edition.++ ++Second Edition.++
_____________________________ _____________________________
++Riga,++ ++Riga,++
++by Johann Friedrich Hartknoch++ ++by Johann Friedrich Hartknoch++
++1786.++ ++1786.++
++Preface.++ ++Preface.++
Ancient Greek philosophy was divided into three Ancient Greek philosophy was divided into three sciences:
sciences: ++physics++, ++ethics++, and ++logic++. This ++physics++, ++ethics++, and ++logic++. This division
division is perfectly suitable to the nature of the is perfectly suitable to the nature of the thing. The
thing, and there is nothing to improve about it, division cannot be made better, except perhaps by adding
except perhaps only to add its principle, in order in in the principle by which the division is made. This
such way partly to assure oneself of its completeness, addition would ensure the division's completeness and
partly to be able to determine correctly the necessary reveal the division's necessary subdivisions.
subdivisions. All rational knowledge is either +material+ and has
All rational cognition is either +material+ and to do with some object, or it is +formal+ and has to
considers some object; or +formal+, and occupies do with the form of the understanding, with the form
itself merely with the form of the understanding and of reason itself, and with the universal rules of thinking
of reason itself and the universal rules of thinking in general, no matter what objects the knowledge might
in general, without distinction of objects. Formal be about. Formal philosophy is called ++logic++. Material
philosophy is called ++logic++, the material, however, philosophy, though,
iii [4:387] iii [4:387]
[Scholar Translation: Orr] [Student Translation: Orr]
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which has to do with determinate objects and the laws which has to do with specific objects and the laws that
to which they are subjected, is again twofold. For govern those objects, is again twofold. This twofold
these laws are either laws of +nature+, or of division occurs because these laws are either laws
+freedom+. The science of the first is called of +nature+ or laws of +freedom+. The science of the
++physics++, that of the other is ++ethics++; the laws of nature is called ++physics++ or the doctrine
former is also named doctrine of nature, the latter of nature. The science of the laws of freedom is called
doctrine of morals. ++ethics++ or the doctrine of morals.
Logic can have no empirical part, i.e. one such, Logic can have no empirical part. That is, logic can
where the universal and necessary laws of thinking have no part which would rest the universal and necessary
rest on grounds which were taken from experience; for laws of thinking on grounds based on experience. Logic
otherwise it would not be logic, i.e. a canon for the cannot have such a part because, if the grounds were
understanding, or the reason, which is valid for all based on experience, logic would not be logic. Logic
thinking and must be demonstrated. On the other hand, would then not be a canon for the understanding or
natural as well as moral philosophy can each have for reason, that is, would not be a collection of strict
their empirical part, because the former must and rigorous guidelines valid for all thinking and
determine its laws of nature as an object of capable of demonstration. On the other hand, natural
experience, the latter however for the will of the philosophy as well as moral philosophy can each have
human being so far as it is affected by nature, the its empirical part. Natural philosophy can have its
first to be sure as laws according to which everything empirical part because nature is an object of experience,
happens, the and natural philosophy must specify nature's laws according
to which everything occurs. Moral philosophy can have
iv [4:387-388] its empirical part because the will of the human being
is affected by nature, and moral philosophy must specify
[Scholar Translation: Orr] the laws of freedom
iv [4:387-388]
[Student Translation: Orr]
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second as such according to which everything ought to according to which everything ought to be done; but
happen, but still also with consideration of the moral philosophy must also mention the conditions under
conditions under which it often does not happen. which what human beings ought to do frequently does
One can name all philosophy, so far as it is not get done.
founded on grounds of experience, +empirical+, that All philosophy, so far as it is based on grounds of
however, so far as it explains its teachings only from experience, can be called +empirical+. But philosophy,
principles a priori, +pure+ philosophy. The latter, if so far as it presents its teachings only on the basis
it is merely formal, is called +logic+; if, however, of a priori principles, can be called +pure+ philosophy.
it is limited to determinate objects of the But pure philosophy, if it is merely formal, is called
understanding, then it is called +metaphysics+. +logic+. If pure philosophy is restricted to specific
In such way the idea of a twofold metaphysics objects, then it is called +metaphysics+.
arises, of a +metaphysics of nature+ and of a Because of these various conceptual subdivisions within
+metaphysics of morals+. Physics will thus have its philosophy, there arises the idea of a twofold metaphysics:
empirical, but also a rational part; ethics likewise; a +metaphysics of nature+ and a +metaphysics of morals+.
although here the empirical part especially could be So physics will have its empirical part, but also a
called +practical anthropology+, the rational, rational part. Ethics, too, will have both kinds of
however, properly +morals+. parts. In the case of ethics, though, the empirical
All trades, crafts and arts have gained through part especially could be called +practical anthropology+,
the distribution of labor, while the rational part could properly be called +moral+.
All trades, crafts and arts, have gained through the
v [4:388] division of labor.
[Scholar Translation: Orr] v [4:388]
[Student Translation: Orr]
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where, that is to say, no one makes everything, but The gain is due to the fact that in the division of
each restricts oneself to certain labor which differs labor no one makes everything. Instead, each person
noticeably from others according to its mode of limits herself to certain work which, in how it needs
treatment, in order to be able to do it in the to be handled, differs markedly from other work. This
greatest perfection and with more ease. Where the limiting makes it possible to perform the work with
labors are not in this way differentiated and divided, increasing perfection and with greater efficiency.
where each is a Jack-of-all-trades, there the trades Where labor is not distinguished and divided in this
still lie in the greatest barbarism. But although it way, where everyone is a Jack-of-all-trades, trade
would for itself be an object not unworthy of remains woefully undeveloped. It would be worth asking
consideration, to ask: whether pure philosophy in all the following questions. Does pure philosophy in all
its parts would not require its special man, and would its parts require a person with special skills? Would
it not be better for the whole of the learned trade, the whole of the learned profession be better off if
if those, who are accustomed to sell the empirical those, who promote themselves as "independent thinkers"
mixed with the rational according to the taste of the while calling others "hair-splitters" who work only
public in all kinds of proportions unknown even to with the rational part of philosophy, were warned not
themselves, who name themselves independent thinkers, to try to perform two tasks at the same time? Would
others however, who prepare the merely rational part, it not be better if these so-called independent thinkers,
hair-splitters, would be warned, not to work at two who, accustomed to trying to satisfy the tastes of
tasks at the same time, which in the way to handle the public, mix the empirical with the rational in
them, are entirely very different, for each of which all kinds of proportions unknown even to themselves,
perhaps a special talent is required, were warned not to multi-task,
vi [4:388] vi [4:388]
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and of which union in one person produces only because multi-tasking by a single person produces only
bunglers: nevertheless, I here ask only, whether the a mess when each individual task demands a special
nature of science does not always require separating talent? But, although those are worthwhile questions,
carefully the empirical from the rational part and I here only ask whether the nature of science demands
sending before the proper (empirical) physics a that the empirical part always be carefully separated
metaphysics of nature, but before practical from the rational part. I here also only ask whether
anthropology a metaphysics of morals, which must be the nature of science requires a metaphysics of nature
carefully cleansed of everything empirical, in order to precede a proper (empirical) physics and requires
to know how much pure reason in both cases can achieve a metaphysics of morals to precede a practical anthropology.
and from which sources it itself draws its own In both cases, the metaphysics must be carefully cleansed
instruction a priori, whether the latter task is of everything empirical in order to know how much pure
conducted by all teachers of morals (whose name is reason could achieve and from what sources pure reason
legion) or only by some who feel a calling to it. could create its own teaching a priori. It is all the
Since my purpose here is properly directed to same to me whether the latter task is conducted by
moral philosophy, I limit the proposed question only all moralists (whose name is legion) or only by those
to this: whether one is not of the opinion that it is who feel a calling to take on the task.
of the utmost necessity to work up once a pure moral Since my aim here is squarely directed at moral philosophy,
philosophy which is completely cleansed of everything I limit the above questions about metaphysics in general
that to this question about the metaphysics of morals in
particular: whether it is of the greatest importance
vii [4:388-389] to work out once a pure moral philosophy which would
be thoroughly cleansed of everything
[Scholar Translation: Orr]
vii [4:388-389]
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might be only empirical and belong to anthropology; which might be empirical and belong to anthropology.
for that there must be such one is clear of itself For that there must be such a pure moral philosophy
from the common idea of duty and of moral laws. is evident from the common idea of duty and of moral
Everyone must admit that a law, if it is to hold laws. Everyone must admit the following points: that
morally, i.e. as a ground of an obligation, must carry a law, if it is to be moral, if, that is, it is to
about itself absolute necessity; that the command: be a ground of an obligation, must carry with it absolute
thou shalt not lie, holds not at all merely for necessity; that the command, "thou shalt not lie,"
humans, other rational beings having themselves, holds not just for human beings, as if other rational
however, to pay no heed to it, and similarly for all beings were not obliged to obey it, and the same goes
remaining proper moral laws; that therefore the ground for all other genuine moral laws; that, therefore,
of the obligation here must be looked for not in the the ground of obligation for moral laws must be sought,
nature of the human being, or the circumstances in the not in the nature of the human being or in the circumstances
world, in which it is placed, but a priori only in of the world in which the human being lives, but rather
concepts of pure reason, and that every other must be sought a priori only in concepts of pure reason;
prescription which is grounded on principles of mere and that every other prescription based on principles
experience, and even a prescription universal in a of mere experience can never be called a moral law
certain respect, so far as it is based in the least but at most only a practical rule, and even a prescription
part, perhaps only as regards a motive, on empirical that might be universal in a certain way — perhaps
grounds, can to be sure be called a practical rule, only in its motive — can only be a practical rule and
never however a moral law. never a moral law if it is based in the least part
on empirical grounds.
viii [4:389]
viii [4:389]
[Scholar Translation: Orr]
[Student Translation: Orr]
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Thus the moral laws together with their So moral laws, together with their principles, are essentially
principles among all practical cognitions differ not different from all other practical knowledge in which
only essentially from everything else in which there there is something empirical. But the scope is even
is anything empirical, but all moral philosophy rests wider: all moral philosophy, not just moral laws and
completely on its pure part, and, applied to the human their principles, rests wholly on its pure part. Moral
being, it borrows not the least from the knowledge of philosophy, when applied to human beings, borrows nothing
human beings (anthropology), but gives it, as a from the knowledge of human beings (anthropology),
rational being, laws a priori, which of course still but rather gives the human being, as a rational being,
require a power of judgment sharpened through laws a priori. These laws still require a power of
experience, in order partly to distinguish in which judgment that is sharpened through experience, partly
cases they have their application, partly to secure to distinguish those cases to which the laws apply,
them entry into the will of the human being and vigor partly to give the laws access to the will of the human
for their practice, since this, as itself affected being and energy for putting the laws into practice.
with so many inclinations, is no doubt capable of the This access to the will and energy for implementation
idea of a practical pure reason, but not so easily are needed because human beings, though capable of
able of making it in concreto effective in its conduct the idea of a pure practical reason, are affected by
of life. so many inclinations that they find it difficult to
A metaphysics of morals is therefore make the idea concretely effective in the way they
indispensably necessary, not merely from a motive of live their lives.
speculation, in order to investigate the source of the A metaphysics of morals is therefore indispensably necessary.
practical ground propositions lying a priori in our It is indispensable not merely to satisfy deep-rooted
reason, curiosity about the source of the practical principles
that are present a priori in our reason.
ix [4:389-390]
ix [4:389-390]
[Scholar Translation: Orr]
[Student Translation: Orr]
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but because morals themselves remain subject to all It is also indispensable because morals themselves remain
kinds of corruption so long as that guide and highest vulnerable to all kinds of corruption so long as that
standard of their correct valuation is lacking. For guiding thread and highest norm of correct moral judgment
with that which is to be morally good it is not enough is lacking. For in the case of what is to be morally
that it be in +conformity+ with the moral law, but it good, it is not enough that it is in +conformity+ with
must also be done +for the sake of it+; failing which, the moral law, but rather it must also be done +for
that conformity is only very contingent and precarious the sake of the moral law+. If it is not also done
because the unmoral ground will now and then to be for the sake of the moral law, then that conformity
sure produce actions conforming to law, but again and is only very coincidental and precarious because, although
again actions contrary to law. Now, however, the moral the non-moral ground will now and then produce actions
law is in its purity and genuineness (precisely which that are in conformity with the moral law, the non-moral
in practical matters counts the most) to be sought ground will again and again produce actions that are
nowhere else than in a pure philosophy, and therefore not in conformity with the moral law. But, now, the
this (metaphysics) must precede, and without it there moral law, in its purity and genuineness (which is
can be no moral philosophy at all; that which mixes what is most important in moral matters), is to be
these pure principles with the empirical does not even found no where else than in a pure philosophy. So this
deserve the name of a philosophy (for, by this, this (metaphysics) must come first, and without it there
distinguishes itself precisely from common rational can be no moral philosophy at all. That which mixes
cognition, that it presents in a separated science pure principles with empirical principles does not
what the latter only confusedly comprehends), even deserve to be called a philosophy (for philosophy
distinguishes itself from common rational knowledge
x [4:390] by presenting as a separated science that which common
rational knowledge comprehends only in a confused way).
[Scholar Translation: Orr]
x [4:390]
[Student Translation: Orr]
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much less of a moral philosophy, because precisely Even less does it deserve to be called a moral philosophy
through this confusion it even damages the purity of because, through this confusion that it creates by
morals themselves and proceeds against its own end. mixing pure principles with empirical principles, it
Let one nevertheless certainly not think that trashes the purity of morality itself and undermines
what is here demanded one already has in the its own ends.
propaedeutic of the famous +Wolff+ before his moral You would be way off base to think that in the preparatory
philosophy, namely before what he called the study to the famous +Wolff's+ moral philosophy, specifically
+universal practical philosophy+, and thus here a in what Wolff called +universal practical philosophy+,
completely new field is not at all to be broken into. you already have what is here demanded and therefore
Precisely because it was to be a universal practical that no new ground needs to be broken. It is just because
philosophy, it has drawn into consideration not a will Wolff's moral philosophy was to be a universal practical
of any special kind, for instance one which, without philosophy that it did not consider a will of any special
any empirical motives, would be determined completely kind. In particular, it did not look into the possibility
from principles a priori, and which one could call a of a will which would be fully motivated by a priori
pure will, but willing in general with all actions and principles. Such a will, animated without empirical
conditions, which belong to it in this general sense, motives, could be called a pure will. Instead, Wolff
and by this it differs from a metaphysics of morals, considered willing in general, with all actions and
just in this way as general logic differs from conditions that belong to willing in this general sense.
transcendental philosophy, Because it considers willing in general, Wolff's moral
philosophy differs from a metaphysics of morals, just
xi [4:390] as general logic differs from transcendental philosophy.
[Scholar Translation: Orr] xi [4:390]
[Student Translation: Orr]
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of which the first explains the actions and rules of General logic presents the operations and rules of thinking
thinking +in general+, the latter however only the +in general+, but transcendental philosophy merely
special actions and rules of ++pure++ thinking, i.e., presents the special operations and rules of ++pure++
of that, by which objects are cognized completely a thinking, i.e., those operations and rules by which
priori. For the metaphysics of morals is to objects are cognized completely a priori. For the metaphysics
investigate the idea and the principles of a possible of moral is to investigate the idea and the principles
+pure+ will and not the actions and conditions of of a possible +pure+ will and not the actions and conditions
human willing in general, which for the most part are of human willing in general, which for the most part
drawn from psychology. That in the universal practical are drawn from psychology. It is no objection to what
philosophy (although contrary to all authorization) I am saying that this universal practical philosophy
moral laws and duty are also spoken of, constitutes no also speaks (although without any warrant) of moral
objection opposed to my assertion. For the authors of laws and duty. For the authors of that science remain
that science remain true to their idea of it also in true to their idea of it also in this: those authors
this; they do not distinguish the motives which, as do not distinguish the motives which, as such, are
such, are represented completely a priori merely represented completely a priori merely by reason and
through reason and are properly moral from the which are genuinely moral from those motives which
empirical, which the understanding raises merely are empirical and which the understanding raises to
through comparison of experiences to universal universal concepts merely by comparing experiences.
concepts, but consider them without paying attention These authors instead, without paying attention to
to the difference the different
xii [4:390-391] xii [4:390-391]
[Scholar Translation: Orr] [Student Translation: Orr]
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of their sources, only according to their greater or sources of motives, consider only the intensity of the
smaller amount (since they are all looked upon as of motives (looking at them as all being of the same kind),
like kind) and in doing this make themselves their and from this sole consideration they put together
concept of +obligation+, which of course is anything their concept of +obligation+. Their concept is, of
but moral, but still so constituted, as can only be course, anything but moral. But a concept so constructed
demanded in a philosophy that judges not at all over is all that can be expected from a philosophy that
the +origin+ of all possible practical concepts makes no attempt to decide the +origin+ of all possible
whether they occur also a priori or merely a practical concepts and that makes no attempt to decide
posteriori. whether the concepts occur a priori or merely a posteriori.
In the intention at present to deliver someday a Having the intention to publish someday a metaphysics
metaphysics of morals, I let this groundlaying take of morals, I prepare the way for it with this groundlaying.
the lead. To be sure, there is properly no other Without a doubt, there is properly no other foundation
foundation for it than the critique of a +pure for a metaphysics of morals than the critique of a
practical reason+, just as for metaphysics there is no +pure practical reason+, just as for metaphysics there
other than the already delivered critique of pure is no other foundation than a critique of pure speculative
speculative reason. But, partly, the former is not of reason, which I have already published. But, first
such extreme necessity as the latter because human of all, a critique of pure practical reason is not
reason in moral matters can easily be brought, even in so extremely necessary as is a critique of pure speculative
the case of the commonest understanding, to great reason. A critique of pure practical reason is not
correctness and completeness, whereas it is in as necessary because in moral matters human reason,
theoretical, but pure, use wholly and even in cases of merely average intelligence, can easily
be brought to a high level of correctness and completeness.
xiii [4:391] In contrast, human reason in its theoretical but pure
use is through and
[Scholar Translation: Orr]
xiii [4:391]
[Student Translation: Orr]
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entirely dialectical: partly, I require for the through dialectical. In the second place, I require
critique of a pure practical reason, that, if it is to that a critique of pure practical reason, if it is
be finished, its unity with the speculative must at to be complete, must at the same time be capable of
the same time be able to be presented in a common presenting in a common principle practical reason's
principle, because there can, after all, in the end be unity with speculative reason. Such a critique must
only one and the same reason that must be be capable of presenting this unity because in the
differentiated merely in its application. I was, end there can be only one and the same reason which
however, here not yet able to bring it to such a is distinguished only in its application. But in this
completeness without bringing in considerations of a groundlaying I was not yet able to pull off such a
quite different kind and confusing the reader. For feat of completeness; doing so would have required
that reason I have, instead of the designation of a that I drag in considerations of a quite different
+critique of pure practical reason+, helped myself to kind and confuse the reader. Because of this incompleteness,
that of a +groundlaying toward the metaphysics of I have called this work a +groundlaying toward the
morals+. metaphysics of morals+ rather than a +critique of pure
Because, however, thirdly, a metaphysics of practical reason+.
morals, in spite of the forbidding title, is But in the third place, because a metaphysics of morals,
nevertheless also capable of a great degree of despite the scary title, is capable of a high degree
popularity and suitability to the common of popularity and resonance with the thinking of ordinary
understanding, I think it useful to separate this folks, I find it useful to separate off this preparation
preparatory work of the foundation from it, in order of the foundation of the metaphysics of morals so that
that subtleties which are unavoidable in it the subtleties that are unavoidable in this preparation
xiv [4:391-392] xiv [4:391-392]
[Scholar Translation: Orr] [Student Translation: Orr]
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in the future need not attach to more comprehensible need not bog down the more comprehensible teachings
teachings. of the metaphysics of morals which I will publish in
The present groundlaying is, however, nothing the future.
more than the search for and establishment +of the The present groundlaying, however, is nothing more than
highest principle of morality+, which constitutes by the search for and establishment +of the highest principle
itself a business complete in its purpose and to be of morality+. In its purpose, this task is by itself
separate from all other moral investigation. No doubt complete and to be kept separate from all other moral
my assertions over this important, and up to now by inquiry. There is no doubt that what I have to say
far still not adequately discussed, main question about this main question, which is an important question
would receive through application of the same but which has up to now been the subject of very unsatisfying
principle to the whole system much light and through discussion, would be made much clearer through the
the adequacy, which it shows everywhere, great application of that highest principle to the whole
confirmation: but I had to give up this advantage, system and that what I have to say would be strongly
which would be also at bottom more self-loving than confirmed by the adequacy that the principle displays
generally useful, because the ease in the use of and everywhere. But I had to forgo this advantage, which
the apparent adequacy of a principle furnishes no would have been more self-serving than generally useful
completely secure proof of the correctness of it, anyway, because a principle's ease of use and apparent
rather rouses a certain bias not to investigate and to adequacy provide no sure proof at all of the correctness
weigh it for itself, without any regard for the of the principle. Instead, a principle's ease of use
consequences, in all strictness. and apparent adequacy awaken a certain bias against
investigating and weighing the principle itself, apart
xv [4:392] from any consideration of consequences, in a strict
way.
[Scholar Translation: Orr]
xv [4:392]
[Student Translation: Orr]
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I have taken my method in this writing in such a I have selected a method for this book which, I believe,
way that, I believe, it is the most fitting, if one will work out best if we proceed in the following way.
wants to take the path from the common cognition to First, we proceed analytically from common knowledge
the determination of its highest principle to the formulation of the highest principle. Then,
analytically and again back from the examination of second, we synthetically work our way back from the
this principle and its sources to common cognition, in examination of this principle and its sources to common
which its use is found, synthetically. knowledge in which we find the principle applied. Using
The division has therefore turned out in this way: this method, the sections of the book turn out to be:
1. +First Section:+ Transition from 1. +First Section:+ Transition from
the common moral rational cognition common moral rational knowledge
to the philosophical. to the philosophical.
2. +Second Section:+ Transition from 2. +Second Section:+ Transition from
the popular moral philosophy to the popular moral philosophy to the
metaphysics of morals. metaphysics of morals.
3. +Third Section:+ Last step from 3. +Third Section:+ Last step from
the metaphysics of morals to the critique of the metaphysics of morals to the critique of
pure practical reason. pure practical reason.
____________________________ _____________________________
xvi [4:392] xvi [4:392]
[Scholar Translation: Orr] [Student Translation: Orr]
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++First Section.++ ++First Section.++
++Transition++ ++Transition++
+from the common moral rational cognition+ +from common moral rational knowledge+
+to the philosophical.+ +to philosophical.+
It is possible to think nothing anywhere in the world, There is nothing at all in the world, or even out of
indeed generally even out of it, which could without it, that could possibly be thought to be good without
limitation be held to be good, except only a ++good qualification except a ++good will++. Intelligence,
will++. Understanding, wit, power of judgment and humor, power of judgment, and whatever else the +talents+
whatever the +talents+ of the mind may otherwise be of the mind may be called, are without doubt in many
called, or courage, resolution, perseverance in respects good and desirable. Likewise, courage, decisiveness,
purpose, as qualities of +temperament+, are without and perseverance in pursuit of goals, as qualities
doubt for many a purpose good and desirable; but they of +temperament+, are without doubt in many respects
can also become extremely bad and harmful, if the good and desirable. But these talents of the mind and
will, which is to make use of these natural gifts and qualities of temperament can also become extremely
whose distinctive quality is therefore called bad and harmful, if the will that is to make use of
+character+, is not good. With +gifts of fortune+ it these natural gifts, and so a will whose distinctive
is just in this way qualified. Power, riches, honor, quality is therefore called +character+, is not good.
even health and the whole well-being and satisfaction It is just the same with +gifts of fortune+. Power,
with one's condition under wealth, reputation, even health and the whole well-being
and satisfaction with your condition, which
1 [4:393]
1 [4:393]
[Scholar Translation: Orr]
[Student Translation: Orr]
Groundlaying · First Section · emended 1786 2nd ed. Groundlaying · First Section · emended 1786 2nd edition
the name of +happiness+ produce courage and by this goes by the name of +happiness+, produce courage; but
often also arrogance, where a good will is not these gifts of fortune frequently also produce arrogance
present, which corrects their influence on the mind as a by-product when there is no good will present
and with this also the whole principle of acting and to check their influence on the mind, no good will
makes them accord with universal ends; not to mention, present to correct the whole principle of acting, and
that a rational impartial spectator even by the view when there is no good will present to make these gifts
of an uninterrupted prosperity of a being, adorned of fortune and principle of acting conform to universal
with no trait of a pure and good will, can never again standards. And it goes without saying that a rational
have a satisfaction, and so the good will appears to and impartial spectator, at the sight of the uninterrupted
constitute the unavoidable condition even of the prosperity of someone who has no trace of a pure and
worthiness to be happy. good will, can never be satisfied, and so a good will
Some qualities are even favorable to this good appears to constitute the indispensable condition of
will itself and can much ease its work, have however even the worthiness to be happy.
for all that no inner unconditional worth, but always Some qualities are even helpful to this good will itself
still presuppose a good will, which limits the high and can make its work easier. But these qualities still
esteem that one after all justly carries for them and have no inner unconditional worth. Instead, the qualities
does not permit them to be held to be absolutely always presuppose a good will which limits the esteem
good. Moderation in emotional disturbances and which we otherwise justly have for them and which does
passions, self-restraint and sober reflection are not not allow them to be considered absolutely good. Moderation
only for many kinds of purpose good, but appear to in volatile emotions and passions, self-control and
constitute even a part of the +inner+ worth of the sober reflection are not only good for many purposes,
person; but it lacks much that would be needed in but they even appear to constitute a part of the +inner+
order to declare them without limitation to be good worth of a person. But there is much that these qualities
(however unconditionally they were praised by the lack that would be needed in order to declare them
ancients). For without ground propositions of a good to be good without qualification (however much the
will they can become extremely bad, and the cold blood ancients praised them unconditionally). For, without
of a scoundrel makes him basic principles of a good will, these qualities can
become very bad, and the cold blood of a scoundrel
2 [4:393-394] makes her
[Scholar Translation: Orr] 2 [4:393-394]
[Student Translation: Orr]
Groundlaying · First Section · emended 1786 2nd ed. Groundlaying · First Section · emended 1786 2nd edition
not only far more dangerous, but also immediately in not only far more dangerous, but also in our eyes even
our eyes even more abominable than he would be held to more immediately abominable than she would be held
be without this. to be without such cold-bloodedness.
The good will is not through that which it The good will is good only through its willing, i.e.,
effects or accomplishes, not through its suitability is in itself good. It is not good because of what it
to the attainment of some proposed end, but only effects or accomplishes, nor is it good because of
through the willing, i.e. in itself, good, and, its suitability for achieving some proposed end. Considered
considered for itself, without comparison of far in itself, the good will is, without comparison, of
higher value than anything which could ever be brought far higher value than anything that it could ever bring
about through it in favor of any inclination, even if about in favor of some inclination or even in favor
one wants, of the sum of all inclinations. Even if of the sum of all inclinations. Even if a good will
this will, through a special disfavor of fate, or wholly lacked the capacity to carry out its purposes,
through the scanty endowment of a stepmotherly nature, due to an especially unfavorable turn of fate or due
were wholly lacking the capacity to carry through its to the scanty provision of a step-motherly nature,
purpose; if, by its greatest effort nevertheless it would still shine for itself like a jewel, like
nothing were accomplished by it, and only the good something that has all its worth in itself. A good
will (of course not at all as a mere wish, but as the will would even shine like this if, despite its greatest
summoning of all means so far as they are in our efforts (not, of course, as a mere wish but rather
power) were left over: then it would still shine for as calling upon all means so far as they are in our
itself like a jewel, as something which has its full power), it never could accomplish anything and remained
worth in itself. Usefulness or fruitlessness can only a good will. The good will's usefulness or fruitlessness
neither add something to this worth, nor take anything can neither add something to that will's worth nor
away. It would, as it were, only be the setting in take anything away from that worth. Any such usefulness
order to be better able to handle it in common would, as it were, only be the setting that would make
commerce, or to call to itself the attention of those the will easier to handle in everyday activities or
who are not yet adequate connoisseurs, not however in the setting that would attract the attention of people
order who do not yet know enough about the good will.
3 [4:394] 3 [4:394]
[Scholar Translation: Orr] [Student Translation: Orr]
Groundlaying · First Section · emended 1786 2nd ed. Groundlaying · First Section · emended 1786 2nd edition
to recommend it to connoisseurs and to determine its Such usefulness would not recommend a good will to those
worth. people who do know about the will and such usefulness
There is, nevertheless, in this idea of the would not play a role in ascertaining the worth of
absolute worth of the mere will, without taking into the good will.
account some utility in its valuation, something so There is, however, something very strange in the idea
odd, that, despite all agreement even of common reason of the absolute worth of the mere will: in figuring
with it, nevertheless a suspicion must arise that the value of this will, no account is made of its usefulness.
perhaps mere high-flying fantasy secretly lies as the Because of this strangeness, and despite the agreement
ground, and that nature, in its purpose in having of even ordinary reason with the idea, a suspicion
reason attached to our will as its governess, may be must nevertheless arise that perhaps mere high-flying
falsely understood. Hence we will put this idea from fantasy is secretly the basis of the idea. The suspicion
this point of view to the test. also arises that nature, in making reason the boss
In the natural predispositions of an organized of our wills, may be misunderstood. So we will put
being, i.e., a being arranged purposively for life, we this idea to the test from the point of view that sees
assume it as a ground proposition that no organ for reason as the commander of our wills.
any end will be found in it, except what is also the In the natural makeup of an organized being, i.e., a
most appropriate for it and the most suitable to it. being that is put together for living, we take it to
Now if in a being which has reason and a will, its be a basic principle that, for any organ with a specific
+preservation+, its +well-being+, in a word its job to do in the being, the organ will be the most
+happiness+, were the proper end of nature, then it appropriate for the job and the most suitable. Now
would have hit very badly on its arrangement for this if, for a being with reason and a will, its +preservation+,
to select the reason of the creature as the executrix its +well-being+, in a nutshell, its +happiness+, were
of its purpose. For all actions that it has to carry the end or goal of nature, then nature would have hit
out for this purpose upon a very poor arrangement by putting reason in charge
of the creature in order to achieve this end or goal.
4 [4:394-395] For all the actions that the creature has to carry
out to achieve this end or goal of happiness
[Scholar Translation: Orr]
4 [4:394-395]
[Student Translation: Orr]
Groundlaying · First Section · emended 1786 2nd ed. Groundlaying · First Section · emended 1786 2nd edition
and the whole rule of its behavior would be prescribed and the whole rule of its behavior would be prescribed
to it much more exactly by instinct and that end would to the creature much more precisely by instinct. The
have been able to be attained by this much more safely end or goal to obtain happiness, too, could have been
than it can ever be by reason, and should this as well much more certainly attained by instinct than it ever
over and above have been given to the favored can be by reason. If reason had anyway been given to
creature, then it would only have had to serve it in the favored creature, then reason would only have had
order to meditate on the happy predisposition of its to serve the creature by helping the creature meditate
nature, to admire it, to enjoy it and to be thankful on the fortunate makeup of its nature, admire it, enjoy
for the beneficent cause of it; not however, in order it, and be thankful for it. Reason would not have served
to submit its faculty of desire to that weak and to subject the creature's powers of desiring to reason's
deceitful guidance and to meddle in the purpose of weak and deceitful guidance and to meddle in the purposes
nature; in a word, it would have ensured that reason of nature. In short, nature would have ensured that
struck out not in +practical use+ and had the reason did not try for +practical use+, that is, was
audacity, with its feeble insights, to think out for not used for making decisions about what to do, and
itself the plan of happiness and the means to reach would have ensured that reason, with its weak insights,
it; nature would have taken over not only the choice did not have the audacity to think out for itself the
of ends, but also even of the means and with wise plan for the creature's happiness and the means to
foresight entrusted both only to instinct. carry out that plan. Nature would have taken over for
In fact we also find that the more a cultivated itself not only the choice of the ends or goals but
reason occupies itself with the aim of the enjoyment also of the means and with wise foresight would have
of life and of happiness, the further does the human entrusted both ends and means only to instinct.
being deviate from true contentment, from which arises In fact, we also find that the more a cultivated reason
with many and to be sure those most tested in the use occupies itself with the aim of obtaining happiness
of it, if they are only candid enough to admit it, and of enjoying life the more the human being departs
from true contentment. In pursuing this aim, in many
5 [4:395] people — and indeed those most experienced in the use
of reason, if they are only honest enough to admit
[Scholar Translation: Orr] it —
5 [4:395]
[Student Translation: Orr]
Groundlaying · First Section · emended 1786 2nd ed. Groundlaying · First Section · emended 1786 2nd edition
a certain degree of +misology+, i.e., hatred of there arises a certain degree of +misology+, i.e., hatred
reason, because they, after rough calculation of all of reason. This misology arises because, after these
advantage which they draw, I do not want to say from people estimate all the advantages which they receive
the invention of all arts of common luxury, but even from not only the invention of all arts of common luxury
from the sciences (which in the end also appear to but also even from the sciences (which appears to them
them to be a luxury of the understanding), at bottom also to be a luxury of the understanding),
nevertheless find that they themselves in fact have they still find that they have in fact created more
only brought more hardship down on their heads than trouble for themselves than they have gained in happiness.
have gained in happiness and on that point finally In the end, these people wind up envying rather than
rather envy than despise the more common run of human despising the more ordinary kind of human being who
being, which is nearer to the guidance of mere natural is closer to the guidance of mere natural instinct
instinct, and which does not allow its reason much and who does not permit reason much influence on her
influence on its doing and letting. And so far one conduct. Some people greatly moderate, or even reduce
must admit that the judgment of those who greatly below zero, the boastful high praises of the advantages
moderate and even decrease below zero the boastful that reason is supposed to provide us in terms of happiness
eulogies of advantages which reason in view of and satisfaction in life; we must admit that the judgment
happiness and contentment of life is to supply to us of these people is in no way bitter or unthankful for
is in no way peevish or ungrateful for the kindness of the goodness that exists in the way the world is governed.
world government, but that the idea of another and And so, instead, we must admit that these judgments
much worthier purpose of their existence lies secretly secretly have as their basis the idea of a different
as ground for these judgments, for which and not for and much worthier purpose for their existence. Reason
happiness reason is quite properly destined, and for is quite properly to be used for this worthier purpose
which therefore, as highest condition, the private and not for happiness. It is therefore to this worthier
purpose of the human being must largely make way. purpose, as the highest condition, that the private
For since reason for that purpose is not able purposes of humans beings must in large part defer.
enough so as to guide reliably the will in view of its For since reason is not sufficiently able to guide the
objects will reliably with regard to the will's objects
6 [4:395-396] 6 [4:395-396]
[Scholar Translation: Orr] [Student Translation: Orr]
Groundlaying · First Section · emended 1786 2nd ed. Groundlaying · First Section · emended 1786 2nd edition
and of the satisfaction of all our needs (which it in and with regard to the satisfaction of all of our needs
part even multiplies), as to which end an implanted (which reason in part even multiplies) — an end to
natural instinct would have much more certainly led, which an implanted natural instinct would have led
nevertheless however reason as a practical faculty, much more certainly — and since reason has nevertheless
i.e. as one that is to have influence on the +will+, been given to us as a practical faculty, i.e., as a
is still alloted to us; so its true function must be capacity that is to exercise an influence on the +will+,
not at all to produce a will good +as a means+ to some the true function of reason must be to produce, not
other purpose but a +will good in itself+, for which at all a will that is good +as a means+ to achieve
purpose reason was absolutely necessary, where some end, but rather a +will good in itself+. Because
otherwise nature has everywhere in the distribution of in all other circumstances nature has worked purposefully
its predispositions purposefully gone to work. This in distributing its capacities, reason was absolutely
will may thus, to be sure, not be the sole and the necessary in order to produce such a will that is good
complete good, but it must yet be the highest good and in itself. So, to be sure, this will may not be the
for all the rest, even every longing for happiness, be only and the whole good, but it must still be the highest
the condition, in which case it is entirely consistent good and be the condition for all the other goods,
with the wisdom of nature, if one notices that the even the condition for all longing for happiness. As
cultivation of reason, which is required for the first such a condition, the good will is quite consistent
and unconditional purpose, limits the attainment of with the wisdom of nature. You can appreciate this
the second, which always is conditioned, namely of consistency even when you notice that the cultivation
happiness, at least in this life in many a way, indeed of reason, which is required for the first and unconditional
can even decrease it below nothing, without nature end of producing a good will, in may ways limits, at
proceeding unpurposively in this, because reason, least in this life, the attainment of the second and
which cognizes its highest practical function in the always conditional end of happiness. Indeed, the good
establishment of a good will, is capable by attainment will can even reduce happiness to something less than
of this purpose only of a satisfaction of its own zero and still be consistent with the purposeful activity
kind, namely from the fulfillment of an end which in of nature. Even such an extreme reduction would be
turn only reason consistent with nature's purposes because reason, which
acknowledges its highest practical function to be the
7 [4:396] production of a good will, is only capable of a satisfaction
of its own kind — namely from the attainment of an
[Scholar Translation: Orr] end that again reason alone sets — when it produces
such a good will.
7 [4:396]
[Student Translation: Orr]
Groundlaying · First Section · emended 1786 2nd ed. Groundlaying · First Section · emended 1786 2nd edition
determines, even if this should be connected with many Reason is even capable of this satisfaction in cases
impairments which happen to the ends of inclination. when producing such a good will is connected with many
In order, however, to explicate the concept of a infringements on the ends of inclination.
will to be highly esteemed in itself and good without The concept of a good will already dwells in the natural
further purpose, just as it is already present in the sound understanding and needs not so much to be taught
naturally sound understanding and needs not so much to as instead only to be clarified. This concept also
be taught as rather only to be cleared up, this always stands highest in the valuation of the whole
concept, which in the valuation of the whole worth of worth of our actions and constitutes the condition
our actions always stands at the top and constitutes of everything else. In order to dissect this concept
the condition of everything left over: we want to take of a good will, a will that is to be highly esteemed
up before ourselves the concept of ++duty++, which in itself and for no further purpose, we will lay bare
contains that of a good will, although under certain the concept of ++duty++, which contains the concept
subjective limitations and hindrances which, however, of a good will. Although the concept of duty contains
far from that they should hide it and make it the concept of a good will, it does so only under certain
unrecognizable, rather bring it out by contrast and subjective limitations and restrictions. Far from hiding
allow it to shine forth that much more brightly. and disguising the concept of a good will, these subjective
I here pass over all actions which are already limitations and restrictions instead let the concept
recognized as contrary to duty, although they might be of a good will stand out by contrast and allow the
useful for this or that purpose; for with them the concept to shine even more brightly.
question is not at all even whether they might be done I here pass over all actions that are already recognized
+from duty+, since they even conflict with this. I as contrary to duty, even though the actions might
also set aside the actions which actually are in be useful for this or that purpose; for in the case
conformity with duty but to which human beings of these actions, the question does not even arise
immediately have +no inclination+, which, however, as to whether they are done +from duty+, since they
they nevertheless practice because they are driven to even conflict with duty. I also put to the side actions
it by another inclination. For that are actually in accordance with duty but are also
actions to which human beings have +no inclination+
8 [4:396-397] that is direct or immediate but which human beings
perform because they are driven to do so by another
[Scholar Translation: Orr] inclination. For
8 [4:396-397]
[Student Translation: Orr]
Groundlaying · First Section · emended 1786 2nd ed. Groundlaying · First Section · emended 1786 2nd edition
there it is easy to distinguish whether the action in these cases it is easy to tell whether the action
conforming to duty is done +from duty+ or from conforming to duty is done +from duty+ or from a self-serving
self-seeking purpose. It is far more difficult to purpose. It is much more difficult to notice this difference
notice this difference where the action is in in cases where the action conforms to duty and the
conformity with duty and the subject moreover has an subject also has an +immediate+ or direct inclination
+immediate+ inclination to it. E.g., it is certainly for the action. For example, a shopkeeper who does
in conformity with duty that the shopkeeper does not not overcharge his inexperienced customers is certainly
overcharge his inexperienced buyers, and, where there acting in conformity with duty, and, where there are
is much commerce, the shrewd merchant also does not do many transactions, the prudent shopkeeper does not
this, but holds a fixed common price for everyone, so overcharge. Instead, the prudent shopkeeper sets a
that a child buys from him just as well as every fixed common price for everyone so that a child can
other. One is thus +honestly+ served; but that is not shop at her store just as well as anyone else. So the
nearly enough in order on that account to believe the public is +honestly+ served. But this honest treatment
merchant has acted in this way from duty and ground of the customers is not nearly enough to be the basis
propositions of honesty; his advantage required it; for the belief that the shopkeeper acted from duty
but that he moreover still should have an immediate and principles of honesty. Her self-interest required
inclination for the buyers in order, as it were, from it. But it cannot here be assumed that the shopkeeper
love to give no one a preference in price over also had an immediate or direct inclination to give
another, cannot here be assumed. Thus the action was the customers, out of love for them, so to speak, no
done neither from duty, nor from immediate preference of one over the other in terms of the price.
inclination, but merely done for a self-interested So the action was done neither from duty nor from immediate
purpose. or direct inclination, but instead the action was done
On the other hand, to preserve one's life is a merely for a self-interested purpose.
duty, and besides everyone also has an immediate On the other hand, to preserve your life is a duty,
inclination for it. But, on account of this, the often and everyone also has an immediate inclination to do
anxious care, which the greatest part of human beings this. But, because of this inclination, the often anxious
takes of it, still has no inner worth, and its maxim care that most of the human race has for life is an
no moral content. They preserve their lives to be sure anxious care that still has no inner worth, and their
+in conformity with duty+, maxim prescribing self-preservation has no moral content.
Their action to preserve their lives definitely +conforms
9 [4:397-398] to duty+,
[Scholar Translation: Orr] 9 [4:397-398]
[Student Translation: Orr]
Groundlaying · First Section · emended 1786 2nd ed. Groundlaying · First Section · emended 1786 2nd edition
but not +from duty+. On the other hand, if adversities but it is not done +from duty+. By contrast, when adversities
and hopeless sorrow have completely taken away the and hopeless sorrow have completely taken away the
taste for life; if the unhappy one, strong of soul, zest for living, when the unhappy person, strong of
more angered over his fate than despondent or soul, angered over her fate more than faint-hearted
dejected, wishes for death and yet preserves his life or dejected, wishes for death and yet preserves her
without loving it, not from inclination or fear, but life without loving it, not from inclination or fear,
from duty; then his maxim has a moral content. but from duty, then her maxim has moral content.
To be beneficent, where one can, is a duty, and To be beneficent where you can is a duty and there are
besides there are many so compassionately attuned also many souls so compassionately disposed that they
souls that they, even without another motive of vanity find an inner satisfaction in spreading joy around
or of self-interest, find an inner pleasure in them and can take delight in the satisfaction of others
spreading joy around themselves, and who can take so far as it is their work. These compassionately attuned
delight in the satisfaction of others, so far as it is souls even experience this inner satisfaction without
their work. But I maintain that in such a case, action any motive of vanity or usefulness to themselves. But
of this kind, however in conformity with duty, however I maintain that in such cases an action of this kind,
kind it is, nevertheless has no true moral worth, but however much it may conform to duty, however kind it
is on a level with other inclinations, e.g. with the may be, nevertheless has no true moral worth. Instead,
inclination for honor, which, if it luckily hits on actions of this kind are on a par with other inclinations,
what in fact is generally good and in conformity with for example, with the inclination to honor. This inclination
duty, therefore honorable, deserves praise and to honor, when it is lucky enough to hit what is generally
encouragement, but not high esteem; for the maxim useful and in line with duty, and is therefore worthy
lacks moral content, namely to do such actions not of honor, deserves praise and encouragement, but not
from inclination, but +from duty+. Granted, then, that esteem. For the maxim lacks moral content, namely,
the mind of that friend of the human being were to do such actions not from inclination, but rather
clouded over by its own sorrow, which extinguishes all +from duty+. Granted, then, that the mind of that friend
of the human being were clouded by its own sorrow,
10 [4:398] which extinguishes all
[Scholar Translation: Orr] 10 [4:398]
[Student Translation: Orr]
Groundlaying · First Section · emended 1786 2nd ed. Groundlaying · First Section · emended 1786 2nd edition
compassion for the fate of others, he still had power compassion for the fate of others. Suppose she still
to benefit other sufferers, but foreign need did not had the power to benefit others who are suffering,
move him because he is sufficiently occupied with his but that strangers in need did not move her because
own, and now, since no inclination incites him further she is sufficiently occupied with her own needs. And
to it, he nevertheless tears himself from out of this now she still rips — since no inclination prods her
deadly insensibility and does the action without any to it — herself out of this deadly insensitivity and
inclination, merely from duty, then it has for the does the action without any inclination, merely from
first time its genuine moral worth. Further still: if duty. Then her action has for the first time its genuine
nature had generally put little sympathy in the heart moral worth. Suppose further still: if nature had put
of this or that one, if he (after all an honest man) very little sympathy in the heart of this or that person,
were of cold temperament and indifferent toward the if she (after all an honest person) were of cold temperament
sufferings of others, perhaps because he, himself and indifferent — perhaps, because she herself is equipped
equipped against his own with the special gift of with the special gift of patience and enduring strength
patience and enduring strength, also presupposes, or against her own suffering, she presumes or even demands
even demands, the same with every other; if nature had the same in the case of every other person — toward
not formed such a man (which truly would not be its the sufferings of others, if nature had not exactly
worst product) properly into a friend of the human formed such a person (who truly would not be nature's
being, would he then not still in himself find a worst product) to be a friend of human beings, would
source to give himself a far higher worth than that of she not still find in herself a source that would give
a good-natured temperament might be? Certainly! just herself a worth far higher than might be the worth
there commences the worth of character that is moral of a good-natured temperament? Certainly! It is precisely
and without any comparison the highest, namely that he here that the worth of character begins, a worth that
is beneficent, not from inclination, but from duty. is moral and above all comparison the highest. In particular,
To secure one's own happiness is a duty (at least that worth begins in that she is beneficent, not from
indirect), for the lack of satisfaction inclination, but from duty.
To secure your own happiness is a duty (at least an
11 [4:398-399] indirect duty), for the lack of satisfaction
[Scholar Translation: Orr] 11 [4:398-399]
[Student Translation: Orr]
Groundlaying · First Section · emended 1786 2nd ed. Groundlaying · First Section · emended 1786 2nd edition
with one's condition in a crowd of many worries and in with your condition, in a crowd of many worries and
the midst of unsatisfied needs could easily become a in the middle of unsatisfied needs, could easily become
great +temptation to transgression of duties+. But, a great +temptation to the transgression of duties+.
even without looking here upon duty, all human beings But, even without looking at duty here, all human beings
have already of themselves the most powerful and most already have of themselves the most powerful and most
intimate inclination to happiness, because just in intimate inclination for happiness, because precisely
this idea all inclinations unite themselves into a in this idea of happiness all inclinations are united
sum. Only the prescription of happiness is for the into a collection. But the prescription of happiness
most part so constituted that it greatly infringes is for the most part constituted in such a way that
some inclinations and yet the human being itself can the prescription greatly infringes on some inclinations,
make no determinate and secure concept of the sum of and yet the human being can formulate no definite and
satisfaction of all under the name of happiness; hence secure concept of the collective satisfaction of all
it is not to be wondered how a single inclination, inclinations, which goes by the name of happiness.
determinate in view of what it promises and of the It should come as no surprise, then, how a single inclination — which
time in which its satisfaction can be received, can specifies what it promises and the time within which
outweigh a wavering idea, and the human being, e.g. a its satisfaction can be felt — might be able to outweigh
gouty one, can choose to enjoy what tastes good to a wavering idea. For example, a person suffering from
him, and to suffer what he is able to, because he, gout might be able to choose to eat or drink what tastes
according to his rough calculation, here at least has good to her and to suffer the consequences because
not destroyed for himself the enjoyment of the present she, according to her way of calculating the costs
moment through perhaps groundless expectations of a and benefits in this case at least, does not miss out
happiness that is to be put in health. But also in on a present enjoyment through a perhaps groundless
this case, when the general inclination to happiness expectation of a happiness that is supposed to be found
does not determine his will, when health for him at in health. But even in this case, if the universal
least in this rough calculation was not so necessary a inclination to happiness does not control her will,
part, there in this way still remains here as in all if health for her at least is not so necessary in her
other cases a law, namely to calculations of costs and benefits, then there remains
in this case, as in all other cases, a law, namely,
12 [4:399] to promote her happiness
[Scholar Translation: Orr] 12 [4:399]
[Student Translation: Orr]
Groundlaying · First Section · emended 1786 2nd ed. Groundlaying · First Section · emended 1786 2nd edition
promote his happiness, not from inclination, but from not from inclination but from duty. And then her conduct,
duty, and there has his conduct first of all the for the first time, has genuine moral worth.
proper moral worth. No doubt, it is also in this way that we are to understand
In this way we are without doubt also to the scriptural passages in which we are commanded to
understand the scriptural passages in which it is love our neighbor and even to love our enemy. For love
commanded to love one's neighbor, even our enemy. For as an inclination cannot be commanded. But beneficence
love as inclination cannot be commanded, but from duty itself, even if no inclination at all drives
beneficence from duty itself, though no inclination at us to it — indeed, even if natural and invincible disinclination
all drives to it, indeed even quite natural and stands against us — is +practical+ and not +pathological+
invincible disinclination opposes, is +practical+ and love. This practical love lies in the will and not
not +pathological+ love, which lies in the will and in tendency to feeling, lies in basic principles of
not in the propensity of feeling, in ground action and not in melting compassion. This practical
propositions of action and not melting compassion; the love alone can be commanded.
former alone, however, can be commanded. The second proposition is this: an action done from
The second proposition is: an action from duty duty has its moral worth +not in the purpose+ which
has its moral worth +not in the purpose+ which is to is to be achieved by performing the action, but rather
be reached by it, but in the maxim according to which in the maxim according to which the action is decided
it is decided, depends thus not on the actuality of upon. So the worth of such an action depends not on
the object of the action, but merely on the the actuality of the object of the action but only
+principle+ of +willing+, according to which the on the +principle+ of +willing+ according to which
action is done irrespective of any objects of the the action, regardless of any objects of the faculty
faculty of desire. That the purposes which we may have of desire, is done. It is clear from what I have already
in actions, and their effects, as ends and incentives said that the purposes which we may have in our actions,
of the will, can give the actions no unconditional and and the effects of our actions, as ends or goals and
moral worth, is clear from the foregoing. In what, incentives of the will, can give no unconditional and
therefore, can this worth lie, if it is not moral worth to the actions. Where, then, can this worth
be located, if it is not
13 [4:399-400]
13 [4:399-400]
[Scholar Translation: Orr]
[Student Translation: Orr]
Groundlaying · First Section · emended 1786 2nd ed. Groundlaying · First Section · emended 1786 2nd edition
to be in the will, in reference to the hoped-for to be found in the will, in the will's relation to the
effect of them? It can lie nowhere else +than in the hoped-for effect of the actions? The worth can be located
principle of the will+ irrespective of the ends which nowhere else +than in the principle of the will+, regardless
can be effected through such action; for the will is of the ends that can be brought about by such action.
right in the middle between its principle a priori, For the will stands, so to speak, at a crossroads right
which is formal, and between its incentive a in the middle between its principle a priori, which
posteriori, which is material, as if at a crossroads, is formal, and between its motive a posteriori, which
and since it must still be determined by something, it is material. Since the will must still be controlled
must be determined by the formal principle of willing by something, it must be guided by the formal principle
in general, if an action is done from duty, since of willing in general when an action is done from duty,
every material principle has been withdrawn from it. because every material principle has been removed from
The third proposition, as a consequence from both the will.
previous, I would express in this way: +duty is the I would express the third proposition, which is a consequence
necessity of an action from respect for the law+. For of the previous two, in this way: +duty is the necessity
an object as an effect of my intended action I can, to of an action out of respect for the law+. I can of
be sure, have an +inclination+, but +never respect+, course have an +inclination+ for an object as an effect
just because it is merely an effect and not activity of my intended action, but I can +never+ have +respect+
of a will. Just in this way I cannot have respect for for such an object precisely because the object is
inclination in general, whether it be mine or that of merely an effect and not the activity of a will. Likewise,
another, I can at most in the first case approve it, I cannot have respect for inclination in general, whether
in the second sometimes even love, i.e. view it as it is my own inclination or someone else's. With an
favorable to my own advantage. Only that which merely inclination of my own, I can at most approve of it;
as ground, never however as effect, is connected with regarding others' inclinations, I can sometimes even
my will, which does not serve my inclination but love them, that is, view their inclinations as favorable
outweighs it, at least completely excludes this from to my own self-interest. But only something that is
rough calculation of them connected to my will merely as a ground, never as an
effect, something that does not serve my inclination
14 [4:400] but instead outweighs it — something at least that
wholly excludes inclination
[Scholar Translation: Orr]
14 [4:400]
[Student Translation: Orr]
Groundlaying · First Section · emended 1786 2nd ed. Groundlaying · First Section · emended 1786 2nd edition
during the choice, therefore the mere law for itself, from rough-and-ready decisions about what choices to
can be an object of respect and along with this a make — and therefore only something that is the mere
command. Now an action from duty should wholly detach law itself, can be an object of respect and thus a
from the influence of inclination and with it each command. Now an action from duty is to be detached
object of the will, thus nothing remains over for the completely from the influence of inclination and along
will, which might be able to determine it, except with inclination from every object of the will. So
objectively the +law+ and subjectively +pure respect+ nothing that could control the will remains except
for this practical law, therefore the maxim*) of objectively the +law+ and subjectively +pure respect+
obeying such a law, even with the thwarting of all my for this practical law. And so all that remains to
inclinations. guide the will is the maxim* of obeying such a law,
Thus the moral worth of the action lies not in even if this obedience involves dialing back all my
the effect which is expected from it, nor, therefore, inclinations.
in some principle of the action, which needs to borrow So the moral worth of an action does not lie in the
its motive from this expected effect. For all these effect that is expected from the action; nor, therefore,
effects (pleasantness of one's condition, indeed even is the moral worth of an action in some principle of
promotion of the happiness of strangers) were also action which has to get its motivating ground from
able to be brought into existence through other this expected effect. For all these effects (pleasantness
causes, and therefore there was for this no need for of your condition, and even the promotion of the happiness
the will of a rational being, in which however the of others) can also be brought about by other causes,
highest and unconditional good alone can be found. and so the will of a rational being is not needed,
Nothing other, therefore, than the +representation of even though it is only in a rational being that the
the law+ in itself, +which+ highest and unconditional good can be found. So nothing
but the intellectual +representation of the law+ in
*) A +maxim+ is the subjective principle of itself, +which of+
willing; the objective principle (i.e. that
one which would serve all rational beings * A +maxim+ is the subjective principle of
also subjectively as a practical principle, willing; the objective principle is the practical
if reason had complete power over the faculty +law+. (That is, the objective principle
of desire) is the practical +law+. is the practical principle that would serve
all rational beings as a subjective principle,
15 [4:400-401] too, if reason had full control over the
faculty of desire.)
[Scholar Translation: Orr]
15 [4:400-401]
[Student Translation: Orr]
Groundlaying · First Section · emended 1786 2nd ed. Groundlaying · First Section · emended 1786 2nd edition
+of course only occurs in a rational being+, so far as +course can only be found in a rational being+, so far
it, not however the hoped-for effect, is the ground of as this representation or thought, and not the expected
determination of the will, can constitute the so effect of the action, is the controlling motivational
pre-eminent good which we call moral, which is already ground of the will, can constitute the pre-eminent
present in the person itself who acts accordingly, and good which we call moral. This pre-eminent moral good
does not first need to be waited for from the is already present in the person who acts according
effect.*) to the representation of the law in itself, and this
moral good does not need to wait for the expected effect
*) One could reproach me, as if I sought behind of the action in order to become good.*
the word +respect+ only refuge in an obscure
feeling, instead of giving to the question * You could object that by using the word
clear information through a concept of reason. "+respect+" I am only seeking to escape in
But although respect is a feeling, so is an obscure feeling instead of bringing clarity
it still not one through influence +received+, to the question through a concept of reason.
but a +self-woven+ feeling received through But although respect is a feeling, it is
a rational concept and therefore specifically not a feeling +received+ by influence. Instead,
different from all feelings of the first respect is a feeling +self-woven+ through
kind, which let themselves be reduced to a rational concept. The feeling of respect,
inclination or fear. What I immediately cognize therefore, is specifically different from
for myself as law, I cognize with respect, all feelings of the kind received by influence,
which merely means the consciousness of the which reduce to inclination or fear. What
+subordination+ of my will under a law, without I immediately cognize or intellectually apprehend
mediation of other influences on my sense. as a law for myself, I cognize with respect,
The immediate determination of the will through which just signifies the consciousness of
the law and the consciousness of it is called the +subordination+ of my will to a law,
+respect+, so that this is looked at as an without the mediation of other influences
+effect+ of the law on the subject and not on my sense. The immediate or direct determination
as a +cause+ of it. Respect is properly the of the will by the law and the consciousness
representation of a worth that infringes of that subordination is called +respect+.
on my self-love. Thus it is something which So respect, this awareness of the will's
is considered neither as an object of inclination, being guided by the law, must be thought
nor of fear, although it has something analogous of as an +effect+ of the law on a person
with both at the same time. The +object+ and not as a +cause+ of the law. Respect
of respect is therefore only the +law+ and is actually the representation of a worth
to be sure that one which we impose on +ourselves+ that does damage to my self-love. So respect
and yet as in itself necessary. As a law is something that is considered neither to
we are subject to it without consulting self-love; be an object of inclination nor an object
as imposed by us on ourselves, it is still of fear, although it has something analogous
a consequence of our will and has in the to both at the same time. The +object+ of
first respect analogy with fear, in the second respect is therefore only the +law+ and indeed
with inclination. that law which we ourselves impose on +ourselves+
and yet which is necessary in itself. Considered
16 [4:401] as a law, we are subject to this object of
respect without consulting self-love; as
[Scholar Translation: Orr] self-imposed, this object is nevertheless
a consequence of our will. Viewing it in
the first way, as a law, the object is analogous
to fear; viewing it in the second way, as
self-imposed, the object is analogous to
inclination.
16 [4:401]
[Student Translation: Orr]
Groundlaying · First Section · emended 1786 2nd ed. Groundlaying · First Section · emended 1786 2nd edition
What kind of law though can that really be, whose But what kind of law can that really be, the representation
representation, even without taking notice of the of which — without even taking into consideration the
expected effect from it, must determine the will, so expected effect from the action — must guide the will
that this absolutely and without limitation can be so that the will can be called absolutely good without
called good? Since I have robbed the will of any qualification? Since I have robbed the will of any
impulses which could spring up for it from the impulse that could arise from the will by following
following of some law, in this way nothing remains any law, nothing remains except the universal conformity
over except the universal conformity to law of actions of actions to law in general; this universal conformity
in general, which alone is to serve the will as a is to serve the will as a principle. That is, I ought
principle, i.e. I ought never act other than in this never act except in this way: +that I could also will
way, +that I can also will, my maxim should become a that my maxim should become a universal law+. Here
universal law+. Here is now the mere conformity to law now is the mere conformity to law in general (without
in general (without laying as ground some law making a law for specific actions a ground) that serves
determined for certain actions) which serves the will the will as its principle and even must serve it as
as a principle and must also serve it in that way if its principle if duty is not to be everywhere an unfounded
duty is not to be everywhere an empty illusion and delusion and chimerical concept. In its judgments about
chimerical concept; common human reason also agrees what to do, ordinary human reason agrees completely
with this completely in its practical judgment and has with this principle and always has the principle in
the aforesaid principle always before its eyes. view.
All respect for a person is actually only All respect for a person is actually only
respect for the law (of integrity etc.), respect for the law (of integrity, etc.)
of which that one gives us the example. Because of which the person provides us with an example.
we view enlargement of our talents also as Because we look at the development of our
a duty, we conceive of a person of talents talents as a duty, we conceive of a person
also as, so to speak, the +example of a law+ who has talents as, so to speak, an +example
(to become like it in this through practice), of a law+ and that conception constitutes
and that constitutes our respect. All so-called our respect. All so-called moral +interest+
moral +interest+ consists simply in the +respect+ consists simply in +respect+ for the law.
for the law.
17 [4:402]
17 [4:402]
[Scholar Translation: Orr]
[Student Translation: Orr]
Groundlaying · First Section · emended 1786 2nd ed. Groundlaying · First Section · emended 1786 2nd edition
The question is e.g. may I, when I am in The question might be, for instance, the following.
distress, not make a promise with the intention not to When I am in a tight spot, may I not make a promise
keep it? I make here easily the distinction, which the with the intention of not keeping it? I easily make
meaning of the question can have, whether it is here the difference in meaning that the question can
prudent, or whether it is in conformity with duty, to have: whether it is prudent, or whether it is in accord
make a false promise. The first can without doubt with duty, to make a false promise. There is no doubt
often occur. To be sure, I well see that it is not that making a false promise can often be prudent. Indeed,
enough to pull myself by means of this excuse out of a I see very well that it is not enough that I extricate
present embarrassment, but must be well weighed, myself from a present embarrassment by means of this
whether for me out of this lie not afterwards much excuse. Instead, I must consider carefully whether
greater inconvenience can spring up than those are from this lie far greater trouble than the trouble
from which I now set myself free, and, since the from which I now set myself free might not arise for
consequences with all my supposed +slyness+ are not so me afterwards. And, since the consequences of all my
easy to predict, that a once lost trust could not for supposed +slyness+ are not so easy to predict and that
me become far more disadvantageous than all the a trust once lost could be far more disadvantageous
trouble that I now intend to avoid, whether it is not to me than any evil that I now intend to avoid, I must
+more prudently+ handled, to proceed in this according also consider whether it might be +more prudently+
to a universal maxim and to make it my habit to handled to act in this matter according to a universal
promise nothing except with the intention to keep it. maxim and to make it a habit to promise nothing except
But it is soon clear to me here that such a maxim with the intention of keeping the promise. But after
still always only has anxious consequences as ground. considering these possibilities, it soon becomes clear
Now, it is surely something completely different to be to me that such a prudential maxim would only be based
truthful from duty than from fear of disadvantageous on the fear of consequences. Now it is certainly something
consequences; since in the first case the concept of quite different to be truthful from duty than to be
the action in itself already contains a law for me, in truthful out of fear of disadvantageous consequences.
the second I first of all must look around elsewhere For, in the case of being truthful from duty, the concept
which effects for me might probably of the action in itself already contains a law for
me. In the case of being truthful out of fear, I must
18 [4:402] first look around elsewhere for the effects on me which
are likely
[Scholar Translation: Orr]
18 [4:402]
[Student Translation: Orr]
Groundlaying · First Section · emended 1786 2nd ed. Groundlaying · First Section · emended 1786 2nd edition
be connected with it. For if I deviate from the to be connected with the action. For, if I deviate from
principle of duty, then it is quite certainly bad; if the principle of duty, then it is quite certainly bad.
I, however, desert my maxim of prudence, then that can If, however, I desert my maxim of prudence, then that
yet sometimes be very advantageous for me, although it can sometimes be very advantageous to me, although
of course is safer to stay with it. In order however it is of course safer to stay with the maxim of prudence.
to instruct myself in view of the answer to this But, in order to inform myself, in the shortest and
problem, whether a lying promise is in conformity with yet least deceptive way, of the answer to this problem
duty, in the very shortest and yet infallible way, I of whether a lying promise conforms to duty, I ask
then ask myself: would I really be content that my myself the following. Would I be quite content that
maxim (to extricate myself from embarrassment by means my maxim (to extricate myself from an embarrassment
of an untrue promise) should hold as a universal law by means of an untruthful promise) should hold as a
(just as much for me as others), and would I really be universal law (for me as well as for others) and would
able to say to myself: everyone may make an untrue I be well able to say to myself that everyone may make
promise when he finds himself in embarrassment from an untruthful promise when she finds herself in an
which he cannot extricate himself in another way? In embarrassment from which she cannot escape in any other
this way I soon become aware that I, to be sure, can way? I soon become aware that I can indeed will the
will the lie but not at all a universal law to lie; lie but that I definitely cannot will a universal law
for according to such a one there would properly be no to lie. I cannot will a universal law to lie, for according
promising at all, because it would be futile to to such a law there would actually be no promise at
profess my will in view of my future actions to all. There would actually be no promise because it
others, who would surely not believe this pretense, would be pointless to pass off my intentions regarding
or, if they in an over-hasty way did believe it, would my future actions to others who would certainly not
surely pay me back in like coin, and therefore my believe this pretence or who, if they did rashly believe
maxim, as soon as it were made into a universal law, it, would certainly pay me back in like coin. My maxim,
would have to destroy itself. therefore, as soon as it became a universal law, would
What I therefore have to do, in order that my have to destroy itself.
willing is morally good, for that I do not at all need What I therefore have to do so that my willing is morally
far-reaching good requires no far-reaching
19 [4:402-403] 19 [4:402-403]
[Scholar Translation: Orr] [Student Translation: Orr]
Groundlaying · First Section · emended 1786 2nd ed. Groundlaying · First Section · emended 1786 2nd edition
sagacity. Inexperienced in view of the course of the acuteness. Inexperienced as to how the world operates,
world, incapable of being prepared myself for all its incapable of preparing myself for any events that might
incidents that might happen, I ask myself only: can occur in the world, I only ask myself: can you also
you also will that your maxim become a universal law? will that your maxim become a universal law? If the
If not, then it is objectionable and that, to be sure, maxim cannot become a universal law, then the maxim
not because of an impending disadvantage to you or is objectionable. It is objectionable not because it
even others from it, but because it cannot fit as a presents an impending disadvantage to you or even to
principle in a possible universal lawgiving; for this, others; instead, the maxim is objectionable because
however, reason forcibly obtains from me immediate it cannot fit as a principle into a possible universal
respect, of which I, to be sure, now do not yet lawgiving. Reason compels respect from me for this
+discern+ upon what it is grounded (which the universal lawgiving. I certainly do not yet +see+ on
philosopher may investigate), at least, however, still what the respect is based (a topic which the philosopher
this much understand: that it is an estimation of may investigate), but I at least understand this much:
worth which far outweighs all worth of that which is respect is the estimation of a worth that outweighs
praised by inclination, and that the necessity of my all the worth of anything that inclination praises,
actions from +pure+ respect for the practical law is and the necessity of my actions from +pure+ respect
that which constitutes duty, to which every other for the practical law is what constitutes duty, and
motive must yield because it is the condition of a every motivating ground must yield to duty because
will good +in itself+, whose worth exceeds everything. duty is the condition of a will good +in itself+ and
In this way, then, we have reached in the moral whose worth exceeds the worth of everything else.
cognition of common human reason up to its principle, We have, then, in the moral knowledge of common human
which it certainly of course does not conceive in such reason, arrived at its principle. Common human reason
way separated off in a universal form, but still of course does not abstractly think of this principle
always actually has before eyes and uses as the in such a universal form, but it does actually always
standard of its judgement. It would be easy to show have the principle before its eyes and uses the principle
here how as the standard for its judgment. It would be easy
to show here how
20 [4:403-404]
20 [4:403-404]
[Scholar Translation: Orr]
[Student Translation: Orr]
Groundlaying · First Section · emended 1786 2nd ed. Groundlaying · First Section · emended 1786 2nd edition
it, with this compass in hand, in all occurring cases common human reason, with this compass in hand, very
knows very well how to distinguish what is good, what well knows in all cases that it encounters how to distinguish
bad, conformable to duty, or contrary to duty, if one, what is good, what is bad, what conforms to duty, or
without teaching it in the least something new, only what is contrary to duty. If only we, as Socrates did,
makes it, as Socrates did, attentive to its own draw its attention to its own principle, common human
principle, and that it thus requires no science and reason can make these distinctions without our having
philosophy in order to know what one has to do so as to teach it anything new. So there is, in order to
to be honest and good, yes, and what is more, so as to know what you have to do in order to be honest and
be wise and virtuous. It might also well in advance good — or even to be wise and virtuous — no need for
have already been supposed that the knowledge of what science and philosophy. It might even have been supposed
to do, and therefore also to know, incumbent on each well in advance that the knowledge that is incumbent
human being would also be the concern of each, even of on everyone — knowledge of what to do and therefore
the most common human being. Here one surely cannot of what to know — would be the concern of everyone,
look without admiration at it, how the practical even the concern of the most ordinary human being.
faculty of judgment has so very great an advantage It is at this point that you have to look with admiration
over the theoretical in common human understanding. In at how the power of practical judgment has an advantage
the latter, when common reason dares to depart from over the theoretical in ordinary human understanding.
the laws of experience and the perceptions of sense, In theoretical matters, when ordinary reason dares
it gets into nothing but incomprehensibilities and to depart from the laws of experience and the perceptions
contradictions with itself, at least into a chaos of of sense, it gets into nothing but incomprehensibilities
uncertainty, obscurity and instability. In the and contradictions with itself. At the very least,
practical, however, the power of judgment then for when ordinary reason dares to make these departures,
just the first time begins to show itself really to it gets into a chaos of uncertainty, obscurity, and
advantage when common understanding excludes all instability. But in practical matters, it is just when
sensuous incentives from practical laws. It becomes ordinary understanding excludes all sensuous motives
then even subtle, whether it be that it quibbles with for practical laws that the power of judgment first
its conscience or other claims in reference to what is begins to show itself to advantage. When ordinary understanding
to be called right, or makes these exclusions it even becomes subtle, whether
it be in quibbling with its conscience or with other
21 [4:404] claims in reference to what is to be called right or
[Scholar Translation: Orr] 21 [4:404]
[Student Translation: Orr]
Groundlaying · First Section · emended 1786 2nd ed. Groundlaying · First Section · emended 1786 2nd edition
also wants sincerely to determine the worth of actions whether it be in wanting correctly to determine the
for its own instruction, and what is the most, it can worth of actions for its own instruction. But what
itself have in the latter case just as good hope to is most remarkable is that, in determining the worth
hit it right as a philosopher might ever promise, yes of actions, ordinary understanding can have just as
is almost still more secure in this than even the good a hope of getting it right as a philosopher herself
latter, because this one has still no other principle can ever promise. In fact, ordinary understanding is
than that one, but can easily confuse his judgment almost more secure in determining the worth of actions
through a crowd of foreign considerations not than the philosopher because the philosopher can have
belonging to the matter, and can make it diverge from no other principle than the principle that ordinary
the straight direction. Would it, accordingly, not be understanding has and because the philosopher's judgment
more advisable in moral things to rest satisfied with can easily be confused by a crowd of extraneous considerations
common rational judgment and at most only to bring in not pertinent to the matter at hand and can be diverted
philosophy in order to present the system of morals from the right direction. Would it not, accordingly,
the more completely and comprehensibly, also to be more advisable in moral matters to rest content
present its rules more conveniently for use (but still with ordinary rational judgment? Would it not be more
more for disputation), not however in order even for advisable to bring in philosophy at most only in order
practical purpose to divert common human understanding to present the system of morals more completely and
from its happy simplicity and to bring it through more comprehensibly? Would it not be more advisable
philosophy to a new way of investigation and to bring in philosophy only so that it can present
instruction? the system's rules in a way more convenient for their
There is a magnificent thing about innocence, use (especially in disputation)? And would it not be
only it is also in turn very bad that it does not let less advisable, for practical purposes, to allow philosophy
itself be preserved well and is easily led astray. For to drag ordinary human understanding away from its
this reason even wisdom — which otherwise consists happy simplicity and to put the understanding on a
perhaps more in doing and letting than in new path of investigation and instruction?
knowing — still also requires science, not in Innocence is a magnificent thing, but it is also very
order to learn from it, but bad in that it cannot be easily preserved and can easily
be misled. Because of these deficiencies, even wisdom — which
22 [4:404-405] otherwise perhaps consists more in doing and letting
than in knowing — still requires science, not in order
[Scholar Translation: Orr] to learn from science, but rather
22 [4:404-405]
[Student Translation: Orr]
Groundlaying · First Section · emended 1786 2nd ed. Groundlaying · First Section · emended 1786 2nd edition
to gain admittance and permanence for its to gain accessibility and permanence for wisdom's prescriptions.
prescription. The human being feels in itself a The human being feels in itself a powerful counterweight
powerful counterweight to all commands of duty, which to all commands of duty, commands which reason represents
reason represents to it as so worthy of high respect, to the human being as so worthy of great respect. This
in its needs and inclinations, the complete counterweight is the needs and inclinations of the
satisfaction of which it embraces under the name of human being, and the whole satisfaction of its needs
happiness. Now reason commands its prescriptions and inclinations is included under the name of happiness.
unrelentingly, yet without in so doing promising Now reason's prescriptions are commanded without apology
something to the inclinations and therefore, as it and without a promise of anything to the inclinations.
were, with neglect and disregard of those so impulsive Reason therefore commands, so to speak, dismissively
and yet so apparently reasonable claims (which will be and with no regard for those claims that are so impulsive
neutralized by no command). Out of this arises, and yet that appear so reasonable (and which can be
however, a +natural dialectic+, i.e., a propensity to willed away by no command). From this, however, a +natural
reason speciously against those strict laws of duty dialectic+ arises, that is, a tendency to rant about
and to cast into doubt their validity, at least their those strict laws of duty and to cast doubt on the
purity and strictness, and where possible to make them validity — at least the purity and strictness — of
more suitable to our wishes and inclinations, i.e. to those laws and, if possible, to make the laws more
ruin them at bottom and to destroy their complete suitable to our wishes and inclinations. That is, a
dignity, which then after all even common practical tendency arises that attempts to corrupt the laws at
reason in the end cannot call good. their foundations and to destroy their dignity. The
Thus in this way +common human reason+ is driven, result of this natural dialectic, then, is something
not through some need of speculation (which never that in the end even ordinary practical reason cannot
befalls it, as long as it contents itself to be merely call good.
sound reason), but from practical grounds themselves, Because of this destructive tendency of natural dialectic,
to go out of its circle and to take a step in the +ordinary human reason+ is driven to go out of its
field of a +practical philosophy+, in order there on comfort zone and to take a step into the field of +practical
behalf of the source of its principle philosophy+. Ordinary human reason is driven to this
not by some intellectual need to theorize (a need which
23 [4:405] never afflicts it so long as it is satisfied with being
merely sound reason), but instead it is driven to it
[Scholar Translation: Orr] for practical reasons. In the field of practical philosophy,
ordinary reason hopes, regarding the source of its
principle
23 [4:405]
[Student Translation: Orr]
Groundlaying · First Section · emended 1786 2nd ed. Groundlaying · First Section · emended 1786 2nd edition
and its correct determination in comparison with the and the correct determination of its principle, in contrast
maxims which base themselves on need and inclination, with the maxims or principles that rest on need and
to get information and clear instruction so that it inclination, to receive information and clear instruction.
escapes from the embarrassment of double-sided claims Having received these, ordinary reason can perhaps
and does not run a risk, through the ambiguity in escape the embarrassment resulting from the flip-flopping
which it easily falls, of being deprived of all claims of dialectic and perhaps not run the risk of
genuine moral ground propositions. Thus arises just as losing all genuine moral principles in the ambiguity
much in practical common reason, when it cultivates into which ordinary reason easily slips. So there arises
itself, unnoticed a +dialectic+, which compels it to unnoticed a +dialectic+ which requires reason to seek
search for help in philosophy, as happens to it in help in philosophy. This dialectic arises just as much
theoretical use, and the first will accordingly find in practical ordinary reason, when it is cultivated,
rest, to be sure, just as little as the other anywhere as it does in the theoretical use of reason. Both uses
else than in a complete critique of our reason. of reason will therefore only find peace in a complete
critique of our reason.
____________________________
24 [4:405] _____________________________
[Scholar Translation: Orr] 24 [4:405]
[Student Translation: Orr]
Groundlaying · Second Section · emended 1786 2nd ed. Groundlaying · Second Section · emended 1786 2nd edition
++Second Section.++ ++Second Section.++
++Transition++ ++Transition++
+from popular moral philosophy+ +from popular moral philosophy+
++to the++ ++to the++
++metaphysics of morals.++ ++metaphysics of morals.++
If we have drawn our previous concept of duty from the Even if we have drawn our previous concept of duty from
common use of our practical reason, there is from that the ordinary use of our practical reason, this is no
no way to conclude, as if we had treated it as a reason to conclude that we have treated the concept
concept of experience. On the contrary, if we attend of duty as a concept of experience. Rather, when we
to the experience of the doing and letting of human pay attention to the experience of the way human beings
beings, we encounter frequent and, as we ourselves act and fail to act, we encounter frequent and, as
admit, just complaints that, of the disposition to act we ourselves admit, justified complaints that no one
from pure duty, one can adduce in this way not any can provide a sure example of the disposition to act
sure examples at all, that, although many a thing, from pure duty. There are also justified complaints
which +duty+ commands, may happen +accordingly+, that even though much of what +duty+ commands may be
nevertheless it is always still doubtful whether it done +according+ to duty, it is always still doubtful
actually happens +from duty+ and hence has a moral whether what is done really is done +from duty+ and
worth. Hence in every epoch there have been so has moral worth. Because of complaints like these,
philosophers who have absolutely denied the actuality there have always been philosophers who have absolutely
of this disposition in human actions and have denied the reality of this disposition in human actions
attributed everything to a more or less refined and who have attributed everything to a more or less
self-love, without yet on this account bringing the refined self-love. These philosophers nevertheless
correctness of the concept of morality into doubt, do not call into question the correctness of the concept
rather mentioned with intimate regret the frailty and of morality. Rather, with heartfelt regret for the
impurity of human nature, which to be sure is noble frailty and impurity of human nature, these philosophers
enough make mention of a human nature which, though definitely
noble enough
25 [4:406]
25 [4:406]
[Scholar Translation: Orr]
[Student Translation: Orr]
Groundlaying · Second Section · emended 1786 2nd ed. Groundlaying · Second Section · emended 1786 2nd edition
to make itself an idea so worthy of respect into its to make an idea so worthy of respect into its prescription,
prescription, but at the same time too weak so as to is at the same time too weak to follow the prescription.
follow it, and uses reason, which was to serve it for So, instead of serving this human nature for lawgiving,
lawgiving, only in order to provide for the interest reason only serves it in order to provide for the interest
of inclinations, whether it be singly or, at the most, of inclinations, whether providing for the inclinations
in their greatest compatibility with one another. individually or at most for their greatest compatibility
In fact it is absolutely impossible to make out with each other.
through experience with complete certainty a single In fact, it is absolutely impossible to find with certainty
case in which the maxim of an action otherwise in through experience a single case in which the maxim
accordance with duty has rested solely on moral of an action that is otherwise in accord with duty
grounds and on the representation of one's duty. For has rested only on moral grounds and on the representation
it is indeed occasionally the case that we meet by the of a person's duty. For it is certainly sometimes the
most acute self-examination nothing at all, except the case that the most thorough self-examination does not
moral ground of duty, which could have been mighty turn up anything, except the moral ground of duty,
enough to move us to this or that good action and to that could have been strong enough to move us to do
such great sacrifice; from this, however, it cannot at this or that good action and to move us to make such
all with certainty be concluded that actually the a great sacrifice. It cannot, however, be safely concluded
slightest secret impulse of self-love under the mere from this unsuccessful self-examination that there
pretense of that idea was not the actual determining really is no hidden impulse of self-love which, under
cause of the will, for on behalf of it we gladly the mere guise of that idea of duty, really was the
flatter ourselves with a nobler motive falsely claimed determining cause of the will. Because of this self-love,
for ourselves, in fact, however, even through the masquerading as duty, we then gladly flatter ourselves
strictest examination, can never completely get behind with a nobler motive which we falsely claim for ourselves.
the secret incentives, because, when the discussion is But, in fact, we can never, even through the most strenuous
about moral worth, it does not depend on the actions examination, fully get behind the hidden incentives
which one sees, but on those inner principles of them, because, when the issue is about moral worth, what
which one does not see. matters are not the actions that you see but rather
the inner principles that you do not see.
26 [4:406-407]
26 [4:406-407]
[Scholar Translation: Orr]
[Student Translation: Orr]
Groundlaying · Second Section · emended 1786 2nd ed. Groundlaying · Second Section · emended 1786 2nd edition
One can also for those, who laugh at all morality There are some people who ridicule all morality as a
as a mere phantom of a human imagination stepping over mere mental fantasy of a human imagination super-sized
itself through self-conceit, not do a more wished-for through its own boasting. You cannot do a greater service
service than to admit to them that the concepts of for such people than to admit to them that the concepts
duty (just as one gladly convinces oneself also out of of duty (just as you gladly convince yourself from
convenience that it is the case also with all other convenience that the same applies to all other concepts)
concepts) had to be drawn only from experience; for must be drawn only from experience; for by this admission
then one prepares for them a guaranteed triumph. I am you prepare for these people a guaranteed triumph.
willing to admit from love of human beings that still I am willing to admit out of a love of humankind that
most of our actions are in conformity with duty; if most of our actions are in accord with duty. But if
one looks, however, at their intentions and endeavors you look at people's intentions and endeavors more
more closely, then one everywhere comes across the closely, you will bump into the dear self everywhere;
dear self, which always stands out, on which, and not it is on this dear self, which is always popping out,
on the strict command of duty, which would again and that their intentions are based, not on the strict
again demand self-denial, their purpose is based. One command of duty. You do not need to be an enemy of
needs also not even to be an enemy of virtue, but only virtue in order to become (especially with increasing
a cold-blooded observer who does not immediately take years and a power of judgment that through experience
the liveliest wish for the good to be its actuality, has been made partly shrewder and partly more observant)
in order (especially with increasing years and a power doubtful at certain moments whether any true virtue
of judgment through experience partly grown shrewd and is really to be found in the world. To become doubtful
partly sharpened for observation) in certain moments about the reality of true virtue, you only need to
to become doubtful, whether also actually in the world be a cold-blooded observer who does not immediately
any true virtue is found. And here now nothing can take the liveliest wish for the good to be the actualization
protect us from the whole descent from our ideas of of that good. And now here nothing can protect us from
duty and preserve grounded respect for its law in the falling completely away from our ideas of duty and
soul, except the clear conviction that, even if there preserve in our soul a well-grounded respect for duty's
never have been actions, laws except the clear conviction that, even if there
never have been actions
27 [4:407]
27 [4:407]
[Scholar Translation: Orr]
[Student Translation: Orr]
Groundlaying · Second Section · emended 1786 2nd ed. Groundlaying · Second Section · emended 1786 2nd edition
which have arisen from such pure sources, nevertheless which arose from such pure sources, the question here
here also the discussion is not at all about whether is not whether this or that happens but rather whether
this or that occurs, but reason for itself and reason by itself and independently of all appearances
independently of all appearances commands what ought commands what ought to happen. Therefore, without letting
to occur, and therefore actions, of which the world up even a bit, reason still commands actions of which
perhaps has given up to now still no example at all, the world has perhaps never given an example and commands
on whose feasibility even someone who grounds actions the feasibility of which might very much be
everything on experience would very much like to doubted by someone who bases everything on experience.
doubt, nevertheless are by reason unyieldingly For example, pure honesty in friendship can no less
commanded, and that e.g. pure honesty in friendship be demanded of every human being, even if up to now
can be no less required of every human being, although there might never have been an honest friend, because
until now there might have been no honest friend at this duty — as duty in general — lies before all experience
all, because this duty as duty in general lies before in the idea of a reason that controls the will through
all experience in the idea of a reason determining the a priori grounds.
will through grounds a priori. Unless you want to deny entirely to the concept of morality
If one adds that, if one does not want to deny all truth and reference to a possible object, you must
entirely to the concept of morality all truth and allow that the law of morality is of such widespread
reference to some possible object, one cannot dispute significance that it must hold not just for human beings
that its law is of such widespread significance that but for all +rational beings in general+, not just
it must hold not only for human beings, but for all under contingent conditions and with exceptions, but
+rational beings in general+, not merely under with +absolute necessity+. Given this widespread significance
contingent conditions and with exceptions, but with and necessity, it is clear that no experience can provide
+absolute necessity+; in this way it is clear that no the occasion to infer even the possibility of such
experience can give occasion to infer to so much as absolutely necessary laws. For with what right can
even the possibility of such apodictic laws. For with we
what right can we bring that,
28 [4:407-408]
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[Student Translation: Orr]
[Scholar Translation: Orr]
Groundlaying · Second Section · emended 1786 2nd ed. Groundlaying · Second Section · emended 1786 2nd edition
which perhaps is valid only under the contingent turn something that perhaps is only valid under the
conditions of humanity, as a universal prescription contingent conditions of humanity into a universal
for every rational nature into unlimited respect, and prescription valid for every rational nature? In addition,
how should laws of the determination +of our+ will be how should laws for the determination +of our+ will
held for laws of the determination of the will of a be taken to be laws for the determination of the will
rational being in general and only as such also for of a rational being in general? And, only as laws for
those of ours, if they were merely empirical and took rational beings in general, how can they be taken to
their origin not completely a priori from pure, but be laws for us? These questions could not be answered
practical reason? if moral laws were merely empirical and did not have
One could also advise morality not more badly their origin completely a priori in pure but practical
than if one wanted to borrow it from examples. For reason.
each example of it which is represented to me must You also could not advise morality more badly than by
itself previously be judged according to principles of wanting to derive it from examples. For each example
morality, whether it is also worthy to serve as the of morality that is presented to me must itself first
original example, i.e. as the model, in no way, be judged according to principles of morality in order
however, can it provide up to topmost the concept of to see whether the example is worthy to serve as an
it. Even the Holy One of the Gospel must first be original example, that is, as a model. In no way, however,
compared with our ideal of moral perfection before one can the example provide the concept of morality at
cognizes him as such; even he says of himself: why do the highest level. Even the Holy One of the Gospel
you name me (whom you see) good, no one is good (the must first be compared with our ideal of moral perfection
archetype of the good) but the one God (whom you do before you can recognize Him as the Holy One. Even
not see). From where however have we the concept of he says of himself: why do you call me (whom you see)
God as the highest good? Only from the +idea+, which good when no one is good (the archetype of the good)
reason sketches a priori of moral perfection and except the one God (whom you do not see)? Where, though,
inseparably connects with the concept of a free will. do we get the concept of God as the highest good? We
Imitation has in the moral get it only from the +idea+ that reason sketches a
priori of moral perfection and that reason inseparably
29 [4:408-409] connects with the concept of a free will. In moral
matters, imitation has
[Scholar Translation: Orr]
29 [4:408-409]
[Student Translation: Orr]
Groundlaying · Second Section · emended 1786 2nd ed. Groundlaying · Second Section · emended 1786 2nd edition
no place at all, and examples serve only for no place at all, and examples only serve as encouragement;
encouragement, i.e. they put the practicability of that is, they put beyond doubt the practicability of
what the law commands beyond doubt, they make what the the commands of the moral law. Examples make intuitive
practical rule more generally expresses intuitive, can what the practical rule expresses more generally. But
never, however, justify setting aside their true examples can never justify setting aside their true
original that lies in reason and guiding oneself original which lies in reason and can never justify
according to examples. us in letting ourselves be guided by examples.
If there is then no genuine highest ground If, then, there is no genuine highest basic principle
proposition of morality which would not have to rest of morality, which would not have to rest independently
independently of all experience merely on pure reason, of all experience merely on pure reason, then I believe
then I believe it is not necessary so much as even to it would not even be necessary to ask whether it would
ask whether it is good to present these concepts, just be good to present these concepts in general (in the
as they, together with the principles belonging to abstract). For these concepts, together with the principles
them, are established a priori, in general (in that belong to them, are established a priori, so that
abstracto), provided that the cognition is to differ presenting them in general is unnecessary provided
from the common and is to be called philosophical. But that the knowledge of the concepts and principles is
in our times this might well be necessary. For if one to differ from common knowledge and is to be called
collected votes, whether pure rational cognition philosophical. But in our times this presentation might
separated from everything empirical, therefore well be necessary. For if you were to take a vote as
metaphysics of morals, or popular practical philosophy to whether pure rational knowledge apart from anything
is preferred, then one soon guesses on which side the empirical — and therefore metaphysics of morals — or
preponderance will fall. popular practical philosophy were preferred, you can
This condescension to folk concepts is certainly easily guess on which side the preponderance of votes
very laudable, if the ascent to the principles of pure would fall.
reason has first occurred and has been attained with This descent into folk concepts is certainly commendable
complete satisfaction, and that would mean if the ascent to the principles of pure reason has
already taken place and has been attained with complete
30 [4:409] satisfaction. A successful ascent would mean
[Scholar Translation: Orr] 30 [4:409]
[Student Translation: Orr]
Groundlaying · Second Section · emended 1786 2nd ed. Groundlaying · Second Section · emended 1786 2nd edition
+grounding+ the doctrine of morals first on +grounding+ the doctrine of morals first on metaphysics
metaphysics, obtaining for it, however, when it is and later, when it is established, providing the doctrine
established, +access+ afterwards through popularity. with +accessibility+ by popularizing it. But it is
It is, however, extremely absurd to want already to extremely silly already to want to give in to this
accede to this in the first investigation on which all crowd-pleasing popularizing in the first investigation
correctness of the ground propositions depends. Not on which all the correctness of the basic principles
only can this procedure never lay claim to the most depends. Not only can this process of popularization
rare merit of a true +philosophical popularity+, since never lay claim to the most rare merit of a true +philosophical
it is no art at all to be commonly understandable if popularity+ since it is no art at all to be understandable
one by this relinquishes all fundamental insight; in by the ordinary person if you, in the process, give
this way it produces a loathsome mish-mash of up all fundamental insight; the process of popularization
patched-together observations and half-reasoned produces a disgusting hodge-podge of mashed up observations
principles, which stale heads enjoy thoroughly, and crack-pot principles which airheads thoroughly
because it is after all something quite useful for the enjoy because it is after all something quite useful
everyday tittle-tattle, where the insightful however for everyday blathering. In contrast to the airheads,
feel confusion and, dissatisfied, yet without being those people with insight feel confused and, dissatisfied,
able to help themselves, turn away their eyes, they look away, unable to help themselves. Meanwhile,
although philosophers, who quite well see through the philosophers see quite well through the deception,
deception, find little hearing when they for a short but few people pay attention when the philosophers
time call away from the supposed popularity in order call for a suspension of the pretended popularizing
to be allowed to be rightly popular only first of all for a short time so that the philosophers may become
after acquired determinate insight. rightly popular only after first acquiring definite
One needs only look at the attempts concerning insight.
morality in that taste thought proper; in this way, You only need to look at the attempts to write about
one will soon meet with the special determination of morality in that style that is thought proper. If you
human nature (occasionally however also the idea of a do, you will sometimes find the special configuration
rational nature in general), soon perfection, soon of human nature (but sometimes also the idea of a rational
happiness, nature in general), now perfection, now happiness,
31 [4:409-410] 31 [4:409-410]
[Scholar Translation: Orr] [Student Translation: Orr]
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here moral feeling, there fear of God, some of this, here moral feeling, there the fear of God, something
some also of that, in wonderful mixture, without that of this, something of that, in a wondrous mixture.
it occurs to one to ask whether even anywhere in the All the while, it never occurs to anyone to ask whether
knowledge of human nature (which we can still only get the principles of morality are even to be looked for
from experience) the principles of morality are to be anywhere in the knowledge of human nature (which we
sought, and, if this is not so, if the latter are to can still only get from experience). It also occurs
be found completely a priori, free from everything to no one to ask whether, if the principles are not
empirical, simply in pure concepts of reason and to be found in human nature — if, instead, the principles
nowhere else not even in the least part, to form the are to be found fully a priori, free from anything
plan rather to separate off completely this empirical, simply in pure rational concepts and nowhere
examination as pure practical philosophy, or (if one else to even the slightest degree — it would be better
may use such a decried name) as metaphysics*) of to form a plan to separate off this investigation completely
morals, to bring it by itself alone to its full as pure practical philosophy or (if a name much decried
completeness and to put off the public, which demands may be used) as metaphysics* of morals. This separation
popularity, until the close of this undertaking. would allow the investigation by itself alone to be
Such a completely isolated metaphysics of morals brought to its full completeness and allow the public,
that is mixed with no anthropology, with which demands popularity, to be put off until the investigation
is finished.
*) One can, if one wants, (just as pure mathematics But a metaphysics of morals that is mixed with no anthropology,
is distinguished from the applied, pure logic with no theology,
from the applied, hence) distinguish the
pure philosophy of morals (metaphysics) from * You can, if you want, (just as pure mathematics
the applied (namely to human nature). Through is distinguished from applied mathematics,
this naming one is also at once reminded and pure logic is distinguished from applied
that the moral principles must be grounded logic, therefore) distinguish pure philosophy
not on the peculiarities of human nature, of morals (metaphysics) from applied (namely
but must be existing for themselves a priori, to human nature) philosophy of morals. By
out of such, however, as for each rational using this nomenclature, you are also reminded
nature, therefore also for the human, practical right away that moral principles must not
rules must be able to be derived. be grounded on the peculiarities of human
nature. Instead, moral principles must be
32 [4:410] a priori and independent. But, though not
grounded on human nature, the moral principles
[Scholar Translation: Orr] must still be of such a kind that it remains
possible to derive from them practical rules
for every rational nature and therefore for
human nature.
32 [4:410]
[Student Translation: Orr]
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no theology, with no physics or hyperphysics, still with no physics, or hyperphysics, still less with occult
less with hidden qualities (which one could call qualities (which you could call hypophysical), is not
hypophysical) is, however, not only an indispensable only an indispensable substrate for all securely established
substrate of all theoretical, securely determined theoretical knowledge of duties, but it is at the same
cognition of duties, but at the same time a time a metaphysics desired because of its great importance
desideratum of the highest importance for the actual for the actual fulfillment of moral prescriptions.
fulfillment of their prescriptions. For the For the representation of duty, pure and unmixed with
representation, pure and mixed with no foreign any foreign additions of empirical stimuli, and in
addition of empirical incitements, of duty and in general the representation of the moral law, has an
general of moral law has on the human heart through influence on the human heart so much more powerful
the way of reason alone (that by this first becomes than any other incentive* that you might summon up
aware that it by itself can also be practical) a so from the empirical field. The representation has this
much more powerful influence than all other influence on the heart by way of reason alone (and
incentives*) which one might summon from the empirical it is in this way that reason first becomes aware that
field that it in the consciousness of its dignity it can by itself also be practical). This influence
despises the latter and little by little can become is so strong that reason, conscious of its dignity,
their master; in place of that, a mixed doctrine of despises empirical incentives and little by little
morals, which is put together from incentives of can become their master. In place of this pure metaphysics
feelings and inclinations and at the same time from of morals, a mixed doctrine of morals, which is put
rational concepts, together from incentives of feelings and inclinations
and at the same time from rational concepts,
*) I have a letter from the deceased excellent
+Sulzer+, in which he asks me: what might * I have a letter from the late excellent
yet be the cause why the teachings of virtue, +Sulzer+. In this letter, he asks me what
howsoever much they have that is convincing the cause might be that would explain why
to reason, yet accomplish so little. My answer the teachings of virtue, however much they
was delayed through the preparation for it have that is convincing to reason, nevertheless
so as to give it whole. But it is not other accomplish so little. My answer was delayed
than that the teachers themselves have not by my preparations to make it complete. But
brought their concepts into purity, and since the answer is nothing other than that the
they want to make it too good, by this, that teachers of virtue themselves have not brought
they everywhere rummage out motives for moral their concepts into purity and have, in wanting
goodness in order to make the medicine right to make the medicine good and strong, looked
strong, they ruin it. For the commonest around everywhere for motives for moral goodness,
only to wind up spoiling the medicine. For
33 [4:410-411] the most ordinary
[Scholar Translation: Orr]
33 [4:410-411]
[Student Translation: Orr]
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must make the mind waver between motives which can be must make the mind waver between motives that cannot
brought under no principle, which only very be brought under any principle and that only coincidentally
contingently can lead to the good, more often however lead to the good and more often lead to the bad.
also to the bad. The following is evident from what has been said: that
From the foregoing it is evident: that all moral all moral concepts have their seat and origin fully
concepts have completely a priori in reason their seat a priori in reason, and this is the case in the most
and origin and this to be sure in the commonest human ordinary human reason just as it is in the case of
reason just as much as that in the highest degree a reason that is intellectually curious to the highest
speculative; that they can be abstracted from no degree; that moral concepts cannot be abstracted from
empirical and hence merely contingent cognition; that any empirical cognition and therefore from any merely
in this purity of their origin precisely lies their contingent cognition; that it is just in the purity
dignity, so as to serve us as highest practical of the origin of the moral concepts that their dignity
principles; that each time so much as one adds to serve us as the highest practical principles lies;
something empirical, so much also one subtracts from that, each time you add something empirical to the
their genuine influence and the unlimited worth of principles, you also subtract just as much from the
actions; that it not only demands the greatest genuine influence and unlimited worth of the actions
necessity in theoretical purpose, when it is merely a done from those principles; that it is not only of
matter of speculation, the greatest necessity for theoretical purposes, when
it is merely a matter of intellectual curiosity,
observation shows that, if one represents
an action of integrity, how it, separated observation shows that, if you represent an
from all intention of some advantage in this action of integrity, showing how it, separated
or another world, even under the greatest from any intention of any advantage in this
temptations of need or of enticement, was or another world, was done with a steadfast
done with steadfast soul, it leaves far behind soul even under the greatest temptation of
itself and eclipses each similar action which need or of enticement and showing how it
even in the least was affected through a leaves far behind itself and eclipses every
foreign incentive, raises the soul and arouses similar action that was affected in even
the wish also to be able to act in such a the least way by a foreign incentive, then
way. Even children of medium age feel this that representation of the action lifts the
impression, and one should also never otherwise soul and arouses the wish to be able to act
represent duties to them. in such a way, too. Even fairly young children
feel this uplifting impression, and you should
34 [4:411] never represent duties to them in any other
way.
[Scholar Translation: Orr]
34 [4:411]
[Student Translation: Orr]
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but also is of the greatest practical importance to but it is also of the greatest practical importance
obtain its concepts and laws from pure reason, to to get practical reason's concepts and laws from pure
expound pure and unmixed, yes to determine the extent reason, to present them pure and unmixed. Indeed, it
of this whole practical or pure rational cognition, is of the greatest practical importance to determine
i.e. the whole faculty of pure practical reason, but the extent of this whole practical or pure rational
in this not, as indeed speculative philosophy allows, knowledge, that is, to determine the whole faculty
yes even sometimes finds necessary, to make the of pure practical reason. In determining this, however,
principles dependent on the special nature of human the principles are not to be made to depend on the
reason, but precisely because moral laws are to hold special nature of human reason in the way that speculative
for each rational being in general, to derive them philosophy does permit this dependence and sometimes
already from the universal concept of a rational being even finds necessary. Instead, because moral laws are
in general and in such a way to expound all morals, to be valid for every rational being in general, moral
which for its +application+ to human beings requires laws are to be derived from the universal concept of
anthropology, first independently of this as pure a rational being in general. By means of this derivation,
philosophy, i.e. as metaphysics, completely (which can all of morals, which requires anthropology for its
well be done in this kind of quite separated +application+ to human beings, is first presented completely
cognitions), well aware that, without being in independently of anthropology as pure philosophy, that
possession of this, it is futile, I do not want to is, presented first as metaphysics (which is quite
say, to determine for the speculative judgment exactly possible in this kind of knowledge that is separated
the moral element of duty in everything that is in from anything empirical). Without possessing this presentation
conformity with duty, but is, even in mere common and of pure philosophy, it would certainly be pointless
practical use, especially of moral instruction, to determine for judgments arising from intellectual
impossible to ground morals on their genuine curiosity what precisely the moral aspect of duty is
principles and by this to effect pure moral in everything that conforms with duty. Not only would
dispositions and to engraft minds for the highest good that determination be pointless, but without that metaphysical
of the world. presentation it would be impossible to base morals
on their genuine principles even for the merely ordinary
35 [4:411-412] and practical use of morals in, to give a particular
example, moral instruction. As a result, without this
[Scholar Translation: Orr] derivation of all morals in a metaphysics of morals,
it would be impossible to raise people to have pure
moral dispositions and impossible to implant these
dispositions in their minds for the highest good of
the world.
35 [4:411-412]
[Student Translation: Orr]
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In order, however, to advance in this treatment By natural steps we have already progressed in this
not merely from common moral judgment (which here is work from ordinary moral judgment (which is here very
very worthy of respect) to the philosophical, as has worthy of respect) to the philosophical. But additional
already happened, but from a popular philosophy, that natural steps are needed now in order to progress from
reaches no farther than it can get through gropings by a popular philosophy, which goes no further than it
means of examples, up to metaphysics (which lets can get by groping about by means of examples, up to
itself be further held back by nothing empirical and, metaphysics (which does not let itself be held back
since it must measure out the whole contents of further by anything empirical since it has to size
rational cognition of this kind, goes in any case up up all the contents of rational knowledge of this kind,
to ideas, where even the examples desert us) by going in any case up to ideas, where even examples
natural steps, we must follow and clearly present the desert us). We must follow the practical rational faculty
practical faculty of reason from its universal rules from its universal rules of determination up to the
of determination up to that place where the concept of place where the concept of duty springs from that faculty
duty springs up from it. and then we must clearly present that faculty.
Each thing in nature works according to laws. Each thing in nature works according to laws. Only a
Only a rational being has the capacity to act rational being has the capacity to act +according to
+according to the representation+ of laws, i.e. the representation+ of law, that is, according to principles,
according to principles, or a +will+. Since for the or has a +will+. Since +reason+ is required for the
derivation of actions from laws +reason+ is required, derivation of actions from laws, the will is nothing
the will is in this way nothing other than practical other than practical reason. If reason unfailingly
reason. If reason unfailingly determines the will, controls the will, then the actions of such a being
then the actions of such a being, which are cognized that are recognized as objectively necessary are also
as objectively necessary, are also subjectively subjectively necessary actions. That is to say, the
necessary, i.e. the will is a capacity to choose +only will is a faculty to choose +only what+ reason, independently
that+ which reason independently of inclination of inclination,
36 [4:412] 36 [4:412]
[Scholar Translation: Orr] [Student Translation: Orr]
Groundlaying · Second Section · emended 1786 2nd ed. Groundlaying · Second Section · emended 1786 2nd edition
cognizes as practically necessary, i.e. as good. If, recognizes as practically necessary, that is, recognizes
however, reason by itself alone does not determine the as good. But if reason by itself alone does not have
will sufficiently, if this is in addition subject to sufficient control over the will, if the will is still
subjective conditions (certain incentives) which do a slave to subjective conditions (such as certain incentives)
not always agree with the objective; in a word, if the that do not always agree with the objective conditions,
will is not +in itself+ completely in conformity with if, in short, the will +in itself+ is not fully in
reason (as it actually is in the case of human conformity with reason (as is actually the case with
beings); then the actions, which are cognized human beings), then the actions that are objectively
objectively as necessary, are subjectively contingent, recognized as necessary are subjectively contingent.
and the determination of such a will according to The determination or directing of such a will according
objective laws is +necessitation+; i.e. the relation to objective laws is +necessitation+; that is, the
of objective laws to a not thoroughly good will is relation of objective laws to a will that is not thoroughly
represented as the determination of the will of a good is represented as the steering of the will of
rational being by grounds, to be sure, of reason to a rational being that listens to reason but that, according
which, however, this will according to its nature is to the nature of its will, does not necessarily follow
not necessarily obedient. what it hears.
The representation of an objective principle, The representation of an objective principle, insofar
insofar as it is necessitating for a will, is called a as it is necessitating for a will, is called a command
command (of reason), and the formula of the command is (of reason), and the formula of the command is called
called ++imperative++. an ++imperative++.
All imperatives are expressed through an +ought+ All imperatives are expressed through an +ought+. Through
and indicate by this the relation of an objective law this ought, imperatives show the relation of an objective
of reason to a will which according to its subjective law of reason to a will that, according to its subjective
constitution is not necessarily determined (a makeup, is not necessarily determined or directed by
necessitation) by it. They say that to do or to omit the ought (a necessitation). These imperatives say
something would be good, but that it would be good to do or not do something, but
37 [4:412-413] 37 [4:412-413]
[Scholar Translation: Orr] [Student Translation: Orr]
Groundlaying · Second Section · emended 1786 2nd ed. Groundlaying · Second Section · emended 1786 2nd edition
they say it to a will which does not always do they say it to a will that does not always do something
something just because it is represented to it that it just because it has been told that it is a good thing
is good to do. Practical +good+ is, however, what by to do. Practical +good+, however, guides the will by
means of the representations of reason, therefore not means of representations of reason and therefore does
from subjective causes, but objective, i.e. from not guide it by subjective causes but rather by objective
grounds that are valid for every rational being as causes, that is, by reasons that are valid for every
such, determines the will. It is distinguished from rational being as such. Practical good is distinguished
the +agreeable+ as that which only by means of feeling from the +pleasant+. They are different in that the
from mere subjective causes that only hold for the pleasant exercises influence on the will only by means
sense of this or that one, and not as a principle of of sensation from mere subjective causes that hold
reason that holds for everyone, has influence on the only for the senses of this or that person, and the
will*). pleasant does not exercise influence on the will as
a principle of reason that holds for everyone.*
*) The dependence of the faculty of desire
on sensations is called inclination, and * The dependence of the faculty of desire
this thus indicates every time a +need+. on sensations is called inclination, and
The dependence of a contingently determinable so this always indicates a +need+. The dependence
will, however, on principles of reason is of the will, however, on principles of reason
called an +interest+. This occurs, therefore, is called an +interest+. This, therefore,
only with a dependent will, which is not only occurs in the case of a dependent will
of itself every time in accordance with reason; that of itself is not always in conformity
in the case of the divine will, one can think with reason; in the case of a divine will,
of no interest. But even the human will can you cannot think of an interest. But even
+take an interest+ in something, without the human will can +take an interest+ in
on that account +acting from interest+. The something without +acting from interest+.
first means the +practical+ interest in the The first, taking an interest, signifies
action, the second the +pathological+ interest a +practical+ interest in the action. The
in the object of the action. The first announces second, acting from interest, signifies a
only dependence of the will on principles +pathological+ interest in the object of
of reason in themselves, the second on its the action. The first shows only dependence
principles for the benefit of inclination, of the will on principles of reason in themselves.
where, that is to say, reason only assigns The second shows a dependence of the will
the practical rule, how the need of inclination on principles of reason that benefit inclination;
might be helped. In the first case the action in this second case, reason only furnishes
interests me, in the second the object of a practical rule that shows how the needs
the action (so far as it is agreeable to of inclination might be satisfied. In the
me). We have in the first section seen: that first case, the action interests me. In the
in the case of an action from duty interest second case, the object of the action interests
must be seen not in the object, but merely me (insofar as I find that object pleasant).
in the action itself and its principle in In the first section we saw the following:
reason (the law). that, in the case of an action from duty,
none of our attention must be given to the
38 [4:413-414] interest in the object of the action; instead,
all our attention must be focused on interest
[Scholar Translation: Orr] in the action itself and on the action's
principle in our reason (on the law).
38 [4:413-414]
[Student Translation: Orr]
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A perfectly good will would thus stand just as So a completely good will would stand just as much under
much under objective laws (of the good), but not be objective laws (of the good). But such a will would
able to be represented by this as +necessitated+ to not, by standing under objective laws, be able to be
actions conforming to law, because it of itself, represented as +necessitated+ to actions that are in
according to its subjective constitution, can be conformity with law. Such a will could not be represented
determined only through the representation of the as necessitated because such a will of itself, according
good. Therefore, for the +divine+ and generally for a to its subjective makeup, can only be controlled by
+holy+ will, no imperatives hold; the +ought+ is here the intellectual representation of the good. No imperatives,
out of place because the +willing+ is already of therefore, hold for the +divine+ will and in general
itself necessarily unanimous with the law. Therefore, for a +holy+ will; the +ought+ is here out of place
imperatives are only formulas to express the relation because the +willing+ is already of itself in necessary
of objective laws of willing in general to the agreement with the law. Imperatives are, therefore,
subjective imperfection of the will of this or that only formulas that express the relation of objective
rational being, e.g. of the human will. laws of willing in general to the subjective imperfection
Now, all +imperatives+ command either of the will of this or that rational being, for example
+hypothetically+ or +categorically+. The former to the subjective imperfection of the human will.
represent the practical necessity of a possible action Now, all +imperatives+ command either +hypothetically+
as a means to attain something else that one wills (or or +categorically+. The former, hypothetical imperatives,
yet is possible that one wills it). The categorical represent the practical necessity of a possible action
imperative would be one which represented an action as as a means to get something else that you want (or
for itself, without reference to another end, as that you might possibly want). The categorical imperative
objectively necessary. would be the imperative which represented an action
Because each practical law represents a possible as objectively necessary in itself, without reference
action as good and on that account as necessary for a to any other end.
subject practically determinable through reason, in Because each practical law represents a possible action
this way as good and therefore, for a subject practically directed
by reason, as necessary,
39 [4:414]
39 [4:414]
[Scholar Translation: Orr]
[Student Translation: Orr]
Groundlaying · Second Section · emended 1786 2nd ed. Groundlaying · Second Section · emended 1786 2nd edition
all imperatives are formulas of the determination of all imperatives are formulas for the specification of
action which is necessary according to the principle an action that is necessary according to the principle
of a will good in some way. Now, if the action would of a will that is good in some way. If now the action
be good merely as a means +to something else+, then would be good merely as a means +to something else+,
the imperative is +hypothetical+; if it is represented then the imperative is +hypothetical+. If the action
as +in itself+ good, therefore as necessary in a will is thought of as good +in itself+, and therefore as
in itself in conformity with reason, as its principle, necessary in a will that is itself in conformity with
then it is +categorical+. reason, reason serving as the will's principle, then
The imperative thus says which action possible the imperative is +categorical+.
through me would be good, and represents the practical So the imperative says which action that is possible
rule in relation to a will which for that reason does through me would be good. The imperative represents
not immediately do an action because it is good, the practical rule in relation to a will that does
partly because the subject does not always know that not immediately do an action because the action is
it is good, partly because, even if it knew this, its good. The will does not do it partly because the subject
maxims could still be opposed to the objective does not always know that the action would be good
principles of a practical reason. and partly because, even if the subject did know the
The hypothetical imperative thus says only that action would be good, the subject's maxims could still
the action is good for some +possible+ or +actual+ be at odds with the objective principles of a practical
purpose. In the first case, it is a ++problematic++, reason.
in the second ++assertoric++-practical principle. The So the hypothetical imperative only says that an action
categorical imperative, which declares the action for would be good for some +possible+ or +actual+ purpose.
itself without reference to any purpose, i.e. even In the first case, about a possible purpose, the hypothetical
without any other end, as objectively necessary, holds imperative is a ++problematically++ practical principle.
as an ++apodictic++ (practical) principle. In the second case, about an actual purpose, the hypothetical
imperative is an ++assertorically++ practical principle.
40 [4:414-415] The categorical imperative, which declares the action
to be objectively necessary in itself without reference
[Scholar Translation: Orr] to any purpose, that is, even without any other end,
holds as an ++absolutely necessary++ (practical) principle.
40 [4:414-415]
[Student Translation: Orr]
Groundlaying · Second Section · emended 1786 2nd ed. Groundlaying · Second Section · emended 1786 2nd edition
One can conceive what is possible only through Something that is only possible through the powers of
powers of some rational being also as a possible some rational being is something you can also think
purpose for some will, and therefore the principles of of as a possible purpose of some will. Therefore, there
action are, so far as this is represented as necessary are in fact infinitely many principles of action, provided
in order to attain some possible purpose to be that the action is thought of as necessary in order
effected by it, in fact infinitely many. All sciences to accomplish a possible purpose that the action works
have some practical part which consists of problems to bring about. All sciences have some practical part
that some end is possible for us, and of imperatives that consists of problems claiming that some end or
how it can be attained. These can therefore in general goal is possible for us and that consists of imperatives
be called imperatives of ++skill++. Whether the end is specifying how that end or goal can be reached. These
rational and good is here not at all the question, but imperatives, therefore, can in general be called imperatives
only what one must do in order to attain it. The of ++skill++. The question here is not at all about
prescriptions for the doctor in order to make his man whether the end is rational and good, but instead about
in a thorough-going way healthy, and for a poisoner in what you must do in order to reach the end. The prescriptions
order certainly to kill him, are of equal worth, that the doctor uses in order to make her patient one
insofar as each one serves to effect perfectly its hundred percent again are of equal worth with the prescriptions
purpose. Because one in early youth does not know that a poisoner uses to bump off her victim insofar
which ends may meet with us in life, parents as each set of prescriptions serves perfectly to accomplish
accordingly seek above all to let their children learn its purpose. Because you do not know when you are young
right +many things+ and provide for the +skill+ in the what ends you may stumble across later in life, parents
use of means to all kinds of +arbitrary+ ends, not one seek above all to have their children learn +lots and
of which can they determine whether it perhaps lots of things+ and provide for +skill+ in the use
actually in the future can become a purpose of their of means to all kinds of +arbitrary+ ends. The parents
pupil, concerning which it nevertheless is still cannot identify any of these optional ends as an end
+possible+ that it might once have it, and this care that in the future will become an actual goal of their
is so great that they on that point commonly neglect child, but they are all still ends that it is +possible+
to form and to correct their judgment over the worth that their child might one day have. The parents' concern
is so great that they typically neglect to shape and
41 [4:415] to correct their children's judgments about the worth
[Scholar Translation: Orr] 41 [4:415]
[Student Translation: Orr]
Groundlaying · Second Section · emended 1786 2nd ed. Groundlaying · Second Section · emended 1786 2nd edition
of the things which they themselves would perhaps like of things that the children would perhaps like to make
to make into ends. into ends.
There is nevertheless +one+ end which one can There is, nevertheless, +one+ end that you can presuppose
presuppose in the case of all rational beings (as far as actual in the case of all rational beings (so far
as imperatives apply to them, namely as dependent as imperatives apply to them, namely, as dependent
beings) as actual, and thus one purpose which they not beings). So there is a purpose that all rational beings
at all merely +can+ have, but of which one can surely not only merely +can+ have but also a purpose which
presuppose that they such one and all do +have+ you can safely presuppose that all rational beings
according to a natural necessity, and that is the do +have+ according to a natural necessity, and this
purpose toward +happiness+. The hypothetical is the purpose that all rational beings have with regard
imperative, which represents the practical necessity to pursuing +happiness+. The hypothetical imperative,
of action as a means to the promotion of happiness, is which represents the practical necessity of action
++assertoric++. One may propose it not merely as as a means to the advancement of happiness, is ++assertoric++.
necessary to an uncertain, merely possible purpose, You must not present this kind of imperative merely
but to a purpose which one safely and a priori can as necessary for an uncertain, merely possible purpose,
presuppose in the case of every human being because it but you must present the imperative as necessary for
belongs to its essence. Now, one can name the skill in a purpose which you can safely and a priori presuppose
the choice of means to one's own greatest well-being in the case of every human being; and you can safely
+prudence+*) in the narrowest sense. Therefore, so presuppose this because the purpose belongs to the
nature of any human being. Now, you can call skill
*) The word prudence is taken in a twofold in the choice of means to your own greatest well-being
sense, one time it can bear the name world +prudence+* in the narrowest sense of the word. Therefore,
prudence, in the second that of private prudence.
The first is the skill of a human being to * The word "prudence" has two senses. In one
have influence on others, in order to use sense, it goes by the name "worldly prudence."
them for its purposes. The second is the In the second sense, the word bears the name
insight to unite all these purposes for its "private prudence." The first sense, worldly
own lasting advantage. The latter is properly prudence, is the skill of a human being to
the one to which even the worth of the first have influence on others in order to use
is traced back, and who is prudent in the them for the human being's own purposes.
first way, not however in the second, of The second sense, private prudence, is the
him one could better say: he is clever and insight to unite all these purposes for the
cunning, on the whole however still imprudent. human being's own lasting advantage. The
latter, private prudence, is properly the
one to which even the worth of the former,
42 [4:415-416] worldly prudence, is traced back. Whoever
is prudent in the first worldly sense but
[Scholar Translation: Orr] not in the second private sense is someone
of whom you could more appropriately say:
she is clever and cunning, but, on the whole,
still not prudent.
42 [4:415-416]
[Student Translation: Orr]
Groundlaying · Second Section · emended 1786 2nd ed. Groundlaying · Second Section · emended 1786 2nd edition
the imperative which refers to the choice of means to the imperative which refers to the choice of means to
one's own happiness, i.e. the prescription of your own happiness, that is, the prescription of prudence,
prudence, is still always +hypothetical+; the action is always +hypothetical+; the action is commanded not
is commanded not absolutely, but only as a means to absolutely but only as a means to some other purpose.
another purpose. Finally, there is an imperative which immediately commands
Finally, there is an imperative, which, without certain conduct and which does not lay down as a condition
laying for the ground some other purpose, attainable for the imperative's basis some other purpose that
through a certain conduct, as a condition, commands is to be achieved by that conduct. This imperative
this conduct immediately. This imperative is is ++categorical++. This imperative does not deal with
++categorical++. It concerns not the matter of the the matter of action and the consequences of action.
action and that which is to result from it, but the Instead, this imperative deals with the form and the
form and the principle from which it itself follows, principle from which the action follows, and the action's
and the essential-good of it consists in the essential good consists in the disposition, whatever
disposition, may the result be what it will. This the consequences turn out to be. This imperative may
imperative may be called that +of+ ++morality++. be called the imperative +of+ ++morality++.
The willing according to these three kinds of Willing according to these three kinds of principles
principles is also clearly distinguished by the is also clearly distinguished by the +dissimilarity+
+dissimilarity+ of necessitation of the will. In order of the necessitation in the will. In order to make
now to make this also noticeable, I believe that one this stand out now, too, I think that you would classify
would most suitably so name them in their order if one these three kinds of principles most appropriately
said: they were either +rules+ of skill, or +counsels+ in their order if you said it in this way: the principles
of prudence, or +commands (laws)+ of morality. For are either +rules+ of skill, or +counsels+ of prudence,
only the +law+ carries about itself the concept of an or +commands (laws)+ of morality. For only the +law+
+unconditional+ and to be sure objective and therefore carries with it the concept of an +unconditional necessity+
universally valid +necessity+, and commands are laws, that is definitely objective and therefore universally
valid. Furthermore, commands are laws
43 [4:416]
43 [4:416]
[Scholar Translation: Orr]
[Student Translation: Orr]
Groundlaying · Second Section · emended 1786 2nd ed. Groundlaying · Second Section · emended 1786 2nd edition
which must be obeyed, i.e. obeyed even against that must be obeyed, that is, must be obeyed even against
inclination. The +counseling+ contains to be sure inclination. +Advice+ certainly contains necessity,
necessity, which, however, can hold merely under a but this necessity can hold only under a merely subjective
subjective contingent condition, whether this or that contingent condition. This condition is whether this
human being counts this or that in its happiness; on or that human being counts this or that as belonging
the other hand, the categorical imperative is limited to her happiness. In contrast, the categorical imperative
by no condition and as absolutely, although is limited by no condition and, as absolutely necessary
practically, necessary can quite properly be called a even though also practically necessary, can quite properly
command. One could name the first imperatives also be called a command. You could also call the first
+technical+ (belonging to art), the second kind of imperative +technical+ (belonging to art),
+pragmatic+*) (to well-being), the third +moral+ (to the second +pragmatic+* (belonging to well-being),
free conduct in general, i.e. belonging to morals). the third +moral+ (belonging to free conduct in general,
Now the question arises: how are all these that is, to morals).
imperatives possible? This question demands not to The question now arises: how are all these imperatives
know how the performance of the action which the possible? This question does not demand to know how
imperative commands, but merely how the necessitation we are to understand the performance of an action that
of the will, which the imperative expresses in the the imperative commands. Instead, the question just
problem, can be thought. How an imperative of skill is demands to know how we are to understand the necessitation
possible really requires no special discussion. Who of the will, which the imperative expresses when it
wills the end, wills (so far as reason has tells us what to do. How an imperative of skill is
possible really requires no special discussion. Whoever
*) It appears to me, the proper meaning of wills the end, wills (to the extent that reason has
the word +pragmatic+ can in this way be determined
most exactly. For +sanctions+ are named pragmatic, * It seems to me that the proper meaning of
which flow properly not from the right of the word "+pragmatic+" can be defined most
states, as necessary laws, but from the +provision+ precisely in this way. For those +sanctions+
for the general welfare. A +history+ is composed are called pragmatic which flow, not out
pragmatically when it makes us +prudent+, of the right of states as necessary laws,
i.e. teaches the world how it can take care but which flow out of the +provision+ for
of its advantage better than, or at least the general welfare. A +history+ is pragmatic
just as good as, the former ages. when it makes us +prudent+, that is, when
it teaches the world how it can take better — or
44 [4:416-417] at least just as good — care of its advantage
than the world did in previous eras.
[Scholar Translation: Orr]
44 [4:416-417]
[Student Translation: Orr]
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decisive influence on his actions) also the decisive influence over her actions) also the indispensable
indispensably necessary means to it that are in his means that are necessary to achieve the end and that
power. This proposition is, as concerns the willing, are in her power to do. This proposition is, as concerns
analytic; for in the willing of an object as my effect willing, analytic; for, in the willing of an object
is already thought my causality as acting cause, i.e. as my effect, my causality as an acting cause, that
the use of means, and the imperative extracts the is, the use of means, is already thought, and the imperative
concept of actions necessary to this end already from already extracts the concept of actions necessary to
the concept of a willing of this end (to determine the achieve this end from a willing of this end. (To be
means themselves to a proposed purpose, to this belong sure, synthetic propositions are needed in order to
to be sure synthetic propositions, which, however, do figure out the means to achieve an intended purpose,
not concern the ground, the Actus of the will, but to but these synthetic propositions have to do with making
make the object actual). That, in order to divide a the object of the action actual and not with grounding
line according to a sure principle into two equal the act of will.) Mathematics, of course, teaches only
parts, I must make from its endpoints two intersecting through synthetic propositions that, in order to divide
arcs, which mathematics teaches of course only through a line in accordance with a reliable principle into
synthetic propositions; but that, if I know, through two equal parts, I must make two intersecting arcs
such action alone the intended effect can occur, I, if from the endpoints of the line. But if I know that
I fully will the effect, will also the action that is an intended effect can only occur by such an action,
required for it, is an analytic proposition; for to then the following proposition is analytic: if I fully
represent something as an effect possible in a certain will the effect, then I also will the action that is
way through me and to represent myself, in view of it, required to achieve the effect. This proposition is
acting in the same way, is one and the same. analytic because thinking of something as an effect
The imperatives of prudence would, if only it that is possible for me to bring about in a certain
were as easy to give a determinate concept of way is exactly the same as thinking of myself as acting
happiness, with those of skill wholly in the same bringing-about way with respect to that
same something.
45 [4:417] The imperatives of prudence would, if it were only as
easy to give a well-defined concept of happiness,
[Scholar Translation: Orr]
45 [4:417]
[Student Translation: Orr]
Groundlaying · Second Section · emended 1786 2nd ed. Groundlaying · Second Section · emended 1786 2nd edition
and entirely agree and be just as well analytic. For agree completely with the imperatives of skill, and
it would just as well here as there be said: who wills the imperatives of prudence would likewise be analytic.
the end, wills also (necessarily in conformity with For the following could be said about imperatives of
reason) the sole means to it that are in his power. prudence just as well as it is said about imperatives
But it is a misfortune that the concept of happiness of skill: who wills the end also wills (necessarily
is such an indeterminate concept that, although each in accordance with reason) the sole means to the end
human being wishes to attain this, it can still never that are in her power to do. But it is unfortunate
say determinately and consistently with itself, what that the concept of happiness is such an ill-defined
it genuinely wishes and wills. The cause of this is: concept that, although each human being wishes to achieve
that all elements that belong to the concept of happiness, she can still never say in a definite and
happiness are one and all empirical, i.e. must be self-consistent way what she really wishes and wants.
borrowed from experience, that nevertheless for the The cause of this wishy-washiness is this: that all
idea of happiness an absolute whole, a maximum of the elements that belong to the concept of happiness
well-being, in my present and every future condition are one and all empirical, that is, all the elements
is required. Now, it is impossible that the most must be borrowed from experience; that, despite the
insightful and at the same time most capable but still empirical basis of the concept of happiness, the idea
finite being makes for itself a determinate concept of of happiness requires an absolute whole, a maximum
what it here actually wills. If it wills riches, how of well-being, in my present and every future condition.
much worry, envy and intrigue could it not in so doing Now, it is impossible that the most insightful and
bring down on its head. If it wills much cognition and at the same time most capable, but still finite being,
insight, perhaps that could become only an eye all the could make for itself a well-defined concept of what
more sharper in order only to show it the evil, that she here really wants. If she wants riches, how much
is for it now still hidden and yet cannot be avoided, worry, envy and intrigue might she bring down on her
all the more dreadfully, or to burden its eager own head? If she wants lots of knowledge and insight,
desires, which already occupy it enough, with still they might just make her eyes sharper so that she can
more needs. If it wills a long life, who guarantees to see all the more dreadfully the evil that currently
it, is hidden from her but that she cannot avoid; or they
might just burden her eager desires, which already
46 [4:417-418] trouble her enough, with even more needs. If she wants
a long life, then who can guarantee her
[Scholar Translation: Orr]
46 [4:417-418]
[Student Translation: Orr]
Groundlaying · Second Section · emended 1786 2nd ed. Groundlaying · Second Section · emended 1786 2nd edition
that it would not be a long misery? If it wills at that it will not be a long misery? If she at least wants
least health, how often still has discomfort of the health, how often has discomfort of the body kept her
body kept from excess into which unlimited health from excess into which unlimited health would have
would have let fall, and so on. In short, it is not let her fall, and so on? In short, she is not able
capable of determining according to some ground to figure out with complete certainty according to
proposition with complete certainty what will make it any basic principle what will make her truly happy,
truly happy because for that omniscience would be for figuring this out would require omniscience. So
required. One can thus not act according to you cannot act according to well-defined principles
determinate principles in order to be happy but only so as to be happy. You can only act according to empirical
according to empirical counsels, e.g. of diet, of counsels, for example, counsels to diet, to be thrifty,
thrift, of courtesy, of reserve and so on, of which to be courteous, to be reserved and so on. Experience
experience teaches, that they on the average most teaches us that these counsels on the average do most
promote the well-being. From this it follows that the to promote our well-being. From these considerations
imperatives of prudence, to speak exactly, cannot about happiness, the following can be concluded: that
command at all, i.e. present actions objectively as the imperatives of prudence, strictly speaking, do
practical-+necessary+, that they are to be held as not command at all, that is, the imperatives of prudence
counsels (consilia) rather than as commands cannot present actions objectively as practically +necessary+;
(praecepta) of reason, that the problem: to determine that the imperatives of prudence are to be held to
surely and universally which action will promote the be counsels (consilia) rather than to be commands (praecepta)
happiness of a rational being is completely insoluble, of reason; that the problem of determining reliably
and therefore no imperative in view of it is possible and universally which action will promote the happiness
which in the strict sense would command doing what of a rational being is completely insoluble; that,
makes us happy, because happiness is not an ideal of therefore, no imperative with a view to happiness is
reason, but of imagination, which merely rests on possible which in the strict sense would command you
empirical grounds from which one futilely expects that to do what will make you happy, and such an imperative
they should determine an action by which the totality is not possible because happiness is not an ideal of
of an reason but instead an ideal of imagination. This imagination
rests merely on empirical grounds, and it is pointless
47 [4:418-419] for you to expect that these empirical grounds should
specify an action by which a totality of an
[Scholar Translation: Orr]
47 [4:418-419]
[Student Translation: Orr]
Groundlaying · Second Section · emended 1786 2nd ed. Groundlaying · Second Section · emended 1786 2nd edition
in fact infinite series of consequences would be in fact infinite series of consequences would be attained.
attained. This imperative of prudence would This imperative of prudence would, nevertheless, if
nevertheless be, if one assumes the means to happiness you assume that the means to happiness could be accurately
could be certainly assigned, an analytic-practical specified, be an analytic practical proposition. For
proposition; for it is distinguished from the the imperative of prudence is distinguished from the
imperative of skill only in this, that with the latter imperative of skill only in this: in the case of the
the end is merely possible, with the former, however, latter, the imperative of skill, the end is merely
given; since both, however, merely command the means possible, while in the case of the former, the imperative
to that, of which one presumes that one willed it as of prudence, the end is given as actual. But, since
an end: in this way the imperative, which commands the both kinds of imperative merely command the means to
willing of the means for him who wills the end, is in something that you assume someone wants as an end,
both cases analytic. Thus there is, in view of the the imperative, which commands the willing of the means
possibility of such an imperative, also no difficulty. for someone who wants the end, is in both cases analytic.
On the other hand, how the imperative of So there is also no difficulty with regard to the possibility
+morality+ is possible is without doubt the only of such an imperative of prudence.
question in need of a solution, since it is not at all On the other hand, the question of how the imperative
hypothetical and therefore the objective-represented of +morality+ is possible is without doubt the only
necessity can be based on no presupposition, as with question in need of a solution. For the imperative
the hypothetical imperatives. Only it is always in of morality is not hypothetical at all and so the objectively
this not to be let out of account, that it is +through represented necessity can be based on no presupposition,
no example+, therefore empirically, to be made out as in the case of the hypothetical imperatives. But
whether there is at all any imperative of such kind, when thinking about the imperative of morality it should
but to be apprehensive that all that appear always be kept in mind that whether there is any such
categorical might yet be in a hidden way hypothetical. imperative of morality is a claim that can be established
E.g. when it is bid: you ought promise nothing +by no example+ and that therefore cannot be established
fraudulently; and one assumes that the necessity of empirically. Instead of looking to examples, it should
this omission is not at all merely giving counsel for also always be kept in mind that care must be taken
with anything that appears categorical because it might
48 [4:419] yet be hypothetical in a hidden way. For example, when
it is said that you should not make deceitful promises,
[Scholar Translation: Orr] and you assume that the necessity of complying with
this is definitely not merely advice to avoid
48 [4:419]
[Student Translation: Orr]
Groundlaying · Second Section · emended 1786 2nd ed. Groundlaying · Second Section · emended 1786 2nd edition
avoidance of some other evil, so that it nearly bids: some other evil, what is said might in a hidden way
you ought not promise falsely, so that you do not, if be saying that you should not make lying promises so
it comes to light, destroy your credit; but an action that you do not, when your deceitful behavior becomes
of this kind must for itself be considered as bad, the public knowledge, ruin your reputation. An action of
imperative of prohibition is thus categorical: in this this kind, which appears to be based on a categorical
way one can still in no example prove with certainty imperative but might actually be based on a hypothetical
that the will is determined here without another imperative in hiding, must be considered to be bad
incentive, merely through the law, although it appears in itself, and so the imperative prohibiting the action
so; for it is always possible that secretly fear of is categorical. So in no example can you prove with
disgrace, perhaps also obscure apprehension of other certainty that the will is controlled only by the law
dangers, might have influence on the will. Who can and not by any other incentive, even though it might
prove the nonexistence of a cause through experience, appear as if only the law is controlling the will;
since this teaches nothing further than that we do not for it is always possible that fear of embarrassment,
perceive the former? In such a case, however, the perhaps also vague worries about other dangers, might
so-called moral imperative, which as such appears secretly have an influence on the will. Who can prove
categorical and unconditional, would in fact only be a through experience the nonexistence of a cause since
pragmatic prescription which makes us attentive to our experience teaches nothing further than that we do
advantage and merely teaches us to take care of this. not perceive the cause? If there were such secret influences
We will thus have to investigate the possibility on the will, the so-called moral imperative, which,
of a +categorical+ imperative completely a priori, as moral, appears categorical and unconditional, would
since here the advantage does not come in useful for in fact only be a pragmatic prescription that makes
us that its actuality is given in experience and us attentive to our advantage and merely teaches us
therefore that the possibility would be necessary not to take care of this advantage.
for the establishment, but merely for the explanation. So we will have to investigate the possibility of a
So much is nevertheless provisionally to be seen: that +categorical+ imperative completely a priori since
the categorical imperative alone we do not here have the advantage that the actuality
of the categorical imperative is given in experience.
49 [4:419-420] If we had that advantage, we would need the possibility
of the categorical imperative not to establish it but
[Scholar Translation: Orr] merely to explain it. Though we lack that advantage,
this much is provisionally evident: that the categorical
imperative alone
49 [4:419-420]
[Student Translation: Orr]
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reads as a practical ++law++; the remaining can one reads as a practical ++law++; all other imperatives
and all undoubtedly be called +principles+ of the can indeed be called +principles+ of the will, but
will, but not laws: because what is necessary to do they cannot be called laws. The categorical imperative
merely for the attainment of an arbitrary purpose can alone is a practical law, while all other imperatives
in itself be considered as contingent, and we can be are only principles of the will, because whatever is
released from the prescription any time if we give up necessary to do in order merely to attain an arbitrary
the purpose; on the contrary, the unconditional end is something that can itself be considered as contingent,
command leaves to the will no discretion in view of and we can be free of the prescription if we give up
the opposite, therefore alone carries with it that the purpose; on the other hand, the unconditional command
necessity which we demand of the law. leaves the will no wiggle room with regard to the opposite,
Secondly, with this categorical imperative or law and therefore the unconditional command alone carries
of morality, the ground of the difficulty (to look with it the necessity which we demand of the law.
into its possibility) is also very great. It is a Secondly, in the case of this categorical imperative
synthetic-practical proposition*) a priori, and since or law of morality, the reason for the difficulty (of
to look into the possibility of propositions of this looking into the possibility of such an imperative
kind has so much difficulty in theoretical cognition, or law) is also very great. A categorical imperative
it can be readily gathered that in the practical it is a synthetic practical proposition* a priori, and,
will not have less. since to look into the possibility of propositions
of this kind is so difficult in theoretical knowledge,
*) I connect with the will, without a presupposed it is easy to see that it will be no less difficult
condition from any inclination, the deed to look into the possibility of synthetic propositions
a priori, therefore necessarily (although a priori in practical knowledge.
only objectively, i.e. under the idea of
a reason that had complete power over all * Without presupposing a condition from any
subjective motives). This is therefore a inclination, I connect a priori a deed with
practical proposition which analytically the will. Because the connection is a priori,
derives the willing of an action not from the connection is also necessary (although
another, already presupposed (for we have only objectively necessary, that is, the
no such perfect will), but connects with connection would hold up only under the idea
the concept of the will as of a rational of a reason that had full control over all
being immediately, as something that is not subjective motives). So this is a practical
contained in it. proposition which does not derive the willing
of an action analytically from another already
50 [4:420] presupposed willing of an action (for we
have no such perfect will). Instead, the
[Scholar Translation: Orr] practical proposition immediately connects
the willing of an action with the concept
of the will of a rational being, the willing
of the action being something that is not
contained in the concept of the will of the
rational being.
50 [4:420]
[Student Translation: Orr]
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With this problem we want first inquire whether In tackling this problem of the possibility of a categorical
not perhaps the mere concept of a categorical imperative, we want first to see whether the mere concept
imperative also supplies its formula which contains of a categorical imperative might also provide the
the proposition which alone can be a categorical formula of a categorical imperative, the formula containing
imperative; for how such an absolute command is the proposition which alone can be a categorical imperative;
possible, even when we also know how it reads, will for how such an absolute command is possible, even
still demand special and difficult effort, which we, if we also know how the command reads, will still require
however, postpone to the last section. special and difficult effort, which we, however, put
If I conceive a +hypothetical+ imperative in off until the last section.
general, then I do not know in advance what it will If I think of a +hypothetical+ imperative in general,
contain: until the condition is given to me. If I then I do not know in advance what the imperative will
conceive, however, a +categorical+ imperative, then I contain until the imperative's condition is given.
know at once what it contains. For since the If, however, I think of a +categorical+ imperative,
imperative contains besides the law only the necessity then I know at once what the imperative contains. For,
of the maxim*) to be in conformity with this law, the since the imperative contains, besides the law, only
law, however, contains no condition to which it was the necessity of the maxim* to be in conformity with
limited, in this way nothing but the universality of a this law, and the law contains no condition to which
law in general remains over to which the maxim of the was limited, nothing remains except the universality
action is to be in conformance, of law in general to which the maxim of the action
is to conform,
*) A +maxim+ is the subjective principle of
acting and must be distinguished from the * A +maxim+ is the subjective principle of
+objective principle+, namely the practical acting and must be distinguished from the
law. The former contains the practical rule +objective principle+, namely from the practical
which reason in conformity with the conditions law. The former, a maxim or subjective principle,
of the subject (often its ignorance or also contains the practical rule which reason
its inclinations) determines, and is thus specifies in accordance with the conditions
the ground proposition according to which of the subject (often the subject's ignorance
the subject +acts+; the law, however, is or also the subject's inclinations). So a
the objective principle valid for every rational maxim is the basic principle according to
being and the ground proposition according which the subject +acts+. The law, however,
to which it +ought to act+, i.e. an imperative. is the objective principle; it is valid for
every rational being and is the basic principle
according to which every rational being +ought
51 [4:420-421] to act+. That is, the objective principle,
the practical law, is an imperative.
[Scholar Translation: Orr]
51 [4:420-421]
[Student Translation: Orr]
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and which conformity alone the imperative properly and it is this conformance alone which the imperative
represents as necessary. properly represents as necessary.
The categorical imperative is thus only a single So there is only one categorical imperative and it is
and indeed this: +act only according to that maxim, just this: +act only according to that maxim through
through which you at the same time can will, that it which you can at the same time will that it become
becomes a universal law+. a universal law+.
If now from this single imperative all Now, if all imperatives of duty can be derived, as from
imperatives of duty can be derived as from their their principle, from this one imperative, then, even
principle, then we will, even though we leave it though we leave it unsettled whether or not in general
undecided whether in general what one calls duty is what we call duty is an baseless concept, we will still
not an empty concept, still at least be able to at least be able to indicate what we think by the concept
announce what we think by this and what this concept of duty and what this concept means.
wants to say. Because the universality of the law according to which
Because the universality of the law, according to effects occur constitutes what is properly called +nature+
which effects occur, constitutes what properly is in the most general sense (according to nature's form),
called +nature+ in the most general sense (according that is, the existence of things so far as the existence
to the form), i.e. the existence of things, as far as is determined according to universal laws, the universal
it is determined according to universal laws, in this imperative of duty could also be expressed like this:
way the universal imperative of duty could also read +so act as if the maxim of your action were to become
thus: +act in this way, as if the maxim of your action through your will a+ ++universal law of nature++.
were to become through your will a+ ++universal law of Now we will list some duties according to the usual
nature++. division of duties into duties
Now we want to enumerate some duties according to
the usual division of them into duties to 52 [4:421]
52 [4:421] [Student Translation: Orr]
[Scholar Translation: Orr]
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ourselves and to other human beings, into perfect and to oneself and to other human beings, and into perfect
imperfect duties.*) and imperfect duties*.
1) One, who, through a series of misfortunes that 1) A person, who is disgusted with life because of a
has grown up to hopelessness, feels a boredom with series of misfortunes that has grown into hopelessness,
life, is still so far in possession of his reason that is still sufficiently in possession of her reason that
he can ask himself whether it is also not at all she is able to ask herself whether it is not wholly
contrary to the duty to himself to take his life. Now contrary to duty to oneself for her to commit suicide.
he tests: whether the maxim of his action can indeed Now she tests whether her maxim of her action could
become a universal law of nature. His maxim, however, indeed be a universal law of nature. But her maxim
is: from self-love I make it my principle, when life is: from self-love, I make it my principle to shorten
by its longer duration threatens more misfortune than my life when continuing to live threatens more misery
it promises pleasantness, to shorten it. There is only than pleasantness. All that remains is the question
still the question whether this principle of self-love whether this principle of self-love could be a universal
can become a universal law of nature. Then one, law of nature. But you then soon see that a nature
however, soon sees that a nature, whose law it were, whose law it was, through the same feeling that is
through the same feeling the function of which it is
* You must here be sure to note that I reserve
*) One must here note well that I wholly reserve the division of duties for a future +metaphysics
to myself the division of duties for a future of morals+. So this division only stands
+metaphysics of morals+, this here thus stands here as arbitrary (in order to order my examples).
forth only as arbitrary (so as to order my Moreover, by a perfect duty, I here understand
examples). Moreover, I understand here under a duty that allows of no exception that is
a perfect duty that one which permits no to the advantage of inclination, and regarding
exception to the advantage of inclination, such duties I have not merely outer but also
and there I have not merely outer, but also inner +perfect duties+. This way of understanding
inner +perfect duties+, which runs counter perfect duty runs counter to the terminology
to the word-use accepted in the schools; used in the schools, but I do not intend
I, however, am here not minded to answer to defend it here because for my purpose
for, because it is all the same to my purpose it is all the same whether you do or do not
whether one concedes it to me or not. concede it to me.
53 [4:421-422]
[Scholar Translation: Orr] 53 [4:421-422]
[Student Translation: Orr]
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to urge on towards the promotion of life, to destroy to urge on the blossoming of life, to destroy life would
life itself, would contradict itself and would thus contradict itself and would not endure as a nature.
not endure as nature, and therefore that maxim can So that maxim could not possibly exist as a universal
impossibly occur as a universal law of nature and law of nature and consequently would wholly conflict
consequently wholly conflicts with the highest with the highest principle of all duty.
principle of all duty. 2) Another person sees herself forced by need to borrow
2) Another sees himself forced by need to borrow money. She very well knows that she will not be able
money. He well knows that he will not be able to to repay the money, but she also sees that nothing
repay, sees also, however, that nothing will be lent will be lent to her if she does not firmly promise
to him if he does not firmly promise to repay it at a to pay the money back at a specific time. She feels
determinate time. He desires to make such a promise; like making the promise; but she still has enough of
still, however, he has enough conscience to ask a conscience to ask herself: is it not impermissible
himself: is it not impermissible and contrary to duty and contrary to duty to get out of difficulty in this
to help myself out of need in such a way? Assuming he way? Assuming that she still resolves to make the promise,
still resolves to do it, then his maxim of the action then her maxim of action would read like this: when
would read in this way: when I believe myself to be in I believe myself to be in need of money, I will borrow
need of money, then I will borrow money and promise to money and promise to repay it even though I know that
repay it, although I know it will never happen. Now, the money will never be repaid. Now, this principle
this principle of self-love or of one's own advantage of self-love or of one's own advantage is perhaps quite
is perhaps quite consistent with my whole future compatible with my whole future well-being, but the
well-being, but now the question is: whether it is question now is whether the principle is right. So
right. I thus change the unreasonable expectation of I change the unreasonable demand of self-love into
self-love into a universal law and arrange the a universal law and put the question like so: how would
question in this way: how would it then stand, if my things then stand if my maxim were to become a universal
maxim became a universal law. Then I now see at once law? Putting it this way, I now see at once that the
that it can never hold as a universal law of nature maxim could never hold as a universal law of nature
and accord with itself, but and be compatible with itself, but
54 [4:422] 54 [4:422]
[Scholar Translation: Orr] [Student Translation: Orr]
Groundlaying · Second Section · emended 1786 2nd ed. Groundlaying · Second Section · emended 1786 2nd edition
must necessarily contradict itself. For the must necessarily contradict itself. For the universality
universality of a law, that each, accordingly as he of a law, that everyone, accordingly as she believes
believes to be in need, can promise what occurs to him herself to be in need, can promise whatever she pleases
with the intention not to keep it, would make the with the intention of not keeping the promise, would
promise and the end, which one may have with it, make the promise itself, and perhaps the end to be
itself impossible, since no one would believe that achieved by making the promise, impossible. The promise
something is promised to him, but would laugh at every would be impossible because no one would believe that
such utterance as idle pretense. anything was promised to her; instead, such utterances
3) A third finds in himself a talent which by of promising would be ridiculed as idle pretense.
means of some cultivation could make him into a human 3) A third person finds in herself a talent which by
being useful for all kinds of purpose. He sees means of some cultivation could make her a human being
himself, however, in comfortable circumstances and useful for all kinds of purposes. But she sees herself
prefers rather to indulge in pleasure than to trouble in comfortable circumstances and prefers to indulge
himself with enlargement and improvement of his in pleasure rather than to strive to enlarge and improve
fortunate natural predispositions. Still, however, he her fortunate natural predispositions. But still she
asks: whether, besides the agreement which his maxim asks whether, besides agreeing in itself with her tendency
of neglecting his natural gifts in itself has with his to amusement, her maxim of neglecting her natural gifts
propensity to amusement, it also agrees with that also agrees with what is called duty. Upon asking this,
which one calls duty. Then he henceforth sees that she now sees for sure that a nature could always endure
undoubtedly a nature according to such a universal law according to such a natural law even if the human being
can indeed always endure, although the human being (in (like the South Sea Islanders) let her talents rust
this way like the South Sea inhabitants) lets his and was intent on devoting her life merely to idleness,
talent rust and were resolved to devote his life amusement, casual sex — in a word, to enjoyment. But
merely to idleness, amusement, procreation, in a word she cannot possibly ++will++ that this law become a
to enjoyment; but he can impossibly ++will++, that universal law of nature or that such a natural law
this become a universal law of nature or as one such be put in us by natural instinct.
be laid in us by natural instinct.
55 [4:422-423]
55 [4:422-423]
[Student Translation: Orr]
[Scholar Translation: Orr]
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For as a rational being he necessarily wills that all For as a rational being she necessarily wills that all
capacities in him be developed, because they are after capacities in her be developed because they, after
all serviceable to him and given to him for all kinds all, are given to her and serve her for all kinds of
of possible purposes. purposes.
Yet a +fourth+, for whom it goes well while he Yet a +fourth+, for whom things are going well, meanwhile
sees that others have to fight with great hardships sees that other people (whom she could also easily
(whom he could also well help), thinks: what does it help) have to struggle with great difficulties. She
concern me? may yet each one be so happy, as heaven thinks: what's that to me? May each person just be
wills it, or he can make himself, I will take nothing as happy as heaven allows or as happy as she can make
from him, indeed not even envy; only to his well-being herself. I will not take anything from her or even
or his assistance in need I have no desire to envy her. But I do not feel like contributing anything
contribute anything! Now, of course, if such a way of to her well-being or to come to her assistance in times
thinking became a universal law of nature, the human of need! Now, of course, if such a way of thinking
race could quite well subsist and without doubt even became a universal law of nature, the human race could
better than when everyone babbles about compassion and quite well endure. Indeed, it could endure even better
benevolence, also exerts oneself occasionally to than it does when everyone blathers on nonstop about
practice them, on the other hand, however, also, where compassion and kindness and even occasionally tries
he only can, cheats, sells the right of human beings, to put these into practice but, on the other hand,
or otherwise violates it. But, although it is possible also tries to cheat, sell the right of the human being,
that according to that maxim a universal law of nature or otherwise violate that right. But, although it is
could indeed subsist; in this way, it is nevertheless possible that a universal law of nature could quite
impossible to +will+ that such a principle hold well endure according to that maxim, it is nevertheless
everywhere as a law of nature. For a will, which impossible to ++will++ that such a principle hold everywhere
resolved this, would conflict with itself, since many as a universal law of nature. For a will that resolved
cases can yet occur where he needs the love and to will according to that maxim would conflict with
compassion of others, and where he, through such a law itself. Such a will would conflict with itself because
of nature sprung from his own will, many cases can arise in which a person needs the love
and compassion of others and in which the person, through
56 [4:423] such a natural law that sprung from the person's own
will,
[Scholar Translation: Orr]
56 [4:423]
[Student Translation: Orr]
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would rob himself of all hope of the assistance for would rob herself of all hope for the assistance that
which he longs. she wants.
These, then, are some of the many actual duties, These, then, are some of the many actual — or that we
or at least held by us as such, whose separation from at least take to be actual — duties whose spinning
the one principle cited above clearly strikes the off from the one principle cited above is clear. You
eyes. One must +be able to will+ that a maxim of our must +be able to will+ that a maxim of your action
action become a universal law: this is the canon of become a universal law; this is the canon for morally
moral judgment of it in general. Some actions are so judging action in general. Some actions are constituted
constituted that their maxim without contradiction in such a way that their maxim cannot without contradiction
cannot even be +thought+ as a universal law of nature; even be +thought+ as a universal law of nature. Even
far from it, that one can still +will+ it +should+ more implausible is that you could +will+ that the
become one such. With others undoubtedly that inner maxim of such actions +should+ become such a universal
impossibility is not to be found, but it is still law of nature. In the case of other actions, that inner
impossible to +will+ that their maxim be raised to the impossibility is definitely not present, but to +will+
universality of a law of nature, because such a will that the actions' maxim be elevated to the universality
would contradict itself. One easily sees: that the of a law of nature is still impossible because such
first conflicts with the strict or narrower a will would contradict itself. You can easily see
(unremitting) duty, the second only with the wider that the first kind of actions, having maxims that
(meritorious) duty, and so all duties, as concerns the are unthinkable as universal laws, conflict with strict
kind of obligation (not the object of their action), or narrower (never slackening) duty and that the second
have through these examples in their dependence on the kind of actions, having maxims that are unwillable
one principle been set forth completely. as universal laws, conflict with wide (meritorious)
If we now pay attention to ourselves during each duty. Consequently, you can also easily see that these
transgression of a duty, then we find that we examples thoroughly present all duties, as far as the
kind of obligation (not the object of the dutiful action)
57 [4:423-424] is concerned, as dependent on the one principle.
If we now pay attention to ourselves whenever we transgress
[Scholar Translation: Orr] a duty, we find that we
57 [4:423-424]
[Student Translation: Orr]
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actually do not will that our maxim should become a actually do not will that our maxim should become a
universal law, for that is for us impossible, but the universal law, for that is impossible for us. Instead,
opposite of it should instead generally remain a law; the opposite of the maxim should rather remain a law
only we ourselves take the liberty to make for generally. We only take the liberty for ourselves,
ourselves or (even only for this time) to the or (even only for this one time) to the advantage of
advantage of our inclination an +exception+ to it. our inclination, to make an +exception+ to the law.
Consequently, if we weighed everything from one and Consequently, if we were to weigh everything from one
the same point of view, namely of reason, then we and the same point of view, namely that of reason,
would find a contradiction in our own will, namely, then we would encounter a contradiction in our own
that a certain principle be objectively necessary as a will. The contradiction would be that a certain principle
universal law and yet subjectively not hold should be objectively necessary as a universal law
universally, but should permit exceptions. Since we, and yet subjectively should not hold universally but
however, one time consider our action from the point should permit exceptions. But since we at one time
of view of a will wholly in conformity with reason, consider our action from the point of view of a will
then, however, also just the same action from the wholly in accord with reason, but then also consider
point of view of a will affected by inclination, in the very same action from the point of view of a will
this way no contradiction is actually here, to be affected by inclination, there is actually no contradiction
sure, however, an opposition of inclination against here. Though there is no contradiction, there is an
the prescription of reason (antagonismus), by which opposition of inclination to the prescription of reason
the universality of the principle (universalitas) is (antagonismus). Through this opposition, the universality
changed into a mere generality (generalitas), and by of the principle (universalitas) is changed into a
this means the practical principle of reason is to mere generality (generalitas). By means of this transformation,
meet with the maxim halfway. Now, although this cannot the practical principle of reason is to meet the maxim
be justified in our own impartially employed judgment, half way. Now, although this resolution of the opposition
in this way it yet shows that we actually acknowledge cannot be justified by our own judgment when our judgment
the validity of the categorical imperative and permit is used impartially, the resolution still proves that
ourselves (with all respect for it) only a few, we actually do acknowledge the validity of the categorical
imperative and that we (with all respect for the imperative)
58 [4:424] only permit ourselves a few,
[Scholar Translation: Orr] 58 [4:424]
[Student Translation: Orr]
Groundlaying · Second Section · emended 1786 2nd ed. Groundlaying · Second Section · emended 1786 2nd edition
as it seems to us, inconsiderable and wrung-from-us as it seems to us, exceptions that are minor and forced
exceptions. from us.
We have this much thus at least shown, that, if So we have at least shown as much as the following.
duty is a concept which is to contain meaning and We have shown that if duty is a concept that is to
actual lawgiving for our actions, this can be contain meaning and actual lawgiving for our actions,
expressed only in categorical imperatives, in no way, then this duty can only be expressed in categorical
however, in hypothetical; we have also, which is imperatives and can in no way be expressed in hypothetical
already much, clearly and determinately for every use imperatives. We have also clearly and distinctly set
exhibited the content of the categorical imperative, forth for every use, which is already to have done
which would have to contain the principle of all duty a great deal, the content of the categorical imperative,
(if there were such a thing at all). Still, however, which must contain the principle of all duty (if there
we are not so far, a priori to prove, that the same were to be such a principle at all). But, still, we
imperative actually occurs, that there is a practical are not so far along as to prove a priori that there
law which absolutely and without any incentives actually is an imperative of this kind, that there
commands for itself, and that the following of this is a practical law which commands absolutely and by
law is duty. itself without any incentives, and that following this
With the aim of arriving at this, it is of the law is duty.
utmost importance to let this serve oneself as a With the aim of obtaining this a priori proof, it is
warning, that one, of course, not let it come into of the utmost importance to be warned against your
one's mind to want to derive the reality of this wanting to derive the reality of this principle from
principle from the +special quality of human nature+. the +special quality of human nature+. For duty is
For duty is to be practical-unconditional necessity of to be the practical-unconditional necessity of action.
action; it must thus hold for all rational beings (to So duty must hold for all rational beings (and only
which only an imperative can apply at all) and +only to such beings can an imperative apply at all) and
for this reason+ also be for all human wills a law. +only for this reason+ can duty be a law for all human
What, on the other hand, is derived from the wills. Whatever, on the other hand,
59 [4:424-425] 59 [4:424-425]
[Scholar Translation: Orr] [Student Translation: Orr]
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special natural predisposition of humanity, what from is derived from the special natural predispositions
certain feelings and propensity, indeed even where of the human being is something that can provide a
possible from a special tendency, which were peculiar maxim for us. Whatever is derived from certain feelings
to human reason and had not to hold necessarily for and propensities is something that can provide a maxim
the will of every rational being, that can, to be for us. Indeed, whatever is derived, where possible,
sure, yield a maxim for us, but not a law, a from a special tendency peculiar to human reason and
subjective principle, according to which we may act, not necessarily valid for the will of every rational
have propensity and inclination, but not an objective being is something that can definitely provide a maxim
principle, according to which we were +directed+ to for us, but it is not something that can provide a
act, even if all our propensity, inclination and law for us. All these predispositions, feelings, and
natural tendency were to the contrary, what is more, tendencies can provide a subjective principle according
that it all the more proves the sublimity and inner to which we may act and may have a propensity and inclination
dignity of the command in a duty, the fewer the to act, but they cannot provide an objective principle
subjective causes for it, the more they are against according to which we are +directed+ to act even if
it, without yet for that reason weakening even in the all our propensity, inclination and natural makeup
least the necessitation through the law and taking were against it. What is more, the fewer the subjective
anything away from its validity. causes of a command and the more the subjective causes
Here we now see philosophy put in fact on a against it, the more the sublimity and inner dignity
precarious standpoint which is to be firm, even though of the command in a duty is shown. This highlighting
it is neither in heaven nor on the earth suspended of sublimity and dignity occurs without these subjective
from something or supported by it. Here it should causes weakening even in the least the necessity of
prove its purity as self-holder of its laws, not as the law or taking anything away from the validity of
herald of those which an implanted sense or who knows the law.
what tutelary nature whispers to it, which all Here we now see philosophy put in fact in a precarious
together, they may always be better than nothing at position. This position is to be firm even though it
all, yet can never yield ground propositions which is neither suspended from anything in heaven nor supported
reason dictates and which must throughout have by anything on earth. This is where philosophy is to
completely a priori their source and with this at the prove her purity as caretaker of her own laws, not
same time their commanding authority: as the spokeswoman of what an implanted sense whispers
to philosophy or as the spokeswoman of who knows what
60 [4:425-426] whispering tutelary nature. Though this whispering
sense and whispering nature might always be better
[Scholar Translation: Orr] than nothing at all, they can still never provide basic
principles which reason dictates and which must throughout
have their origin fully a priori and, along with this
a priori origin, at the same time have their commanding
authority.
60 [4:425-426]
[Student Translation: Orr]
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to expect nothing from the inclination of the human These a priori basic principles expect nothing from
being, but everything from the supreme power of the the inclination of the human being. Instead, they expect
law and the respect owed to it, or otherwise to everything from the supreme power of the law and from
condemn the human being to self-contempt and inner the respect owed to the law. If their expectation is
abhorrence. not met, then the human being is condemned to self-contempt
Thus everything which is empirical, is, as an and inner abhorrence.
addition to the principle of morality, not only wholly So everything that is empirical is not only wholly unsuitable
unsuitable to it, but even highly disadvantageous to as an addition to the principle of morality, but everything
the purity of morals, in which the proper worth, empirical is highly damaging to the purity of morals
raised above all price, of an absolutely good will themselves. In this purity of morals is found the proper
consists just in this, that the principle of the worth, raised above all price, of an absolutely good
action be free from all influences of contingent will. This purity of morals consists just in this:
grounds, which only experience can provide. Against that the principle of action is free from all influences
this carelessness or even base way of thinking, in of contingent grounds which can only be provided by
search of the principle among empirical motives and experience. You also cannot too frequently issue too
laws, one can issue neither too much nor too many warnings against this carelessness and even base
frequently warnings, since the human reason in its way of thinking which searches for the principle of
weariness gladly rests on this pillow and in the dream morality among empirical motives and laws. These warnings
of sweet illusions (which permit it after all to cannot be too many or too frequent because human reason,
embrace a cloud instead of Juno) substitutes for in its weariness, gladly rests on this pillow of empirical
morality a bastard patched up from limbs of quite mush, and, in a dream of sweet illusions (which, after
different ancestry, which looks like everything which all, allows reason to embrace a cloud instead of Juno),
one wants to see in it, only not like virtue for one substitutes for morality a bastard patched up from
who has beheld it once in its true form.*) limbs of completely different ancestry. This patched
up bastard, masquerading as morality, looks like everything
*) To behold virtue in its proper form is that you want to see in it, except like virtue for
nothing other than to exhibit morality stripped those who have once beheld virtue in her true form*.
of all admixture of the sensuous
* To behold virtue in her proper form is nothing
61 [4:426] other than to exhibit morality stripped of
all admixture of sensuous
[Scholar Translation: Orr]
61 [4:426]
[Student Translation: Orr]
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Thus the question is this: is it a necessary law So the question is this: is it a necessary law +for
+for all rational beings+ to judge their actions all rational beings+ that they judge their actions
always according to such maxims of which they always according to maxims that they themselves can
themselves can will that they should serve as will as maxims that should serve as universal laws?
universal laws? If there is one such, then it must If there is such a necessary law, then it must (completely
(completely a priori) be connected already with the a priori) already be connected with the concept of
concept of the will of a rational being in general. In the will of a rational being in general. But in order
order, however, to discover this connection, one must, to discover this connection, you must, even though
however much one resists, take a step out, namely into you would rather not, take a step out into metaphysics.
metaphysics, although in a region of it which is In particular, you must take a step out into the metaphysics
different from that of speculative philosophy, namely of morals, which covers an area of metaphysics that
into the metaphysics of morals. In a practical is different from the area covered by speculative philosophy.
philosophy, where it is not our concern to assume In a practical philosophy, it is not our concern to
grounds of that which +happens+, but laws of that assume grounds for what +happens+ but rather laws for
which +ought to happen+, although it never happens, what +ought to happen+ even if it never does happen;
i.e. objective-practical laws: there we have no need that is, in a practical philosophy our concern is with
to undertake investigation of the grounds why objective-practical laws. In a practical philosophy,
something pleases or displeases, how the enjoyment of we have no need to undertake an investigation into
mere sensation is different from taste, and whether the reasons why something pleases or displeases us,
the latter is different from a universal satisfaction how the enjoyment of mere sensation differs from taste,
of reason; upon what feeling of pleasure and and whether taste is different from a universal satisfaction
displeasure rests, and how from here eager desires and of reason. We have no need to investigate what the
inclinations, from these, however, through cooperation feeling of pleasure and displeasure rests on, and how
of reason, maxims from this feeling eager desires and inclinations arise,
and then how, through the cooperation of reason, from
and all spurious adornment of reward or of these desires and inclinations maxims
self-love. How much it then eclipses everything
else which appears enticing to the inclinations and all fake decorations of reward or of self-love.
can each easily become aware of by means By means of the slightest exercise of one's
of the least effort of one's reason which reason, as long as that reason has not been
is not wholly ruined for all abstraction. completely ruined for all abstraction, everyone
can easily become aware of how much virtue
then eclipses everything else that appears
62 [4:426-427] enticing to inclinations.
[Scholar Translation: Orr]
62 [4:426-427]
[Student Translation: Orr]
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arise; for all that belongs to an empirical doctrine arise. For all that belongs to an empirical doctrine
of the soul, which would constitute the second part of of the soul, which would make up the second part of
the doctrine of nature, if one considers it as the doctrine of nature if you consider it as +philosophy
+philosophy of nature+, as far as it is grounded on of nature+ as far as it is grounded on +empirical laws+.
+empirical laws+. Here, however, the discussion is of Here, however, we are talking about objective-practical
objective-practical laws, therefore of the relation of laws and are therefore talking about the relation of
a will to itself, so far as it determines itself a will to itself so far as the will controls itself
merely through reason, where then everything, which merely through reason. When this happens, when the
has reference to the empirical, of itself falls away; will controls itself merely through reason, everything
because, if +reason by itself alone+ determines that has reference to the empirical falls away by itself.
conduct (the possibility of which we just now want to Everything that is empirical falls away because if
investigate), it must do this necessarily a priori. +reason by itself alone+ controls behavior (and the
The will is thought as a capacity to determine possibility of this kind of control is exactly what
itself to action +according to the representation of we now want to investigate) then reason must necessarily
certain laws+. And such a capacity can only be found execute this control in an a priori way.
in rational beings. Now, that which serves the will as The will is thought as a capacity to direct itself to
the objective ground of its self-determination is the act +according to the representation of certain laws+.
+end+, and this, if it is given through mere reason, And such a capacity can only be found in rational beings.
must hold equally for all rational beings. What, on An +end+ is what serves the will as an objective ground
the other hand, contains merely the ground of the of the will's self-direction. This end or goal, if
possibility of an action whose effect is an end is it is given only by reason, must hold equally for all
called the +means+. The subjective ground of desire is rational beings. On the other hand, a +means+ is what
the +incentive+, the objective ground of willing the contains merely the ground of possibility of an action
+motive+; thus the difference between subjective ends, that has an end as its effect. The subjective ground
which rest on incentives, and objective, which depend of desiring is an +incentive+; the objective ground
on motives, which of willing is a +motive+; thus the difference between
subjective ends, which rest on incentives, and objective
63 [4:427] ends, which depend on motives that
[Scholar Translation: Orr] 63 [4:427]
[Student Translation: Orr]
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hold for each rational being. Practical principles are hold for every rational being. Practical principles
+formal+, if they abstract from all subjective ends; are +formal+ if they abstract from all subjective ends.
they are, however, +material+, if they lay down these, But practical principles are +material+ if they make
therefore certain incentives, as the ground. The ends subjective ends, and therefore certain incentives,
that a rational being arbitrarily proposes as their basis. The ends that a rational being arbitrarily
+effects+ of its action (material ends) are one and aims at as +effects+ of her action (material ends)
all only relative; for only merely their relation to a are one and all only relative. For only the ends' mere
particularly constituted faculty of desire of the relation to a particularly fashioned faculty of desire
subject gives them the worth, which can therefore of the subject gives the ends their worth. This worth
provide no valid and necessary universal principles, can therefore provide no valid and necessary universal
i.e. practical laws, for all rational beings or for principles, that is, practical laws, for all rational
every willing. Hence all these relative ends are only beings or for every case of willing. All these relative
the ground of hypothetical imperatives. ends are therefore only the ground of hypothetical
Granted, however, there were something, +whose imperatives.
existence in itself+ has an absolute worth, which as Suppose, however, that there were something +whose existence
an +end in itself+ could be a ground of determinate in itself+ has an absolute worth, something which as
laws, then in it and only in it alone would the ground an +end in itself+ could be a ground of well-defined
of a possible categorical imperative, i.e. a practical laws. If that were supposed, then the ground of a possible
law, lie. categorical imperative, that is, the ground of a practical
Now I say: the human being and in general every law, would lie in that something and only in that something.
rational being +exists+ as an end in itself, +not Now I say: the human being and in general every rational
merely as a means+ to the arbitrary use for this or being +exists+ as an end in itself, +not merely as
that will, but must in all its actions, directed not a means+ for the optional use of this or that will.
only to itself but also to other rational beings, Instead, the human being must in all its actions, whether
the actions are directed at the human being performing
64 [4:427-428] the action or are directed at other rational beings,
[Scholar Translation: Orr] 64 [4:427-428]
[Student Translation: Orr]
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always be considered +at the same time as an end+. All always be considered +at the same time as an end+. All
objects of inclinations have only a conditional worth; objects of inclinations have only a conditional worth;
for if the inclinations and the needs based on them for, if the inclinations and needs grounded on them
were not, then their object would be without worth. did not exist, then their object would be without worth.
The inclinations themselves, however, as sources of But inclinations themselves, as sources of need, are
need, are so far from having an absolute worth so as very far from having an absolute worth so that they
to be wished for themselves that, on the contrary, to would be wished for in themselves. Instead, it must
be completely free of them must be the universal wish be the universal wish of every rational being to be
of each rational being. Thus the worth of all objects completely free of inclinations. So the worth of any
+to be obtained+ by our action is always conditional. objects +to be attained+ through our action is always
The beings whose existence rests indeed not on our conditional. The beings whose existence rests not,
will, but on nature, have nevertheless, if they are to be sure, on our will but on nature still have, if
beings without reason, only a relative worth as means they are beings without reason, only a relative worth
and are therefore called +things+, on the other hand, as means and are therefore called +things+. On the
rational beings are named +persons+ because their other hand, rational beings are called +persons+ because
nature already marks them out as ends in themselves, their nature already marks them out as ends in themselves,
i.e. as something that may not be used merely as that is, as something that may not be used merely as
means, therefore so far limits all choice (and is an a means, and therefore their nature as persons limits
object of respect). These are thus not merely any choice about how to act (and is an object of respect).
subjective ends whose existence as effect of our So persons are not merely subjective ends whose existence
action has a worth +for us+; but +objective ends+, as an effect of our action has a worth +for us+. Instead,
i.e. things whose existence in itself is an end and, persons are +objective ends+, that is, things whose
to be sure, one such in place of which no other end existence in itself is an end. In particular, their
can be put for which they should stand to serve existence in itself is an end that cannot be replaced
+merely+ as means, because without this nothing at all by some other end in such a way that their existence
of +absolute worth+ would be found anywhere; if, is to serve the substituted end +merely+ as a means.
however, all Another end cannot be put in place of their existence
as an end because, if the substitution could occur,
65 [4:428] no +absolute worth+ at all would be found anywhere;
but if all
[Scholar Translation: Orr]
65 [4:428]
[Student Translation: Orr]
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worth were conditional, therefore contingent, then for worth were conditional and therefore contingent, then
reason no highest practical principle could be found no highest practical principle for reason could be
anywhere. found anywhere.
If, then, there is thus to be a highest practical So if there is to be a highest practical principle and,
principle and in view of the human will a categorical with regard to the human will, a categorical imperative,
imperative, then it must be one such that, from the then it must be a principle that, from the thought
representation of that which necessarily for everyone or representation of what is necessarily an end for
is an end because it is an +end in itself+, everyone because it is an +end in itself+, constitutes
constitutes an +objective+ principle of the will, an +objective+ principle of the will and so can serve
therefore can serve as the universal practical law. as a universal practical law. The ground of this principle
The ground of this principle is: +rational nature is: +rational nature exists as an end in itself+. The
exists as an end in itself+. In this way the human human being necessarily conceives of her own existence
being necessarily conceives its own existence; so far in this way. Limited to the individual in this way,
is it thus a +subjective+ principle of human actions. the principle is thus a +subjective+ principle of human
In this way, however, also every other rational being actions. But every other rational being also conceives
conceives its existence owing to just the same of its existence in this way on the very same rational
rational ground which also holds for me *); hence it ground that also holds for me*. Hence, the principle
is at the same time an +objective+ principle from is at the same time an +objective+ principle from which,
which as a highest practical ground all laws of the as a highest practical ground, all laws of the will
will must be able to be derived. The practical must be able to be derived. So the practical imperative
imperative will thus be the following: +Act in this will be the following: +act in such a way that you
way, that you use humanity in your own person, as well treat humanity, in your own person, as well as in the
as in the person of every other, always at the same person of every other, always at the same time as an
time as an end, never+ end, never+
*) This proposition I set forth here as a * Here I set this proposition out as a postulate.
postulate. In the last section one will find In the last section you will find the reasons
the grounds for this. for the proposition.
66 [4:428-429]
[Scholar Translation: Orr] 66 [4:428-429]
[Student Translation: Orr]
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+merely as a means+. We want to see whether this can +merely as a means+. We want to see if this principle
be achieved. can be worked out.
So as to stay with the previous examples, in this If we stay with the previous examples, then we will
way will have the following.
+Firstly+, in accordance with the concept of +Firstly+, as regards the concept of necessary duty
necessary duty toward oneself, that one, who has toward oneself, a person who has suicide in mind will
suicide in mind, ask himself whether his action can ask herself whether her action can be compatible with
subsist together with the idea of humanity +as an end the idea of humanity +as an end in itself+. If she,
in itself+. If he, in order to escape from a in order to escape from a troublesome situation, destroys
troublesome situation, destroys himself, then he makes herself, then she makes use of a person merely as +a
use of a person merely as +a means+ for the means+ for maintaining a tolerable situation until
preservation of a tolerable situation till the end of the end of life. But the human being is not a thing
life. The human being, however, is not a thing, and therefore is not something that can be used +merely+
therefore not something that can be used +merely+ as as a means. Instead, the human being must in all her
means, but must in all its actions always be actions always be considered as an end in herself.
considered as an end in itself. Thus I can dispose of So I can dispose of nothing about the human being in
nothing concerning the human being in my own person, my person, cannot maim her, corrupt her, or kill her.
to maim him, to corrupt, or to kill. (The more precise (Although it would help to avoid any misunderstanding,
determination of this ground proposition for the I have to forego a more precise specification of this
avoidance of all misunderstanding, e.g. of the basic principle, for example, of how the principle
amputation of limbs in order to preserve myself, of would apply to the amputation of limbs in order to
the danger to which I expose my life in order to save myself, how it would apply to cases in which I
preserve my life, etc., I must here pass by; it expose my life to danger in order to preserve my life,
belongs to morals proper.) and so on; this more precise specification of the principle
+Secondly+, what concerns the necessary or belongs to morals proper.)
obliged duty to others, so will he, who has it in mind +Secondly+, as concerns the necessary or owed duty to
to make a lying promise to others, at once see that he others, someone who intends to make a lying promise
wills to make use of another human being to others will see at once that she wants to make use
of another human being
67 [4:429]
67 [4:429]
[Scholar Translation: Orr]
[Student Translation: Orr]
Groundlaying · Second Section · emended 1786 2nd ed. Groundlaying · Second Section · emended 1786 2nd edition
+merely as a means+, without that the latter at the +merely as a means+, without the other person at the
same time contains the end in itself. For he, whom I same time having the same the end. For the person whom
will to use through such a promise for my purposes, I want to use for my purposes by making such a promise
can impossibly agree in my way of proceeding against cannot possibly agree with my way of proceeding against
him and thus himself contain the end of this action. her, and she cannot therefore contain in herself the
This conflict with the principle of other human beings end of my action. This conflict with the principle
more clearly catches the eye when one draws near of duty owed to other human beings more clearly catches
examples of attacks on freedom and property of others. the eye when you bring in examples of attacks on the
For then it is clear that the transgressor of the freedom and property of others. For then it is evident
rights of human beings is disposed to make use of the that the transgressor of the rights of human beings
person of others merely as a means, without taking intends to make use of the person of others merely
into consideration that they as rational beings ought as a means and intends to do this without taking into
always at the same time to be valued as ends, i.e. consideration that the others, as rational beings,
only as such, who must be able to contain the end of ought always to be valued at the same time as ends,
just the same action also in themselves*). that is, ought always to be valued as beings who must
+Thirdly+, in view of the contingent also be able to have in themselves the end of the very
(meritorious) duty to oneself, it's not enough that same action*.
the +Thirdly+, with regard to the contingent (meritorious)
duty to oneself, it's not enough that the
*) Let one not think that here the trivial:
what you do not want done to you etc. can * You should not think that here the trivial:
serve as a rule of conduct or principle. what you do not want done to you etc. can
For it is, although with various limitations, serve as a rule of thumb for conduct or as
only derived from that one; it can be no a guiding principle. For this trivial saying
universal law, for it does not contain the is, although with various limitations, only
ground of duties to oneself, not of duties derived from the principle of duty owed to
of love to others (for many would gladly others; it cannot be a universal law, for
agree to it that others ought not benefit it does not contain the ground of duties
him if only he might be excused from showing to oneself, does not contain the ground of
them kindness), finally not of duties owed duties of love to others (for many a person
to one another; for the criminal would from would gladly agree that others should not
this ground argue against his punishing judges, do anything to benefit her if only she may
and so on. be excused from showing them any kindness).
And, finally, this trivial saying does not
68 [4:429-430] contain the ground of duties owed to one
another; for the criminal would use this
[Scholar Translation: Orr] deficiency to argue against the judges who
are punishing her, and so on.
68 [4:429-430]
[Student Translation: Orr]
Groundlaying · Second Section · emended 1786 2nd ed. Groundlaying · Second Section · emended 1786 2nd edition
action not conflict with humanity in our person as an action not conflict with the humanity in our person
end in itself, it must also +harmonize with it+. Now, as an end in itself; the action must also +harmonize
in humanity there are predispositions to greater with that humanity in our person+. Now, in humanity
perfection, which belong to the end of nature in view there are predispositions to greater perfection that
of humanity in our subject; to neglect these would be belong to the end of nature with regard to humanity
at most possibly compatible with the +preservation+ of in our subject. To neglect these predispositions would
humanity as an end in itself, but not with the be, at most, probably compatible with the +preservation+
+furtherance+ of this end. of humanity as an end in itself, but neglecting them
+Fourthly+, in reference to the meritorious duty would not be compatible with the +promotion+ of this
to others, the natural end that all human beings have end.
is their own happiness. Now, humanity would no doubt +Fourthly+, with regard to meritorious duty to others,
be able to subsist, if no one contributes anything to the natural end that all human beings have is their
the happiness of others, in doing so, however, own happiness. Now, humanity would no doubt endure
intentionally withdraws nothing from it; but this is if no one contributed anything to the happiness of
still only a negative and not positive agreement with others but also, in so doing, intentionally withdrew
+humanity as end in itself+, if everyone did not also nothing from that happiness. But, if everyone does
strive to further the ends of others, so far as he not also try, as far as she can, to promote the ends
can. For the subject, which is an end in itself, ends of others, then this neutrality is still only a negative
of it must, if that representation is to have +full+ and not positive harmonization with +humanity as an
effect in me, also, so far as possible, be +my+ ends. end in itself+. For the ends of a subject which is
This principle of humanity and of each rational an end in itself must, as far as possible, also be
nature in general, +as an end in itself+, (which is +my+ ends, if that thought of an end in itself is to
the highest limiting condition of the have +full+ effect in me.
This principle of humanity and of each rational nature
69 [4:430-431] in general +as an end in itself+ (which is the highest
limiting condition on the freedom
[Scholar Translation: Orr]
69 [4:430-431]
[Student Translation: Orr]
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freedom of the actions of each human being) is not of action of every human being) is not borrowed from
borrowed from experience, firstly, on account of its experience. First, because of the principle's universality,
universality, since it applies to all rational beings applying as it does to all rational beings in general,
in general, about which to determine something no and since no experience is sufficient to say anything
experience suffices; secondly, because in it humanity definite about all rational beings in general, the
is represented not as an end of human beings principle is not borrowed from experience. Secondly,
(subjectively), i.e. as an object which one of oneself the principle also is not borrowed from experience
actually makes an end, but as an objective end which, because, in the principle, humanity is not represented
whatever ends we may have, as law is to constitute the or thought of as an end of human beings (subjectively);
highest limiting condition of all subjective ends, and that is, humanity is not represented as an object which
therefore must arise from pure reason. That is to say, you by yourself actually make into an end; instead,
the ground of all practical lawgiving lies humanity is represented as an objective end which,
+objectively in the rule+ and in the form of whatever ends we might happen to have, as a law is
universality which makes it capable of being to constitute the highest limiting condition of all
(according to the first principle) a law (possibly law subjective ends. Therefore, the principle must arise
of nature), +subjectively+, however, in the +end+; the from pure reason. In particular, the ground of all
subject of all ends, however, is each rational being practical lawgiving resides +objectively in the rule+
as an end in itself (according to the second and in the form of universality. This universality
principle): from this follows now the third practical (according to the first principle) makes the rule capable
principle of the will, as highest condition of the of being a law (possibly a natural law). +Subjectively+,
harmony of it with universal practical reason, the however, the ground of practical lawgiving resides
idea +of the will of each rational being as a will in the +end+. The subject of all ends, however, is
giving universal law+. each rational being as an end in itself (according
All maxims are rejected according to this to the second principle). From this the third practical
principle, which are not consistent with the will's principle of the will, as the highest condition of
own universal lawgiving. The will is thus not only the harmony of the will with universal practical reason,
subject to the law, now follows: the idea +of the will of every rational
being as a will giving universal law+.
70 [4:431] According to this third practical principle of the will,
all maxims which are not consistent with the will's
[Scholar Translation: Orr] own universal lawgiving are rejected. So the will is
not only subject to the law,
70 [4:431]
[Student Translation: Orr]
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but so subject, that it also must be seen +as but the will is subject to the law in such a way that
self-lawgiving+ and for just that reason subject first the will must also be seen +as giving law to itself+;
of all to the law (of which it can consider itself as and, just because the will does give law to itself,
author). the will must be seen as first of all subject to the
The imperatives according to the previous way of law (of which the will itself can consider itself the
representation, namely, of a conformity to law of author).
actions, generally similar to a +natural order+, or of Up to now, imperatives have been modelled according
the universal +prerogative of the end+ of rational to two different ways of thinking of the imperatives.
beings in themselves, excluded undoubtedly from their One way of thinking of imperatives is to represent
commanding authority all admixture of any interest as them as expressing a conformity of actions to law,
incentive just by this: that they were represented as that conformity being generally similar to a +natural
categorical; they were, however, only +assumed+ as order+. A second way represents imperatives as expressing
categorical, because one had to assume such-like, if the universal +priority of the end+ of rational beings.
one wanted to explain the concept of duty. That there Both of these ways of representing imperatives definitely
are, however, practical propositions that command excluded from the imperatives' commanding authority
categorically could for itself not be proved, just as all admixture of any interest as an incentive. All
little as it also not yet anywhere here in this interest was excluded precisely because the imperatives
section can be done; but one thing could still have were represented as categorical; they, however, were
been done, namely: that the renunciation of all only +assumed+ to be categorical because you had to
interest in willing from duty, as the specific assume that they were categorical if you wanted to
distinguishing mark of the categorical from explain the concept of duty. That there are, however,
hypothetical imperative, would be jointly indicated in practical propositions that command categorically could
the imperative itself through some determination which not itself be proved. No more than before, that there
it contains, and this is done in the present third are such propositions can also not yet be proved anywhere
formula of the principle, namely, in the idea of the here in this section. But one thing could still have
will of each rational being as a +will giving been done, namely: that in cases of willing from duty,
universal law+. the renunciation of any interest — that renunciation
being the specific mark distinguishing categorical
71 [4:431-432] imperatives from hypothetical imperatives — would be
jointly indicated in the imperative itself by some
[Scholar Translation: Orr] specific feature that the imperative contains. This
joint indication of renunciation of interest and distinction
between types of imperative occurs in the present third
formula of the principle, namely, in the idea of the
will of each rational being as a +will giving universal
law+.
71 [4:431-432]
[Student Translation: Orr]
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For if we think one such, then, although a will For if we think of such a will, then, although a will
+which stands under laws+ may still be bound by means +that stands under laws+ may still be connected to
of an interest to this law, nevertheless a will, which this law by an interest, it is impossible for a will
is itself at highest lawgiving, can depend impossibly which itself is highest in lawgiving to be dependent
so far on any interest; for such a dependent will to such an extent on any interest; for such a dependent
would itself require still another law, which limited will would itself require still another law that would
the interest of its self-love to the condition of a limit the interest of the will's self-love to the condition
validity for universal law. of the interest's validity as universal law.
Thus the +principle+ of each human will, as +a So the +principle+ of every human will as +a will giving
will giving universal law through all its maxims+*), universal law through all its maxims+* would be quite
if it otherwise had with it only its correctness, +well-suited+ to be a categorical imperative, if the
would be quite +well suited+ for the categorical principle were quite correct in other ways. The principle
imperative by this, that it, just for the sake of the would be well-suited to be a categorical imperative
idea of universal lawgiving, +is grounded on no because the principle, just for the sake of the idea
interest+ and thus among all possible imperatives can of universal lawgiving, +rests on no interest+ and
alone be +unconditional+; or still better, in that we therefore alone among all possible imperatives can
convert the proposition, if there is a categorical be +unconditional+. The reason for the well-suitedness
imperative (i.e. a law for every will of a rational of the principle can be stated even better if we turn
being), then it can only command to do everything from the proposition around: if there is a categorical imperative
the maxim of its will as one such that at the same (that is, a law for the will of every rational being),
time could have itself as giving law universally then the imperative can only command that the rational
being always act from the maxim of the being's will
*) I can here be excused from citing examples regarded as a will that at the same time could have
for the illustration of this principle, for itself as giving universal law
those, that at first illustrated the categorical
imperative and its formula, can here all * I can here be excused from citing examples
serve to just the same end. to illustrate this principle, for those examples
first used in this way to illustrate the
72 [4:432] categorical imperative and its formula can
all serve just the same purpose here.
[Scholar Translation: Orr]
72 [4:432]
[Student Translation: Orr]
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as an object; for then only is the practical principle as an object. For only then is the practical principle
and the imperative, which it obeys, unconditional, and the imperative which the will obeys unconditioned
because it can have no interest at all as ground. because the imperative can have no interest at all
It is now no wonder, when we look back on all as a ground.
previous efforts that have ever been undertaken in It is now not surprising, when we look back on all previous
order to discover the principle of morality, why they efforts that have ever been undertaken to discover
in every case had to fail. One saw the human being the principle of morality, why they had to fail in
through its duty bound to laws, but it occurred to no every case. You saw the human being bound by its duty
one that it is subject +only to its own+ and to laws, but it never occurred to anyone that the human
nevertheless +universal lawgiving+, and that it is being is subject +only to its own+, but still +universal,
only bound to act in conformity with its own will, lawgiving+ and that the human being is only obligated
though, according to the natural end, universally to act according to its own will which, according to
lawgiving. For if one conceived of it only as subject nature's end, however, is universally lawgiving. For,
to a law (whichever it is): then this had to carry if you conceived of the human being only as subject
with itself some interest as attraction or constraint, to a law (whichever law it might be), then this law
because it arose not as law from +its+ will, but the had to carry with itself some interest as an attraction
latter was necessitated in conformity to law by or constraint. The law had to have this attracting
+something else+ to act in a certain way. Through this or constraining interest because the law did not arise
wholly necessary consequence, however, all labor to from the +human being's+ will as a law; instead, the
find a highest ground of duty was irretrievably lost. human being's will was necessitated to act in a certain
For one never got duty, but necessity of action from a way in conformity to law by +something else+. But by
certain interest. This might now be one's own or this entirely necessary consequence, all labor expended
another's interest. But then the imperative had each in trying to find a highest ground of duty was irretrievably
time to turn out conditioned lost. For you never got duty; instead, you only got
necessity of action from a certain interest. Now, this
73 [4:432-433] interest might be your own or another's. But in either
case the imperative always had to turn out conditioned
[Scholar Translation: Orr]
73 [4:432-433]
[Student Translation: Orr]
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and was not able at all to be fit as the moral and could not at all be suited to be the moral command.
command. Thus I want to name this ground proposition So I want to call this basic principle the principle
the principle of the +autonomy+ of the will, in of the +autonomy+ of the will, in opposition to every
opposition to every other that I on this account class other principle which I therefore count as ++heteronomy++.
with ++heteronomy++. The concept of any rational being which must consider
The concept of any rational being which must itself as giving universal law through all of the maxims
consider itself through all maxims of its will as of its will, in order to judge itself and its action
giving universal law, in order from this point of view from this point of view, leads to a very fruitful concept.
to judge itself and its actions, leads to a very This latter, very fruitful concept hangs on the former
fruitful concept hanging on it, namely, that +of an concept of any rational being and is the concept +of
empire of ends+. an empire of ends+.
I understand, however, under an +empire+ the But, by an +empire+, I understand the systematic union
systematic union of different rational beings through of different rational beings through a common law.
common laws. Now, because laws determine ends as Now, because laws determine ends according to the laws'
regards their universal validity, in this way will, if universal validity, an empire of ends can be thought
one abstracts from the personal difference of rational which is possible according to the above principles.
beings, also from all content of their private ends, But the thought of this empire of ends becomes possible
be able to be thought a whole of all ends (not only of in this way only if you also abstract from the personal
rational beings as ends in themselves, but also of differences of rational beings and from all content
individual ends which each one may set itself) in of their private ends. If you abstract in this way,
systematic bond, i.e. an empire of ends, which in then the thought of a whole of all ends (not only a
accordance with the above principles is possible. whole of rational beings as ends in themselves but
For rational beings all stand under the +law+ also of individual ends which each rational being may
that each of them is to treat itself and all others set for herself) in a systematic bond is possible.
For rational beings all stand under the +law+ that each
74 [4:433] rational being is to treat itself and all other rational
beings
[Scholar Translation: Orr]
74 [4:433]
[Student Translation: Orr]
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+never merely as a means+, but always +at the same +never merely as a means+, but instead always +at the
time as an end in itself+. Through this, however, same time as an end in itself+. But from this law,
arises a systematic union of rational beings through and from the treatment the law prescribes, there arises
common objective laws, i.e. an empire, which, because a systematic union of rational beings through common
these laws have just the reference of these beings to objective laws. That is, an empire arises which, because
each other as ends and means as the purpose, can be these laws have as their aim just the relation of these
called an empire of ends (admittedly only an ideal). beings to each other as ends and means, can be called
A rational being, however, belongs as a +member+ an empire of ends (which is, admittedly, only an ideal).
to the empire of ends, if it is, to be sure, A rational being, however, belongs to an empire of ends
universally lawgiving in it but also is itself subject as a +member+, if the rational being is, of course,
to these laws. It belongs to it +as head+, if it as universally lawgiving in the empire but also is itself
lawgiving is subject to no will of another. subject to these laws. A rational being belongs to
The rational being must consider itself always as an empire of ends +as head+, if the rational being
lawgiving in an empire of ends possible through as lawgiving is subject to the will of no other.
freedom of the will, whether it now be as a member, or The rational being must always consider itself as lawgiving
as head. It can keep the seat of the latter, however, in an empire of ends possible through freedom of the
not merely through the maxims of its will, but only will, whether it be as member or as head. A rational
then, when it is a completely independent being being cannot keep the seat of the latter, the head's
without need and limitation of its capacity adequate seat, merely by the maxims of its will; instead, a
to the will. rational being can keep the seat only when the rational
Morality thus consists in the reference of all being is a completely independent being without need
action to the lawgiving by which alone an empire of and without limitation to its power that is adequate
ends is possible. This lawgiving must, however, to its will.
So morality consists in the relation of all action to
75 [4:433-434] the lawgiving through which alone an empire of ends
is possible. This lawgiving must, however,
[Scholar Translation: Orr]
75 [4:433-434]
[Student Translation: Orr]
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be found in each rational being itself and be able to be found in every rational being itself and must be
arise from its will, whose principle therefore is: to able to arise from the rational being's will. The principle
do no action according to another maxim, except such of the rational being's will is thus this: to do no
that it also can be consistent with it, that it is a action according to any maxim unless the maxim could
universal law, and thus only such +that the will be a universal law and thus to do an action only if
through its maxim can consider itself at the same time +the will could through its maxim consider itself at
as universally lawgiving+. If now the maxims are with the same time as giving universal law+. Now, if the
this objective principle of rational beings, as maxims are not by their nature already necessarily
universally lawgiving, not through their nature in agreement with this objective principle of rational
already necessarily in agreement, then the necessity beings as giving universal law, then the necessity
of action according to that principle is called of action according to that principle is called practical
practical necessitation, i.e. +duty+. Duty belongs not necessitation, that is, +duty+. Duty does not apply
to the head in the empire of ends, does, however, to to the head in the empire of ends, but duty surely
each member and undoubtedly to all in equal measure. does apply to each member and, to be sure, to each
The practical necessity to act according to this member in equal measure.
principle, i.e. the duty, rests not at all on The practical necessity of acting according to this
feelings, impulses and inclinations, but merely on the principle, that is, the duty, does not rest at all
relation of rational beings to one another, in which on feelings, impulses and inclinations. Instead, the
the will of a rational being must be considered always practical necessity of acting according to this principle
at the same time as +lawgiving+, because it otherwise rests merely on the relation of rational beings to
could not think them as an +end in themselves+. Reason each other. In this relation, the will of a rational
thus refers each maxim of the will as universally being must always at the same time be considered as
lawgiving to each other will and also to each action +giving law+ because otherwise the rational being could
toward oneself and this, to be sure, not for the sake not think other rational beings as +ends in themselves+.
of any other practical motive or future advantage, but So reason refers every maxim of the will as giving
from the idea of the universal law to every other will and also to every
action towards oneself. Reason definitely does not
76 [4:434] make these references to other wills and to self-directed
actions for the sake of any other practical motive
[Scholar Translation: Orr] or for the sake of future advantage. Instead, reason
makes these references from the idea of the
76 [4:434]
[Student Translation: Orr]
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+dignity+ of a rational being who obeys no law other +dignity+ of a rational being who obeys no law except
than that which it at the same time itself gives. a law that the rational being itself gives at the same
In the empire of ends everything has either a time.
++price++, or a ++dignity++. What has a price, in its In the empire of ends everything has either a ++price++
place can also something else as +equivalent+ be or a ++dignity++. What has a price is something in
placed; what, on the other hand, is raised above all the place of which something else, as an +equivalent+,
price, and therefore allows no equivalent, that has a can also be placed. What, on the other hand, is elevated
dignity. above all price, that has a dignity.
What refers to general human inclinations and What refers to general human inclinations and needs
needs has a +market price+; that which, even without has a +market price+. That which, even without presupposing
presupposing a need, conforms to a certain taste, i.e. a need, accords with a certain taste, that is, accords
to a delight in the mere purposeless play of our with a delight in the mere purposeless play of our
powers of mind, a +fancy price+; that, however, which powers of mind, has a +fancy price+. That, however,
constitutes the condition under which alone something which constitutes the condition under which alone something
can be an end in itself has not merely a relative can be an end in itself has not merely a relative worth,
worth, i.e. a price, but an inner worth, i.e. that is, a price, but instead has an inner worth, that
+dignity+. is, +dignity+.
Now, morality is the condition under which alone Now, morality is the condition under which alone a rational
a rational being can be an end in itself, because only being can be an end in itself. Morality is the only
through it is it possible to be a lawgiving member in condition because only through morality is it possible
the empire of ends. Thus morality and humanity, as far to be a lawgiving member in the empire of ends. So
as it is capable of it, is that which alone has morality, and humanity insofar as it is capable of
dignity. Skill and diligence in work have a market morality, is that which alone has dignity. Skill and
price; wit, diligence in work have a market price; wit,
77 [4:434-435] 77 [4:434-435]
[Scholar Translation: Orr] [Student Translation: Orr]
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lively imagination and humor, a fancy price; on the lively imagination and humor have a fancy price. In
other hand, fidelity in promising, benevolence from contrast, sincerity in promising, kindness from basic
ground propositions (not from instinct) have an inner principles (not from instinct), have an inner worth.
worth. Nature as well as art contain nothing which Nature as well as art contain nothing which they, lacking
they, in deficiency of them, could put in their place; sincerity and kindness, could put in place of sincerity
for their worth consists not in the effects that arise and kindness; for the worth of sincerity and kindness
from them, in the advantage and profit which they consists not in the effects which arise from them,
provide, but in the dispositions, i.e. the maxims of not from the advantage and profit which they provide.
the will, that are ready to reveal themselves in this Instead, the worth of sincerity and kindness consists
way in actions, even though success did not favor in the dispositions, that is, in the maxims of the
them. These actions also need no recommendation from will, that are ready to reveal themselves in this way
any subjective disposition or taste, to look at them in actions even if success does not favor them. These
with immediate favor and delight, no immediate actions also require no recommendation from any subjective
propensity or feeling for the same: they present the disposition or taste in order to be regarded with immediate
will, which practices them, as an object of an favor and delight; they require no immediate tendency
immediate respect, for which nothing but reason is or feeling in order to be regarded in such a way. These
required in order +to impose+ them on the will, not to actions of sincerity and kindness present the will
+coax+ from it, which latter were in the case of that practices them as an object of an immediate respect.
duties anyhow a contradiction. This estimation thus For this presentation of the will as a respected object,
shows the worth of such a way of thinking as dignity nothing but reason is required in order +to impose+
and puts it above all price infinitely far off, with the actions on the will. To +coax+ the actions from
which it can not at all be brought into account and the will, which in the case of duties would anyhow
comparison, without as it were assaulting its be a contradiction, is not required for the presentation
holiness. of the will as a respected object. This valuation thus
And what is it now, then, which justifies the shows the worth of such a way of thinking as dignity
morally good disposition or virtue to make such high and puts dignity infinitely far above all price. Dignity
claims? cannot be brought into calculation or comparison with
price at all without, so to speak, assaulting dignity's
78 [4:435] holiness.
And now, then, what is it that justifies the morally
[Scholar Translation: Orr] good disposition or virtue in making such lofty claims?
78 [4:435]
[Student Translation: Orr]
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It is nothing less than the +share+ that it affords What justifies it is nothing less than the +share+ that
the rational being +in universal lawgiving+ and makes the disposition provides to the rational being +in
it by this fit to be a member in a possible empire of universal lawgiving+. By providing this share in universal
ends to which it through its own nature was already lawgiving, the disposition makes the rational being
determined as an end in itself and just for that fit to be a member in a possible empire of ends. The
reason as lawgiving in the empire of ends, in view of rational being was already destined by its own nature
all natural laws as free, only obeying those alone as an end in itself and therefore as a lawgiver in
that it itself gives and according to which its maxims an empire of ends to be fit to be such a member and
can belong to a universal lawgiving (to which it at to be free with regard to all natural laws, obeying
the same time subjects itself). For nothing has a only those laws that the rational being itself gives
worth other than that which the law determines for it. and only those laws according to which the rational
The lawgiving itself, however, which determines all being's maxims can belong in a universal lawgiving
worth, must just for that reason have a dignity, i.e. (to which the rational being at the same time subjects
unconditional, incomparable worth, for which the word itself). For nothing has a worth except that worth
+respect+ alone furnishes the proper expression of the which the law determines for it. But lawgiving itself,
estimation which a rational being has to assign with which determines all worth, must for just that reason
regard to it. +Autonomy+ is thus the ground of the have a dignity, that is, have unconditional, incomparable
dignity of the human and every rational nature. worth. Only the word '+respect+' provides the appropriate
The three ways cited above to represent the expression of the valuation that a rational being must
principle of morality, however, are at bottom only so assign to dignity. +Autonomy+ is therefore the ground
many formulas of just the same law, of which the one of the dignity of human nature and of all rational
of itself unites in itself the other two. Meanwhile, a nature.
difference is yet in them that, to be sure, is The three ways above, however, of representing the principle
subjective rather than objective-practical, namely, so of morality are at bottom only so many formulas of
as to bring an idea of reason nearer to intuition the very same law, in which one by itself unites the
(according to a certain analogy) other two in itself. Meanwhile, there is still a difference
in them that is definitely subjectively practical rather
79 [4:435-436] than objectively practical, namely, so as to bring
an idea of reason closer to intuition (according to
[Scholar Translation: Orr] a certain analogy)
79 [4:435-436]
[Student Translation: Orr]
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and by this to feeling. All maxims have namely and, by bringing the idea closer to intuition, bringing
1) a +form+, which consists in universality, and the idea closer to feeling. All maxims have, namely
here the formula of the moral imperative is expressed 1) a +form+, which consists in universality, and here
thus: that the maxims must in this way be selected, as the formula of the moral imperative is expressed in
if they were to hold as universal laws of nature; this way: that maxims must so be chosen as if they
2) a +matter+, namely an end, and here the were to hold as universal laws of nature;
formula says: that the rational being, as an end 2) a +matter+, namely an end, and here the formula says:
according to its nature, therefore as an end in that the rational being, as an end according to its
itself, must serve for every maxim as the limiting nature, therefore as an end in itself, must serve for
condition of all merely relative and optional ends; every maxim as the limiting condition of all merely
3) +a complete determination+ of all maxims relative and optional ends;
through that formula, namely: that all maxims from 3) +a complete determination+ of all maxims through
individual lawgiving ought to harmonize to a possible that formula, namely: that all maxims as individual
empire of ends, as to an empire of nature*). The lawgiving ought to harmonize with a possible empire
progression occurs here as through the categories of of ends, as with an empire of nature*. The progression
the +unity+ of the form of the will (of its happens here as through the categories of +unity+ of
universality), of the +plurality+ of the matter (of the form of the will (of the universality of the will),
the objects, i.e. of the ends) and of the +allness+ or of +plurality+ of the matter (of the objects, that
totality of the system of them. One does better, is, of the ends), and of +allness+ or totality of the
however, if one in moral +judgment+ always system of ends. But you do better if in moral +judgment+
you always
*) Teleology considers nature as an empire
of ends, morals a possible empire of ends * Teleology considers nature as an empire
as an empire of nature. There the empire of ends. Morals considers a possible empire
of ends is a theoretical idea in explanation of ends as an empire of nature. In the former,
of that which exists. Here it is a practical teleological, consideration, the empire of
idea, in order to bring into existence that ends is a theoretical idea that explains
which does not exist, but through our doing what exists. In the latter, moral, consideration,
and letting can become actual, and, to be the empire of ends is a practical idea for
sure, in conformity with just this idea. bringing into existence what does not exist
but which can, in accordance of course with
precisely this practical idea, become actual
80 [4:436] through our conduct.
[Scholar Translation: Orr]
80 [4:436]
[Student Translation: Orr]
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proceeds according to the strict method and lays the proceed according to the strict method and make the
universal formula of the categorical imperative as the universal formula of the categorical imperative the
ground: +act according to the maxim which at the same ground of judgment: +act according to the maxim which
time can make itself into a universal law+. If one can make itself at the same time into a universal law+.
wants, however, to provide at the same time +entry+ If, however, you want at the same time to make the
for the moral law: then it is very useful to lead one moral law more +accessible+, then it is very useful
and just the same action through the named three to lead one and the same action through the three named
concepts and in so doing, so far as it is possible, to concepts of unity of form, plurality of matter, and
bring it nearer to intuition. allness of the system of ends and, by doing this, bring
We can now here end from where we in the the three concepts, as far as possible, closer to intuition.
beginning started, namely, from the concept of an We can now end where we began, namely, with the concept
unconditionally good will. The +will+ is +absolutely of an unconditionally good will. That +will+ is +absolutely
good+, which cannot be bad, therefore whose maxim, if good+ which cannot be bad and therefore whose maxim,
it is made into a universal law, can never conflict if the maxim is made into a universal law, can never
with itself. This principle is thus also its highest conflict with itself. So this principle is also the
law: act always according to that maxim whose will's highest law: act always according to that maxim
universality as law you at the same time can will; whose universality as law you can at the same time
this is the sole condition under which a will can will; this is the sole condition under which a will
never be in conflict with itself, and such an can never be in conflict with itself, and such an imperative
imperative is categorical. Because the validity of the is categorical. Because the validity of the will, as
will as a universal law for possible actions has a universal law for possible actions, is analogous
analogy with the universal connection of the existence to the universal connection of the existence of things
of things according to universal laws, which is the according to universal laws, which is what is formal
formal aspect of nature in general, so can the in nature in general, the categorical imperative can
categorical imperative also in this way be expressed: also be expressed in this way: +Act according to maxims
+Act according to maxims which can at the same time which can have themselves, as universal laws of nature,
have themselves as universal laws of nature as the at the same time as an object+.
object+.
81 [4:436-437]
81 [4:436-437]
[Student Translation: Orr]
[Scholar Translation: Orr]
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Thus in this way the formula of an absolutely good That, then, is the makeup of the formula of an absolutely
will is constituted. good will.
Rational nature excludes itself from the rest by Rational nature distinguishes itself from the others
this, that it sets itself an end. This would be the by setting an end for itself. This end would be the
matter of any good will. Since, however, in the idea matter of any good will. Since, however, in the idea
of a will absolutely good without limiting condition of an absolutely good will without a limiting condition
(of the attainment of this or of that end) complete (of the attainment of this or that end) complete abstraction
abstraction must be made from every end to be must be made from any end +to be produced+ (as this
+effected+ (as it would only make each will relatively kind of end would make every will only relatively good),
good), in this way will the end here have to be the end here must be thought not as one to be produced
thought not as one to be effected, +but self-standing+ +but rather as a self-sufficient+ end. So the end here
end, therefore only negatively, i.e. the never acted must be thought only negatively, that is, as something
against, which therefore must never be valued merely never acted against, and therefore as something which
as a means, but always at the same time as an end in must never be valued merely as a means but which must
each willing. This can now be nothing other than the instead always at the same time in every act of willing
subject of all possible ends itself, because this at be valued as an end. This end can be nothing other
the same time is the subject of a possible absolutely than the subject of all possible ends itself because
good will; for this can without contradiction be this subject at the same time is the subject of a possible
subordinated to no other object. The principle: act in absolutely good will; for this will can, without contradiction,
reference to any rational being (to yourself and be subordinated to no other object. The principle:
others) in this way, that it holds in your maxim at act in reference to each rational being (to yourself
the same time as an end in itself, is accordingly at and others) in such a way that the rational being is
bottom one and the same with the ground proposition: considered in your maxim at the same time as an end
act according to a maxim, which contains its own in itself, is accordingly at bottom one and the same
universal validity for each rational being at the same as the basic principle: act according to a maxim that
time in itself. For that I ought to limit my maxim in contains in itself at the same time its own universal
the use validity for every rational being. For, saying that
I ought to limit my maxim, in the use
82 [4:437-438]
82 [4:437-438]
[Scholar Translation: Orr]
[Student Translation: Orr]
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of the means to each end to the condition of its of means to every end, to the condition of the maxim's
universal validity as a law for each subject, says universal validity as a law for every subject, is the
just so much, as the subject of ends, i.e. the same as saying that the subject of ends must be made
rational being itself, must never merely as a means, the ground of all maxims of actions. That is, it is
but as highest limiting condition in the use of all the same as saying that the rational being itself must
means, i.e. always at the same time as an end, be laid never be treated as a mere means but instead must be
as the ground of all maxims of actions. treated as the highest limiting condition in the use
Now follows from this incontestably: that each of all means, that is, must always be treated at the
rational being as an end in itself must be able to same time as an end.
look at itself, with reference to all laws to which it From what has been said above, these points now follow
may ever be subjected, at the same time as universal incontestably. First, each rational being, as an end
lawgiving, because just this fitness of its maxims to in itself, must, with reference to all laws to which
the universal lawgiving marks it out as an end in the rational being may ever be subject, be able to
itself, also that this its dignity (prerogative) look at itself at the same time as giving universal
before all mere natural beings brings with it, to have law. The rational being must be able to look at itself
to take its maxims always from the point of view of in this way because it is just this fitness of the
itself, at the same time, however, also of every other rational being's maxims for universal lawgiving that
rational being as lawgiving (who for this reason are mark out the rational being as an end in itself. Second,
also called persons). Now, in such way a world of the dignity of the rational being (its prerogative)
rational beings (mundus intelligibilis) as an empire before all merely natural beings brings with it that
of ends is possible and undoubtedly through the the rational being's maxims must always be taken from
individual lawgiving of all persons as members. the point of view of the rational being itself and
Accordingly, any rational being must in this way act, also at the same time from the point of view of each
as if it were through its maxims always a lawgiving other rational being as a lawgiving being (for which
member in the universal empire of ends. The formal reason the other rational beings are also called persons).
principle of these maxims is: Now, in this way a world of rational beings (mundus
intelligibilis) as an empire of ends is possible, and
83 [4:438] indeed possible through the individual lawgiving of
all persons as members. Accordingly, each rational
[Scholar Translation: Orr] being must act in such a way as if the rational being,
through its maxims, always were a lawgiving member
in the universal empire of ends. The formal principle
of these maxims is:
83 [4:438]
[Student Translation: Orr]
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act in this way, as if your maxim at the same time act in such a way as if your maxim at the same time
were to serve as the universal law (of all rational were to serve as the universal law (of all rational
beings). An empire of ends is thus only possible beings). So an empire of ends is only possible according
according to the analogy with an empire of nature, the to the analogy with an empire of nature. But, in thinking
former, however, only according to maxims, i.e. rules by means of this analogy, it must be kept in mind that
imposed on oneself, the latter only according to laws the former, the empire of ends, operates only according
of externally necessitated efficient causes. Despite to maxims, that is, to self-imposed rules, and that
this, one still gives also to the whole of nature, the latter, the empire of nature, operates only according
although it is looked at as a machine, nevertheless, to laws of externally necessitated efficient causes.
so far as it has reference to rational beings as its Despite this difference in operation, we still call
ends, from this ground the name of an empire of the whole of nature an empire of nature; we still give
nature. Such an empire of ends would now through the whole of nature this name, even though the whole
maxims, whose rule the categorical imperative of nature is seen as a machine, insofar as the whole
prescribes to all rational beings, really come to of nature has reference to rational beings as its ends.
pass, +if they would be universally followed+. But, Now, such an empire of ends would actually come into
although the rational being cannot count on it, that, existence through maxims whose rule the categorical
even if it itself strictly followed this maxim, for imperative prescribes to all rational beings, +if the
that reason every other would be faithful precisely to maxims were universally followed+. The following are
it, also that the empire of nature and its purposive things that the rational being cannot count on happening:
order harmonize with it, as a fitting member, toward first, that, even if the rational being itself were
an empire of ends possible through it itself, i.e. to follow this maxim to the letter, every other rational
will favor its expectation of happiness; so remains being would therefore faithfully follow the same maxim;
still that law: act according to maxims of a member second, that the empire of nature and its purposive
giving universal law to a merely possible empire of order will harmonize with the rational being as with
ends, in its full force because it is categorically a fitting member of an empire of ends possible through
commanding. And in this lies precisely the paradox: the rational being itself — that is, that the empire
that merely the dignity of humanity, as of nature will favor the rational being's expectation
of happiness. But, although the rational being cannot
84 [4:438-439] count on these things, that law still remains: act
according to maxims of a member giving universal law
[Scholar Translation: Orr] to a merely possible empire of ends. That law remains
in full force because it commands categorically. And
it is just in this that the paradox lies: first, that
merely the dignity of the human being, as rational
84 [4:438-439]
[Student Translation: Orr]
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of rational nature, without any other end or advantage nature without any other end or advantage to be attained
to be attained by this, therefore the respect for a by this dignity, therefore with respect for a mere
mere idea should nevertheless serve as the unrelenting idea, is nevertheless to serve as the constant prescription
prescription of the will, and that just in this of the will; and second, that it is just in this independence
independence of the maxim from all such incentives its of the maxim from all such incentives that the sublimity
sublimity consists and the worthiness of any rational of the maxim consists and in which the worthiness of
subject to be a lawgiving member in the empire of any rational subject to be a lawgiving member in the
ends; for otherwise it would have to be represented empire of ends consists. For without this independence
only as subject to the natural law of its need. Even the rational subject would have to be thought of as
if the natural empire as well as the empire of ends subject only to the natural laws of its needs. Even
were thought as united under one head, and by this the if the natural empire as well as the empire of ends
latter remain no longer merely an idea, but receive were thought as united under one head and through this
true reality, in this way would by this undoubtedly unification the latter, the empire of ends, no longer
that one gain the increase of a powerful incentive, remained a mere idea but instead received true reality,
never, however, augmentation of its inner worth; for, the idea would definitely gain a strong incentive,
despite this, even this sole unlimited lawgiver would but through this unification the idea would never receive
have still always to be so represented, how it judged an increase in its inner worth. For, if this unification
the worth of rational beings only according to their under one head did occur, even this sole unlimited
disinterested conduct, prescribed to themselves merely lawgiver would still always have to be thought of as
from that idea itself. The essence of things does not judging the worth of the rational being only according
alter through their outer relations, and what, without to the rational beings' disinterested conduct that
thinking of the latter, alone constitutes the absolute the rational beings prescribe for themselves merely
worth of the human being, accordingly must it also, by from that idea of an empire of ends. The essence of
whomsoever it is, even by the highest being, be things does not change through their outer relations,
judged. +Morality+ is thus the relation of actions to and, without thinking of these outer relations, what
the autonomy of the will, that is, to the possible alone constitutes the absolute worth of the human being
universal has to be that according to which the human being must
also be judged, no matter who the judge may be — even
85 [4:439] if the judge is the highest being. So +morality+ is
the relation of actions to the autonomy of the will,
[Scholar Translation: Orr] that is, to the possible universal
85 [4:439]
[Student Translation: Orr]
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lawgiving through its maxims. The action that can lawgiving through the will's maxims. An action that
subsist with the autonomy of the will is is compatible with the autonomy of the will is +permitted+.
+permissible+; that not harmonious with it, is An action that is not compatible with the autonomy
+impermissible+. The will whose maxims necessarily of the will is +impermissible+. The will whose maxims
harmonize with the laws of autonomy is a +holy+, necessarily harmonize with the laws of autonomy is
absolutely good will. The dependence of a not a +holy+, absolutely good will. The dependence of a
absolutely good will on the principle of autonomy will that is not absolutely good on the principle of
(moral necessitation) is +obligation+. This can thus autonomy (moral necessitation) is +obligation+. So
not be pulled on a holy being. The objective necessity obligation cannot apply to a holy being. The objective
of an action from obligation is called +duty+. necessity of an action from obligation is called +duty+.
One can from the recent foregoing now easily You can now easily explain from what has just been said
explain it, how it comes to pass: that, although we how it comes about: that, although under the concept
conceive under the concept of duty a subjection under of duty we think a subjection under the law, in thinking
the law, we imagine by this nevertheless at the same this we still at the same time imagine a certain sublimity
time a certain sublimity and +dignity+ in that person and +dignity+ in that person who fulfills all of her
who fulfills all its duties. For, to be sure, no duties. For there is definitely no sublimity in the
sublimity is in it so far as it is +subject+ to the person insofar as the person is +subject+ to the moral
moral law, but rather so far as it is in view of just law. More plausibly, however, there is sublimity in
it at the same time +lawgiving+ and only for that the person insofar as the person, with regard to the
reason subordinate to it. We have also shown above how very same moral law, at the same time is +lawgiving+
neither fear, nor inclination, but merely respect for and only because of that lawgiving is subject to that
the law is that incentive which can give to the action law. We have also shown above how neither fear nor
a moral worth. Our own will, so far as it would act inclination but, instead, how only respect for the
only under the condition of a universal lawgiving law is that incentive which can give an action a moral
possible through its maxims, worth. Our own will, so far as it would act only under
the condition of a universal lawgiving possible through
86 [4:439-440] the will's maxims,
[Scholar Translation: Orr] 86 [4:439-440]
[Student Translation: Orr]
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this will possible to us in the idea, is the proper is the proper object of respect. This will is possible
object of respect, and the dignity of humanity for us in the idea of an empire of ends; and the dignity
consists just in this capability, universal lawgiving, of the human being consists just in this capability
although with the condition to be itself subject at to give universal law, although on the condition of
the same time precisely to this lawgiving. being itself at the same time subject to just this
lawgiving.
++The autonomy of the will++
++as++ ++The autonomy of the will++
+highest principle of morality.+ ++as++
+highest principle of morality.+
Autonomy of the will is the characteristic of the
will by which it is to itself (independently of any Autonomy of the will is the characteristic of the will
characteristic of the objects of willing) a law. The by which the will is a law to itself (independently
principle of autonomy is thus: not otherwise to choose of any characteristic of the objects of willing). So
than in this way, that the maxims of one's choice are the principle of autonomy is: not to choose otherwise
comprehended jointly in the same willing at the same than in such a way that the maxims of your choice are
time as universal law. That this practical rule is an included as universal law at the same time in the same
imperative, i.e. the will of each rational being is act of will. That this practical rule is an imperative,
necessarily bound to it as a condition, cannot be that is, that the will of every rational being is necessarily
proven through mere analysis of the concepts present bound to the rule as a condition, cannot be proven
in it, because it is a synthetic proposition; one by mere analysis of the concepts present in the principle
would have to go out beyond the cognition of objects because the principle is a synthetic proposition. To
and to a critique of the subject, i.e. of pure prove that this practical rule is an imperative, you
practical reason, for this synthetic proposition, would have to go out beyond the knowledge of objects
which commands apodictically, must be able to be and to a critique of the subject, that is, a critique
cognized completely a priori, this business, however, of pure practical reason; and you would have to undertake
does not belong in the present such a critique because this synthetic proposition,
which commands with absolute necessity, must be able
87 [4:440] to be known completely a priori. This task of a critique,
however, does not belong in the present
[Scholar Translation: Orr]
87 [4:440]
[Student Translation: Orr]
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section. But that the aforesaid principle of autonomy section. But that the aforesaid principle of autonomy
is the exclusive principle of morals lets itself is the sole principle of morals can quite well be shown
through mere analysis of concepts of morality very by mere analysis of the concepts of morality. For by
well be proved. For by this is found that its carrying out such an analysis, we find that the principle
principle must be a categorical imperative, this, of morality must be a categorical imperative and that
however, commands nothing more or less than just this this imperative commands nothing more nor less than
autonomy. just this autonomy.
+The heteronomy of the will+ +The heteronomy of the will+
+as the source of all spurious principles+ +as the source of all spurious principles+
+of morality.+ +of morality.+
If the will +anywhere else+ than in the If the will seeks what is to guide it +in anything else+
suitability of its maxims to its own universal than in the suitability of the will's maxims to the
lawgiving, hence, if it, in that it goes out beyond will's own universal lawing, then +heteronomy+ always
itself, seeks the law that is to determine it in the results. If, that is, the will, in going out beyond
character of any of its objects, then +heteronomy+ itself, seeks the law that is to guide the will in
results each time. The will gives then not itself, but the character of any of the will's objects, then heteronomy
the object through its relation to the will gives it always results. In cases of heteronomy, the will does
the law. This relation, whether it rests now on not give itself the law; but, instead, the object through
inclination or on representations of reason, lets only its relation to the will gives the law to the will.
hypothetical imperatives become possible: I ought do This relation, whether it rests now on inclination
something just +because I will something else+. On the or on representations of reason, only allows hypothetical
other hand, the moral, hence categorical imperative, imperatives to be possible: I ought to do something
says: I ought act thus or so, even if I willed nothing just +because I want something else+. In contrast,
else. E.g. the former says: I ought not lie, if I will the moral imperative, and therefore the categorical
to remain with honor; the latter, imperative, says: I ought to act thus and so even if
I wanted nothing else. For example, the former, hypothetical
88 [4:440-441] imperative, says: I ought not lie, if I want to retain
my honorable reputation; but the latter,
[Scholar Translation: Orr]
88 [4:440-441]
[Student Translation: Orr]
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however: I ought not lie, even if it brings upon me moral or categorical imperative, says: I ought not lie
not the least shame. The latter must therefore even if it brought upon me not the least shame. So
abstract from any object so far that this has no the latter, categorical imperative, must abstract from
+influence+ at all on the will, so that practical all objects to such an extent that the objects would
reason (will) not merely administers foreign interest, have no +influence+ at all on the will, so that practical
but merely proves its own commanding authority as reason (will) would not merely administer alien interest
highest lawgiving. In this way I ought e.g. seek to but instead would merely prove its own commanding authority
promote others' happiness, not as if its existence as highest lawgiving. So I ought, for example, to seek
were anything of consequence to me (whether it be to promote the happiness of others, not as if the existence
through immediate inclination, or some satisfaction of that happiness were any of my concern (whether it
indirectly through reason), but merely because the be through immediate inclination or some satisfaction
maxim which excludes it cannot be comprehended in one provided indirectly through reason); instead, I ought
and the same willing, as universal law. to promote the existence of that happiness just because
the maxim that excludes that happiness cannot be included
++Division++ in one and the same willing as a universal law.
+of all possible principles of morality+
+from the+ ++Division++
++assumed ground concept++ +of all possible principles of morality+
+of heteronomy.+ +from the+
++assumed basic concept++
Human reason has here, as everywhere in its pure +of heteronomy.+
use, so long as it lacks a critique, previously tried
all possible incorrect ways before it succeeds in Human reason has here, as everywhere in human reason's
hitting upon the only true one. pure use so long as human reason lacks a critique,
All principles, which one might take from this previously tried all possible incorrect ways before
point of view, are either +empirical+ or human reason succeeds in hitting upon the one correct
way.
89 [4:441] All principles that you might take from the point of
view of human reason are either +empirical+ or
[Scholar Translation: Orr]
89 [4:441]
[Student Translation: Orr]
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+rational+. The ++first++, from the principle of +rational+. The ++first++, from the principle of +happiness+,
+happiness+, are built on physical or moral feeling, are built on physical or moral feeling. The ++second++,
the ++second++, from the principle of +perfection+, from the principle of +perfection+, are built either
either on the rational concept of it as a possible on the rational concept of perfection as a possible
effect, or on the concept of a self-standing effect or on the concept of a self-sufficient perfection
perfection (the will of God), as determining cause of (the will of God) as a controlling cause of our will.
our will. +Empirical principles+ are not at all fit to be the
+Empirical principles+ are not at all fit to be ground of moral laws. For the universality with which
the ground of moral laws. For the universality with the laws are to hold for all rational beings without
which they are to hold for all rational beings without difference — the unconditional practical necessity
difference, the unconditional practical necessity that that is imposed on rational beings by this universality
is imposed on them by this, falls away, if the ground of moral laws — falls away if the ground of the laws
of them is taken from the +special constitution of is taken from the +particular arrangement of human
human nature+ or the contingent circumstances in which nature+ or from the contingent circumstances in which
it is placed. Yet the principle of +individual that nature is placed. But the principle of +personal
happiness+ is most of all objectionable, not merely happiness+ is most objectionable, not merely because
because it is false, and experience contradicts the it is false, and because experience contradicts the
pretense, as if well-being always adjusts itself pretense that well-being always adjusts itself according
according to good conduct, also not merely because it to good conduct, and also not merely because the principle
contributes nothing at all to the grounding of contributes nothing at all to the grounding of morality
morality, since it is wholly something else to make a since it is something quite different to make a happy
happy than a good human being, and make this prudent human being than to make a good human being and something
and sharp-sighted for its advantage than make it quite different to make a human being prudent and alert
virtuous: but because it puts incentives underneath to what might be to her advantage than to make her
morality that rather undermine it and destroy its virtuous. To be sure, those flaws make the principle
whole sublimity, since they put the motives of personal happiness objectionable, but it is most
objectionable because it puts incentives underneath
90 [4:441-442] morality, and these incentives, rather than supporting
morality, instead undermine it and destroy its entire
[Scholar Translation: Orr] sublimity.
90 [4:441-442]
[Student Translation: Orr]
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to virtue with those to vice in one class and only The incentives undermine morality because they put motives
teach better calculation, the specific difference of to virtue in the same class with motives to vice and
both, however, wholly and entirely obliterate; on the because the incentives only teach us to calculate better
other hand, moral feeling, this supposed special what is to our personal advantage or disadvantage,
sense*), (however shallow the appeal to it is, since thus thoroughly obliterating the specific difference
those, who cannot +think+ even in that which merely between virtue and vice. On the other hand, moral feeling,
depends on universal laws, believe to help themselves this supposed special sense*, (however shallow the
out through +feeling+, however little feelings, that appeal to this sense is, in that those who cannot +think+
are in terms of rank by nature infinitely different even about what depends merely on universal law believe
from each other, furnish a uniform standard of good they can help themselves out through +feeling+, feelings,
and bad, also one can through one's feeling for others which according to their ranking by nature are infinitely
not at all validly judge) nevertheless remains closer different from each other, provide just as little a
to morality and its dignity in that it shows to virtue uniform standard of good and bad; you also cannot judge
the honor of ascribing the satisfaction and the high at all validly through your feeling for others), nevertheless
esteem for her +immediately+ to her, and does not say remains closer to morality and its dignity for the
to her as it were in her face, that it is not her following reasons. First, moral feeling remains closer
beauty, but only advantage, that attaches us to her. because moral feeling does virtue the honor of ascribing
Among the +rational+ or reason-grounds of +immediately+ to virtue the delight and high esteem
morality is yet the ontological concept of that we have for virtue. Second, moral feeling remains
closer to morality and its dignity because moral feeling
*) I class the principle of moral feeling does not say to virtue, as if to her face, that it
with that of happiness because any empirical is not her beauty but instead only the advantage to
interest, through the agreeableness that us that ties us to her.
something only affords, it may well happen Among the +rational+ grounds of morality or grounds
immediately and without view to advantages based on reason, there is still the ontological concept
or in regard to them, promises a contribution of
to well-being. Likewise one must class the
principle of compassion for others' happiness, * I classify the principle of moral feeling
with +Hutcheson+, with the same moral sense with the principle of happiness because any
assumed by him. empirical interest promises a contribution
to well-being through the agreeableness that
91 [4:442-443] something offers us, whether this agreeableness
is immediate and without a view to advantages
[Scholar Translation: Orr] or whether the agreeableness occurs with
regard to those advantages. Likewise, you
must classify, with +Hutcheson+, the principle
of compassion for the happiness of others
with the same moral sense that he assumed.
91 [4:442-443]
[Student Translation: Orr]
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+perfection+ (however empty, however indeterminate, +perfection+. (This concept is exceedingly unfounded,
therefore useless it is, in order to discover in the indeterminate, and therefore useless for discovering
immense field of possible reality the greatest sum in the immense field of possible reality the greatest
appropriate for us, however much it, in order sum appropriate for us. The concept also has an unavoidable
specifically to distinguish the reality, of which here tendency, in specifically distinguishing reality, which
the discussion is, from every other, has an is here under discussion, from every other, to turn
unavoidable propensity to turn in the circle, and around in a circle and cannot avoid secretly presuming
cannot avoid secretly to presume the morality which it the morality that the concept is to explain.) Despite
is to explain) nevertheless better than the the drawbacks of this concept of perfection, it is
theological concept, to derive it from a divine, still better than the theological concept, still better
all-perfect will, not merely because we do not, after than deriving morality from a divine all-perfect will.
all, intuit its perfection, but can only derive it The concept of perfection is better not merely because
from our concepts, among which that of morality is the we cannot of course see the divine will's perfection
foremost, but because, if we do not do this (as it but instead can only derive that perfection from our
then, if it happened, would be a coarse circle in the concepts, chief among our concepts being that of morality.
explanation), the concept still remaining to us of its Rather, the concept of perfection is also better because,
will from the qualities of eager desire for glory and if we do not do this derivation (which, if we did do
dominion, combined with the fearful representations of it, would amount to a crude circle in the explanation),
power and of vengefulness, would have to make the the concept left to us of the divine will would have
foundation for a system of morals which would be to be made the foundation for a system of morals; but
directly set against morality. that concept left to us would be made up of the attributes
If I, however, had to choose between the concept of eager desire for glory and dominion, combined with
of the moral sense and that of perfection in general terrible thoughts of power and of thirst for vengeance,
(both of which at least do not infringe on morality, and a concept made up of such attributes would pit
although they are not at all suitable for the purpose the concept directly against morality.
of supporting it as foundations): then I would decide But if I had to choose between the concept of moral
for the latter, sense and that of perfection in general (both of which
at least do no harm to morality, although they are
92 [4:443] not at all suited to support morality as its foundations),
then I would decide for the latter.
[Scholar Translation: Orr]
92 [4:443]
[Student Translation: Orr]
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because it, since it at least pulls the decision of I would choose the concept of perfection because the
the question away from sensibility and to the court of concept of perfection, since it at least transfers
pure reason, although it also here decides nothing, the decision of the question from sensibility to the
nevertheless preserves unfalsified the indeterminate court of pure reason, although here the concept also
idea (of a will good in itself) for closer decides nothing, nevertheless preserves unfalsified
determination. the vague idea (of a will good in itself) for more
For the rest, I believe to be able to be excused precise specification.
from a lengthy refutation of all these doctrines. It Regarding the remaining rational grounds for morality,
is so easy, it is even by those, whose office demands I believe I can be excused from a lengthy refutation
it, to declare themselves nevertheless for one of of all these doctrines. It is so easy to refute these
these theories (because listeners do not really want doctrines that even those whose job requires that they
to put up with postponement of judgment), even declare themselves for one of these theories (because
presumably so well seen, that by this only superfluous listeners will not put up with a postponement of judgment)
labor would take place. What, however, interests us presumably see through the theories, so that refuting
here more is to know: that these principles set up the theories here would only be superfluous labor.
everywhere nothing but heteronomy of the will as the What interests us more, however, is to know the following:
first ground of morality and for that very reason must that these principles everywhere set up nothing but
necessarily fail to do their end. heteronomy of the will as the first ground of morality,
Everywhere, where an object of the will must be and that for just this reason these principles must
laid as ground in order to prescribe to this the rule necessarily fail in their purpose.
that determines it, there the rule is nothing but In all cases in which an object of the will must be
heteronomy; the imperative is conditional, namely: made the basis of action in order to prescribe to the
+if+ or +because+ one wills this object, one ought act will the rule that is to guide the will, the rule is
thus or so; hence it can never morally, i.e. nothing but heteronomy; the imperative is conditional,
categorically, command. Whether now the object by namely: +if+ or +because+ you want this object, you
means of inclination, as with the principle of one's ought to act in such and such a way. Therefore, the
own happiness, imperative can never command morally, that is, categorically.
Whether the object controls the will by means of inclination,
93 [4:443-444] as with the principle of your own happiness,
[Scholar Translation: Orr] 93 [4:443-444]
[Student Translation: Orr]
Groundlaying · Second Section · emended 1786 2nd ed. Groundlaying · Second Section · emended 1786 2nd edition
or by means of reason directed to objects of our or controls the will by means of reason directed to
possible willing in general, in the principle of objects of our possible willing in general, in the
perfection, determines the will, in this way the will principle of perfection, the will never controls itself
never determines itself +immediately+ through the +immediately+ by the thought of an action. Instead,
representation of the action, but only through the the will controls itself only by the incentive which
incentive which the anticipated effect of the action the anticipated effect of the action has on the will;
has on the will; +I ought do something, for this +I ought do something just because I want something
reason, because I will something else+, and here must else+, and here yet another law must be put in my subject
still another law in my subject be laid as ground, as a ground according to which I necessarily will this
according to which I necessarily will this other, other thing that I want, and this other law again requires
which law in turn requires an imperative that limits an imperative which would limit this maxim. The reason
this maxim. For, because the impulse, which the for this lack of direct self-control by the will is
representation of an object possible through our the following: the thought of an object that we can
powers is to exercise according to the natural bring about through our own powers is to exert an impulse
constitution of the subject on its will, belongs to on the subject's will; this exertion occurs according
the nature of the subject, whether it is of to the natural constitution of the subject; so the
sensibility (of inclination and of taste) or of impulse belongs to the nature of the subject; whether
understanding and of reason, which according to the the impulse belongs to the nature of the subject's
special arrangement of their nature exercise sensibility (of inclination and taste) or to the nature
themselves with delight on an object, in this way of the subject's understanding and reason, these features
nature strictly speaking gives the law, which, as one of the subject, according to the special arrangement
such must not only be cognized and proved through of their nature, allow the subject to take delight
experience, therefore is in itself contingent and for in an object. In this way, it is, properly speaking,
apodictic practical rule, of such kind the moral must nature that would give the law. This law, as one given
be, becomes by this unfit, but it is +always only by nature, must be recognized and proved through experience,
heteronomy+ of the will, the will gives not to itself, and so is contingent in itself. Because of this contingency,
but a foreign impulse gives the law to it by means of this law given by nature becomes unfit to be an absolutely
a necessary practical rule, which is the kind of practical
rule that the moral rule must be. Not only is this
94 [4:444] law given by nature contingent and so unfit to be a
moral law, but this law given by nature is +always
[Scholar Translation: Orr] only heteronomy+ of the will; the will does not give
the law to itself, but rather an alien impulse gives
the law to the will by means of a
94 [4:444]
[Student Translation: Orr]
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nature of the subject attuned to the receptivity of nature of the subject that is disposed to receive the
it. law.
The absolutely good will, whose principle must be So the absolutely good will, whose principle must be
a categorical imperative, will therefore, undetermined a categorical imperative and whose choices are not
in view of all objects, contain merely the +form of controlled by any objects, will contain merely the
willing+ in general and undoubtedly as autonomy, i.e. +form of willing+ in general. Indeed, the absolutely
the suitability of the maxim of any good will to make good will contains this form of willing in general
itself into universal law, is itself the sole law that as autonomy. That is to say, the suitability of the
the will of any rational being imposes on itself, maxim of any good will to make itself into a universal
without putting any incentive and interest of it law is itself the sole law that the will of any rational
underneath as ground. being imposes on itself, and the rational being imposes
+How such a synthetic practical proposition a this law on itself without making any incentive or
priori is possible+ and why it is necessary, is a interest of the maxim the basis of the law.
problem whose solution lies no longer within the +How such a synthetic practical proposition a priori
boundaries of the metaphysics of morals, also we have is possible+ and why the proposition is necessary,
its truth here not maintained, much less presumed to is a problem whose solution no longer lies within the
have a proof of it in our power. We showed only boundaries of the metaphysics of morals. We have also
through development of the once generally in vogue not asserted the proposition's truth, much less pretending
going concept of morality: that an autonomy of the to have within our power a proof of the truth of the
will attaches to it in an unavoidable way, or rather proposition. We only showed by analyzing the generally
lies as ground. Who, therefore, holds morality to be accepted concept of morality that an autonomy of the
something, and not to be a chimerical idea without will, in an unavoidable way, attaches to the will or,
truth, must at the same time admit its above-cited rather, is the ground of the will. So, whoever takes
principle. This morality to be something and not to be a wildly fanciful
idea without truth must at the same time admit morality's
95 [4:444-445] principle of autonomy that was cited above. So this
[Scholar Translation: Orr] 95 [4:444-445]
[Student Translation: Orr]
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section was, therefore, just in this way, like the section was merely analytic, just like the first section.
first, merely analytic. That now morality is no Now, that morality is not a phantom, which follows
phantom, which then follows if the categorical if the categorical imperative and with it the autonomy
imperative and with it the autonomy of the will is of the will is true and is absolutely necessary as
true and as a principle a priori absolutely necessary, a principle a priori, requires a +possible synthetic
requires a +possible synthetic use of pure practical use of pure practical reason+. But we may not venture
reason+, which we, however, may not venture upon on this use of pure practical reason without first
without sending on before a +critique+ of this giving a +critique+ of this rational faculty itself.
rational faculty itself, of which we in the last Sufficient for our purpose, we have to present the
section have to present the leading features main features of such a critique in the last section.
sufficient for our purpose.
____________________________ _____________________________
96 [4:445] 96 [4:445]
[Scholar Translation: Orr] [Student Translation: Orr]
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++Third Section.++ ++Third Section.++
++Transition++ ++Transition++
+from the+ +from the+
++metaphysics of morals to the critique++ ++metaphysics of morals to the critique++
+of pure practical reason.+ +of pure practical reason.+
____________________________ _____________________________
+The concept of freedom+ +The concept of freedom+
+is the+ +is the+
+key to the explanation of the autonomy+ +key to the explanation of the autonomy+
+of the will.+ +of the will.+
The +will+ is a kind of causality of living beings, so The +will+ is a kind of causality that living beings
far as they are rational, and +freedom+ would be that have insofar as they are rational. +Freedom+ would
quality of this causality, since it can be effective be that property of this causality by which the causality
independently of foreign causes +determining+ it; just can be effective independently of alien causes +controlling+
as +natural necessity+ the quality of the causality of the will as a causality. Similarly, +natural necessity+
all reasonless beings to be determined to activity is the property of causality of all non-rational beings
through the influence of foreign causes. to be directed to activity by the influence of alien
The above-cited explanation of freedom is causes.
+negative+ and, therefore, in order to look into its The above explanation of freedom is +negative+ and is
essence, unfruitful; but there flows out of it a therefore unfruitful for seeing into the essence of
+positive+ concept of it, which is so much more freedom. But out of this negative explanation there
comprehensive and more fruitful. Since the concept of flows a +positive+ concept of freedom which is so much
a causality carries with it that of +laws+, according richer and more fruitful. The concept of a causality
to which through something which we name cause, carries with it the concept of +laws+ according to
something which, by something that we call a cause, something
97 [4:446] 97 [4:446]
[Scholar Translation: Orr] [Student Translation: Orr]
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else, namely the effect, must be posited: in this way else, namely the effect, must be assumed as a fact.
is freedom, although it is not a quality of the will Because the concepts of causality and law are related
according to natural laws, for that reason still not in this way, although freedom is not a property of
entirely lawless, but must rather be a causality the will according to natural laws, freedom is still
according to immutable laws, but of special kind; for not entirely lawless. Instead of operating according
otherwise a free will would be an impossibility. to natural laws, freedom must rather be a causality
Natural necessity was a heteronomy of efficient according to unchanging laws, but unchanging laws of
causes; for each effect was possible only according to a special kind; for a free will would be an impossibility
the law that something else determined the efficient if it did not operate according to some kind of law.
cause to causality; what really, then, can the freedom Natural necessity was a heteronomy of efficient causes;
of the will be other than autonomy, i.e. the quality for each effect was possible only according to the
of the will to be itself a law? The proposition, law that something else determined the efficient cause
however: the will is in all actions itself a law, to become causally active. What, then, can freedom
signifies only the principle to act according to no of the will possibly be other than autonomy, that is,
other maxim except which can have itself also as a the property of the will to be a law to itself? But
universal law as object. This is, however, just the the proposition that the will is in all actions itself
formula of the categorical imperative and the a law signifies only the principle to act according
principle of morality: thus is a free will and a will to no other maxim except one that can also have itself
under moral laws one and the same. as a universal law as an object. This principle, however,
If, therefore, freedom of the will is is just the formula of the categorical imperative and
presupposed, then morality follows together with its the principle of morality. So a free will and a will
principle from that through mere analysis of its under moral laws are one and the same.
concept. Nevertheless, the latter is still always a If, therefore, freedom of the will is presupposed, then
synthetic proposition: an absolutely good will is that morality together with morality's principle follow
one whose maxim can always contain itself, considered from that presupposition merely by analysis of the
as universal law, in itself, presupposition's concept. Nevertheless, the latter,
morality's principle, is still always a synthetic proposition:
98 [4:446-447] an absolutely good will is a will whose maxim always
can contain itself, considered as a universal law,
[Scholar Translation: Orr] in itself,
98 [4:446-447]
[Student Translation: Orr]
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for through analysis of the concept of an absolutely for through analysis of the concept of an absolutely
good will can that quality of the maxim not be found. good will that property of the maxim (i.e., the maxim's
Such synthetic propositions, however, are only property to be able to contain itself as a universal
possible by this, that both cognitions are joined to law) cannot be found. Such synthetic propositions,
each other through the connection with a third in however, are only possible by this: that both cognitions
which they are reciprocally to be found. The are bound to each other through the connection with
+positive+ concept of freedom provides this third, a third in which both cognitions are to be found. The
which cannot be, as with the physical causes, the +positive+ concept of freedom provides this third cognition.
nature of the world of sense (in which concept the Unlike in cases dealing with physical causes, in this
concepts of something as cause in relation to case this third cognition cannot be the nature of the
+something else+ as effect come together). What this world of sense (in which concept the concept of something
third is, to which freedom directs us, and of which we as a cause in relation to +something else+ as an effect
have a priori an idea, lets itself here right now not come together). We cannot yet show here right now what
yet be shown, and to make comprehensible the deduction this third cognition is to which freedom points us
of the concept of freedom from pure practical reason, and of which we have an a priori idea. We also cannot
with it also the possibility of a categorical yet make the deduction of the concept of freedom from
imperative, but requires still some preparation. pure practical reason comprehensible and, along with
this deduction, cannot yet make the possibility of
++Freedom++ a categorical imperative comprehensible. Still further
++must as quality of the will++ preparation is required in order to identify the third
++of all rational beings++ cognition and in order to make the deduction and possibility
+be presupposed.+ comprehensible.
It is not enough that we ascribe to our will, it ++Freedom++
be from what ground, freedom, if we do not have ++must as a property of the will++
sufficient ground to attribute the very same also to ++of all rational beings++
all rational beings. +be presupposed.+
99 [4:447] It is not enough that we ascribe, for whatever reason,
freedom to our will. We also need to have sufficient
[Scholar Translation: Orr] reason to attribute the very same freedom of the will
to all rational beings.
99 [4:447]
[Student Translation: Orr]
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For since morality serves as law for us merely as for For, since morality serves as a law for us only because
+rational beings+, in this way must it hold also for we are +rational beings+, morality must also hold for
all rational beings, and since it must be derived only all rational beings; and, since morality must be derived
from the quality of freedom, in this way must also merely from the property of freedom, freedom must also
freedom as a quality of the will of all rational be proved as a property of the will of all rational
beings be proved, and it is not enough to demonstrate beings. In addition, it is not enough to demonstrate
it from certain supposed experiences of human nature freedom from certain alleged experiences of human nature
(although this also is absolutely impossible and it (although this is also absolutely impossible and freedom
can be demonstrated only a priori), but one must prove can only be demonstrated a priori); instead, you must
it as belonging to the activity of rational beings in prove freedom as belonging to the activity of rational
general endowed with a will. I say now: Any being, beings in general endowed with a will. I say now: any
that can act not otherwise than +under the idea of being that cannot act other than +under the idea of
freedom+, is just for that reason, in practical freedom+, is, just for that reason, in a practical
regard, actually free, i.e. all laws that are respect, actually free. That is to say, all laws that
inseparably joined with freedom hold for it, just in are inseparably bound up with freedom are laws that
this way, as if its will also in itself, and validly hold for such a being just as if the being's will also
in theoretical philosophy, would be declared as in itself and in theoretical philosophy would be validly
free*). Now I maintain: that we, to each declared to be free.* Now I maintain: that we
*) This way, to assume, as sufficient to our * I suggest that to assume this way of only
purpose, freedom only as laid down by rational taking the mere +idea+ of freedom to be the
beings in their actions merely +in the idea+ basis for the actions of rational beings
as ground, I suggest for this reason so that is sufficient for our purpose. I suggest
I may not make myself bound to prove freedom this so that I may not also be bound to prove
also in its theoretical respect. For, even freedom in its theoretical aspect. For, even
if this latter is left undecided, then still if this theoretical aspect of proving freedom
the same laws hold for a being that can act is left undecided, the same laws that hold
not otherwise than under the idea of its for a being that cannot act except under
own freedom that would bind a being that the idea of the being's own freedom are laws
really were free. We can thus liberate ourselves that still would hold for a being that was
here from the load that weighs down the theory. actually free. So we can here free ourselves
from the burden that presses on the theory.
100 [4:447-448]
[Scholar Translation: Orr]
100 [4:447-448]
[Student Translation: Orr]
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rational being that has a will, must necessarily lend must also necessarily lend to each rational being that
also the idea of freedom under which it alone acts. has a will the idea of freedom under which alone the
For in such a being we conceive a reason that is being can act. For in such a being we conceive of a
practical, i.e. has causality in view of its objects. reason that is practical, that is, has a causality
Now, one cannot possibly conceive a reason that, with with respect to its objects. Now, you cannot possibly
its own consciousness in view of its judgments, would conceive of a reason that, with its own consciousness
receive direction from elsewhere, for then the subject with regard to its judgments, receives direction from
would not to its reason, but to an impulse, ascribe elsewhere, for then the subject would ascribe the control
the determination of the power of judgment. It must of the power of judgment not to the subject's reason
look at itself as authoress of its principles but instead to an impulse in the subject. Reason must
independently of foreign influences, consequently, it view itself as the authoress of its principles, independently
must be looked at by itself as practical reason, or as of alien influences. Consequently, reason, as practical
a will of a rational being, as free; i.e. its will can reason or as the will of a rational being, must be
only under the idea of freedom be a will of its own viewed by itself as free. That is to say, the will
and must therefore in practical respect be attributed of a rational being can only be a will of its own under
to all rational beings. the idea of freedom and so such a will must, for practical
purposes, be attributed to all rational beings.
++Of the interest,++
++which to the ideas of morality++ ++Of the interest,++
++attaches.++ ++which to the ideas of morality++
++attaches.++
We have at last traced the determinate concept of
morality back to the idea of freedom; this, however, We have at last traced the specific concept of morality
we were not able even to prove as something actual in back to the idea of freedom. We were not able, however,
ourselves and in human nature; we saw only that we to prove this idea of freedom to be something actual,
must presuppose it if we not even in ourselves and in human nature. We only
saw that we must presuppose the idea if we
101 [4:448-449]
101 [4:448-449]
[Scholar Translation: Orr]
[Student Translation: Orr]
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ourselves want to conceive a being as rational and want to conceive of a being as rational and with consciousness
endowed with consciousness of its causality in view of of its causality with regard to actions, that is, as
actions, i.e. with a will, and in this way we find endowed with a will. And so we find that we must, for
that we must from just the same ground attribute to the very same reason, attribute this property, namely,
each being endowed with reason and will this quality the property of directing itself to action under the
of determining itself to action under the idea of its idea of its freedom, to each being endowed with reason
freedom. and a will.
There flowed, however, from the presupposition of But from the presupposition of these ideas there also
these ideas also the consciousness of a law to act: flowed the consciousness of a law of acting: that the
that the subjective ground propositions of actions, subjective basic principles of actions, that is, maxims,
i.e. maxims, must always be taken so that they also must always be taken in such a way that they also hold
hold objectively, i.e. universally as ground objectively, that is, hold universally as basic principles,
propositions, and therefore can serve for our own and therefore can serve for our own universal lawgiving.
universal lawgiving. Why, however, should I then But why then ought I subject myself to this principle
subject myself to this principle and, to be sure, as a and indeed, as a rational being in general, subject
rational being in general, therefore also by this all therefore also all other rational beings endowed with
other beings endowed with reason? I will admit that no a will to this principle? I am willing to admit that
interest +impels+ me to this, for that would give no no interest +impels+ me to this subjection; for that
categorical imperative; but I must still necessarily would give rise to no categorical imperative. But I
+take+ an interest in this and look into how it comes must still necessarily +take+ an interest in this subjection
about; for this ought is properly a willing that holds and look into how it comes about; for this ought is
under the condition for each rational being, if reason actually a want that holds for each rational being
with it were practical without hindrances; for beings, under the condition that in the case of each being
who, as we, are still affected through sensibility as reason would be practical without hindrances. For beings
incentives of different kind, with whom what reason such as ourselves, who are still affected by sensibility,
for itself alone would do does not always happen, as incentives of a different kind, and for whom what
reason for itself alone would do does not always happen,
102 [4:449]
102 [4:449]
[Scholar Translation: Orr]
[Student Translation: Orr]
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that necessity of action is called only an ought, and that necessity of action is only called an ought and
the subjective necessity is distinguished from the the subjective necessity is distinguished from the
objective. objective necessity.
It appears, therefore, as if in the idea of So it appears as if we actually only presupposed the
freedom we strictly speaking only presupposed the moral law, namely, the principle of autonomy of the
moral law, namely the principle of the autonomy of the will itself, in the idea of freedom and could not prove
will itself, and could not prove for itself its for itself the reality and objective necessity of the
reality and objective necessity, and there we would moral law. If that is indeed all that we have done,
have gained to be sure still always something quite then we would still have gained something quite considerable
considerable by this, that we at least had determined in the process; we would at least have specified the
the genuine principle more accurately than indeed genuine moral principle moral precisely than otherwise
otherwise would occur, but in view of its validity and would have been done. But with regard to the validity
of the practical necessity to subject ourselves to it, of the moral principle and the practical necessity
we would have come farther for nothing; for we could of subjecting ourselves to that principle, we would
give no satisfactory answer to him who asked us, why have gotten no farther along; for we could give no
then the universal validity of our maxim, as a law, satisfactory answer to someone who asked the following
must be the limiting condition of our actions, and on questions. Why, then, must the universal validity of
what we ground the worth which we attribute to this our maxim, as a law, be the limiting condition of our
way of acting which is to be so great that there can actions? On what do we base the worth that we attribute
be no higher interest anywhere, and how it comes to to this way of acting, a worth which is to be so great
pass that the human being believes to feel by this that there can be no higher interest anywhere? And
alone its personal worth against which that of an how does it come to pass that the human being believes
agreeable or disagreeable condition is to hold for that she feels her personal worth to reside only in
nothing. this subjection to moral law, a worth against which
Of course we very well find that we can take an the worth of a pleasant or unpleasant condition is
interest in a personal characteristic that held to be nothing?
We surely do find that we can take an interest in a
103 [4:449-450] personal characteristic which
[Scholar Translation: Orr] 103 [4:449-450]
[Student Translation: Orr]
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carries with itself no interest at all of the carries with itself no interest in any condition, if
condition, if only the former makes us capable of only the former characteristic makes us capable of
partaking of the latter, in case reason should effect sharing in the latter condition in case reason were
its distribution, i.e. that the mere worthiness to be to bring about the distribution of the condition. That
happy, even without the motive of partaking of this is to say, the mere worthiness to be happy, even without
happiness, can interest for itself: but this judgment the motive of sharing in this happiness, can itself
is in fact only the effect of the already presupposed be of interest to us. But this judgment of worthiness
importance of moral laws (when we separate ourselves is in fact only the effect of the already presupposed
through the idea of freedom from all empirical importance of moral laws (when we separate ourselves
interest); but we can not yet discern in this way that from all empirical interest through the idea of freedom).
we ought to separate ourselves from this, i.e. But in this way we cannot yet see into the following:
consider ourselves as free in acting, and in this way that we ought to separate ourselves from this empirical
nevertheless take ourselves to be subject to certain interest, that is, ought to consider ourselves to be
laws, in order to find a worth merely in our person, free in acting and so ought nevertheless to hold ourselves
which can compensate us for all loss of that which to be subject to certain laws in order to find a worth
provides a worth to our condition, and how this is merely in our person, a worth that can compensate us
possible, therefore +from where the moral law binds+. for the loss of everything that gives worth to our
There appears here, one must freely admit it, a condition; how this separation is possible; and so
kind of circle, from which, as it seems, there is no +from what source or on what basis the moral law binds+
coming out. We assume ourselves in the order of us.
efficient causes as free in order to think ourselves You must freely admit that there appears to be a circle
in the order of ends under moral laws, and we think here from which it seems there is no recovery. We take
ourselves afterwards as subject to these laws because ourselves to be free in the order of efficient causes
we have attributed to ourselves the freedom of the in order to think ourselves in the order of ends under
will; for freedom and individual lawgiving of the will moral laws, and we afterwards think ourselves as subject
are both to these laws because we have attributed freedom of
the will to ourselves, for freedom and individual lawgiving
104 [4:450] of the will are both
[Scholar Translation: Orr] 104 [4:450]
[Student Translation: Orr]
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autonomy, therefore reciprocal concepts, of which, autonomy, and so they are reciprocal concepts. But,
however, just for that reason, one cannot be used in precisely because they are reciprocal concepts, one
order to explain the other and to specify the ground of them cannot be used to explain the other and to
of it, but at most only in order for logical purpose specify the ground of the other. At most, one concept
to bring different appearing representations of can only be used for logical purposes to reduce different
precisely the same object to a single concept (like appearing representations of the very same object to
different fractions of equal value to the littlest a single concept (as different fractions of equal value
expression). are reduced to the simplest expression).
One recourse, however, remains over to us still, But one way out of the circle still remains open to
namely to search: whether we, when we think ourselves us, namely, to try to find: whether we, when we think
through freedom as a priori efficient causes, do not ourselves through freedom as a priori efficient causes,
take up a different standpoint than when we represent do not take a different standpoint than we do when
ourselves according to our actions as effects that we we represent ourselves according to our actions as
see before our eyes. effects that we see before our eyes.
It is a remark which to post quite certainly no No subtle reflection at all is required to post the
subtle reflection is required, but of which one can following remark; indeed, you can assume that even
assume that indeed the commonest understanding, the most common understanding may make the remark,
although according to its way through an obscure although such an understanding makes the remark in
distinction of power of judgment that it names its own way through an obscure distinction of the power
feeling, may make it: that all representations that of judgment which it calls feeling. The remark is this:
come to us without our choice (like those of sense) all ideas that we receive involuntarily (like those
give the objects to us to cognize exactly so as they ideas we receive through the sense organs) give us
affect us, while what they may be in themselves no knowledge of objects except as the objects affect
remains unknown to us, and therefore that, as concerns us; what the objects may be in themselves remains unknown
representations of this kind, we can by this, even to us. So, as far as this involuntary kind of ideas
with the most strenuous is concerned, we can, even with the most strenuous
105 [4:450-451] 105 [4:450-451]
[Scholar Translation: Orr] [Student Translation: Orr]
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attentiveness and distinctness that the understanding attentiveness and clarity that the understanding may
may ever add, still merely arrive at the cognition of ever add, still only arrive at knowledge of +appearances+,
+appearances+, never of +things in themselves+. As never at knowledge of the +things in themselves+. As
soon as this distinction (possibly merely through the soon as this distinction (perhaps merely through the
noticed difference between the representations that noticed difference between the ideas that are given
are given to us from somewhere else, and with which we to us from somewhere else and with which we are passive
are passive, from those that we bring forth only from and the ideas that we produce only from ourselves and
ourselves and with which we prove our activity) is with which we prove our activity) is made once, then
once made, then it follows of itself that one must it follows of itself that you must admit and assume
admit and assume behind the appearances yet still that behind the appearances there is after all still
something else which is not appearance, namely the something else that is not appearance, namely, the
things in themselves, although we resign of ourselves, things in themselves. Although we admit and assume
that, since they can never become known to us, but the existence of these things in themselves, we resign
always only as they affect us, we cannot step nearer ourselves to the fact that, since they can never become
to them and can never know what they are in known to us in themselves but always only by how they
themselves. This must provide a, although crude, affect us, we cannot get closer to them and can never
distinction of a +world of sense+ from the +world of know what they are in themselves. This must provide
understanding+, of which the first according to a distinction, although crude, between a +world of
difference of sensibility in various observers of the sense+ and the +world of understanding+. The first,
world also can be very different, meanwhile the the world of sense, according to difference of sensibility
second, which underlies it as ground, always remains in various observers, can also be very diverse. Meanwhile,
the same. Even itself and, to be sure, according to the second, the world of understanding, which is the
the knowledge that the human being has through inner basis for the world of sense, always remains the same.
sensation of itself, it may not presume to cognize how Even the human being herself cannot presume to know,
it is in itself. For since it after all does not as it by the knowledge she has of herself through inner sensation,
were procure itself and gets its concept not a priori what she is in herself. For since she after all does
but empirically, in this way it is natural that it can not, so to speak, create herself, and she gets her
also draw in information of itself through the inner concept of herself not a priori but instead empirically,
sense and it is natural that she also gets information about
herself through the inner sense and
106 [4:451]
106 [4:451]
[Scholar Translation: Orr]
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consequently only through the appearance of its nature consequently only through the appearance of her nature
and the way in which its consciousness is affected, and through the way in which her consciousness is affected.
meanwhile it nevertheless in a necessary way must Meanwhile, she must still necessarily assume that beyond
assume beyond this characteristic, put together from this constitution, put together from nothing but appearances,
nothing but appearances, of its own subject still of her own subject there is something else that is
something else underlying as ground, namely its I, the basis of her constitution. This basis of her natural
such as it may in itself be constituted, and must thus makeup or constitution is her I or ego, in whatever
class itself in view of the mere perception and way it may be constituted in itself. So, with regard
receptivity of sensations with the +world of sense+, to the mere perception and receptivity of sensations
in view of that, however, which in it may be pure she must count herself as belonging to the +world of
activity (of that which arrives in consciousness not sense+; but, with regard to what may be pure activity
at all by affecting the senses, but immediately), in her (to what arrives in consciousness not by affecting
class itself with the +intellectual world+ which it, the senses but instead to what arrives in consciousness
however, knows no further. immediately), she must count herself as belonging to
The reflective human being must draw a conclusion the +world of the intellect+. She knows nothing further,
of this kind from all things that may appear to it; however, about this latter, intellectual world.
presumably it is also to be found in the most common A reflective human being must draw a conclusion of this
understanding, which, as is known, is very inclined to kind from all things that may appear to her. Presumably,
expect behind the objects of the senses still always this conclusion is also to be found in the most common
something invisible, something active for itself, but understanding which, as is well-known, is always very
again by this ruins it, that it soon makes this inclined to expect something invisible and active in
invisible itself again sensible, i.e. wants to make itself behind the objects of the senses. But the common
into an object of intuition, and thus becomes by this understanding again corrupts this invisible something
not by a degree wiser. by wanting to make the invisible something into a sensuous
Now the human being actually finds in itself a thing again, that is, by wanting to make the invisible
capacity by which it distinguishes itself from all something into an object of intuition. And so, by trying
other things, even from to make something invisible into something sensuous,
the common understanding does not become even a little
107 [4:451-452] bit wiser.
Now, the human being actually finds in herself a capacity
[Scholar Translation: Orr] by which she distinguishes herself from all other things,
and even from
107 [4:451-452]
[Student Translation: Orr]
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itself, so far as it is affected by objects, and that herself so far as she is affected by objects; and this
is +reason+. This, as pure self-activity, is even in capacity is +reason+. This reason, as pure self-activity,
this raised still above the +understanding+: that, is even in this self-activity still raised above the
although this is also self-activity and does not, like +understanding+ in this way: that reason in self-activity
sense, contain merely representations that only arise is higher because, although the understanding is also
when one is affected by things (therefore passive), it self-activity and does not, as sense does, merely contain
can nevertheless produce from its activity no other ideas that only arise when you are affected by things
concepts than those that in this way serve merely in (and are therefore passive), the understanding nevertheless
order +to bring sensuous representations under rules+ can produce from its activity no concepts other than
and to unite them by this in a consciousness, without those that serve merely +to bring sensuous representations
which use of sensibility it would think nothing at under rules+ and that, by bringing the representations
all, while on the other hand, reason under the name of under these rules, unite the representations in a single
ideas shows such a pure spontaneity that it goes out consciousness; without this use of sensibility, the
by this far beyond anything that sensibility can only understanding would think nothing at all. On the other
deliver to it, and proves in this its most eminent hand, reason, under the name of ideas, shows such a
occupation, to distinguish the world of sense and the pure spontaneity that the human being, by this spontaneity,
world of understanding from each other, by this, goes out far beyond anything that sensibility only
however, to prescribe to the understanding itself its can provide to the human being and showcases reason's
boundaries. foremost occupations by distinguishing the world of
For this reason a rational being must look at sense from the world of understanding; in making this
itself +as an intelligence+ (thus not on behalf of its distinction, however, reason marks out the boundaries
lower powers), not as belonging to the world of sense, for the understanding itself.
but to the world of understanding; therefore, it has Because of this distinction that reason makes, a rational
two standpoints from which it can consider itself and being, +as an intelligence+ (so not from the perspective
can cognize laws of the use of its powers, of the rational being's lower powers), must look at
consequently of all its actions, +once+, so far as it itself as belonging not to the world of sense but instead
belongs to the world of sense, as belonging to the world of the understanding. So
the rational being has two standpoints from which it
108 [4:452] can consider itself and can recognize laws for the
use of its powers and, consequently, can recognize
[Scholar Translation: Orr] laws governing all of its actions. +First+, as far
as the rational being belongs to the world of sense,
108 [4:452]
[Student Translation: Orr]
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under natural laws (heteronomy), +secondly+, as the rational being can consider itself as under laws
belonging to the intelligible world, under laws that of nature (heteronomy). +Secondly+, as belonging to
are independent of nature, not empirical, but are the intelligible world, the rational being can consider
grounded merely in reason. itself as under laws that are independent of nature
As a rational being, therefore as belonging to and are not empirical; instead, these independent and
the intelligible world, the human being can think the non-empirical laws are grounded only in reason.
causality of its own will never otherwise than under As a rational being, and therefore as a being belonging
the idea of freedom; for independence from the to the intelligible world, the human being can never
determinate causes of the world of sense (of such kind think of the causality of its own will except as under
reason must always attribute to itself) is freedom. the idea of freedom; for independence from the determinate
Now, with the idea of freedom the concept of causes of the world of sense (which is the kind of
+autonomy+ is inseparably connected, with this, independence that reason must always attribute to itself)
however, the universal principle of morality, which is freedom. Now, with the idea of freedom the concept
underlies in the idea all actions of +rational+ beings of +autonomy+ is inseparably connected, but the concept
as ground just in this way as natural law all of autonomy is inseparably connected with the universal
appearances. principle of morality; and the principle of morality
Now is the suspicion that we above made astir underlies in the idea as a ground all actions of +rational+
removed, as if a hidden circle were contained in our beings just as natural law, as an idea and ground,
inference from freedom to autonomy and from this to underlies all appearances.
the moral law, namely, that perhaps we laid the idea The suspicion that we stirred up earlier has now been
of freedom as ground only for the sake of the moral removed. The suspicion was that a hidden circle might
law in order to infer this afterwards from freedom in have been contained in our inference from freedom to
turn, therefore of that could provide no ground at autonomy and then from autonomy to the moral law. In
all, but it only as begging of a principle that particular, the circle might have been that we perhaps
friendly souls will probably gladly allow to us, which made the idea of freedom a ground only for the sake
we, however, could of the moral law in order afterwards in turn to conclude
the moral law from freedom. So, because of this hidden
109 [4:452-453] circle, we could provide no ground at all for the moral
law; instead, we could only provide the moral law as
[Scholar Translation: Orr] a begging of a principle that friendly souls will probably
gladly grant us, but which we
109 [4:452-453]
[Student Translation: Orr]
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never set up as a provable proposition. For now we see never could set up as a provable proposition. For we
that when we think ourselves as free, in this way we now see that, when we think ourselves as free, we transport
transfer ourselves as members into the world of ourselves as members into the world of understanding
understanding and cognize the autonomy of the will and recognize the autonomy of the will together with
together with its consequence, morality; if we, its consequence, morality. But when we think ourselves
however, think ourselves as obligated, in this way we as obligated, then we consider ourselves as belonging
consider ourselves as belonging to the world of sense to the world of sense and yet at the same time as belonging
and yet at the same time to the world of to the world of understanding.
understanding.
+How is a categorical imperative+
+How is a categorical imperative+ +possible?+
+possible?+
The rational being, as an intelligence, counts itself
The rational being classes itself as intelligence as belonging to the world of understanding, and the
with the world of understanding, and only as an rational being, merely as an efficient cause belonging
efficient cause belonging to this does it name its to this world of understanding, calls its causality
causality a +will+. From the other side, it is a +will+. But from a different point of view, the rational
conscious of itself, however, also as a piece of the being is also conscious of itself as a piece of the
world of sense, in which its actions as mere world of sense in which the rational being's actions,
appearances of that causality are found, but of which as mere appearances of that causality, are found. But
possibility from this, which we do not know, cannot be we cannot comprehend the possibility of these actions
looked into, but in which place those actions as as effects of that causality with which we have no
determined through other appearances, namely eager acquaintance; instead, in place of that comprehension,
desires and inclinations, must be looked into as we must understand those actions as determined by other
belonging to the world of sense. As a mere member of appearances, namely, by eager desires and inclinations,
the world of understanding, all my actions would thus and as belonging to the world of sense. So, as only
be in perfect conformity with the principle of the a member of the world of understanding, all my actions
autonomy of the pure will; as a mere piece of the would be in perfect conformity with the principle of
world of sense, they would have to be taken as wholly autonomy of the pure will; as only a piece of the world
in conformity with the natural law of eager desires of sense, my actions would have to be taken as in complete
and inclinations, therefore with the heteronomy of conformity with the natural law of eager desires and
inclinations, and therefore with the heteronomy of
110 [4:453]
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[Scholar Translation: Orr]
[Student Translation: Orr]
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nature. (The first would rest on the highest principle nature. (The first actions, those of the world of understanding,
of morality, the second of happiness.) But because would rest on the highest principle of morality; the
+the world of understanding contains the ground of the second actions, those in the world of sense, would
world of sense, therefore also of its laws+, thus is rest on the principle of happiness.) But +the world
in view of my will (which wholly belongs to the world of understanding contains the ground of the world of
of understanding) immediately lawgiving, and thus must sense and therefore also the ground of the laws of
also be thought as such, in this way I will cognize the world of sense+; thus, the world of understanding
myself as subject as an intelligence, although on the is immediately lawgiving with respect to my will (which
other side as a being belonging to the world of sense, belongs entirely to the world of understanding); so
nevertheless to the law of the first, i.e. of reason, the world of understanding must also be thought as
which contains in the idea of freedom the law of it, lawgiving; for these reasons, I will have to recognize
and thus to the autonomy of the will, consequently that, although from another point of view I am a being
must look at the laws of the world of understanding as belonging to the world of sense, I am nevertheless
imperatives for me and the actions in conformity with subject as an intelligence to the law of the first
this principle as duties. world, the world of understanding, that is, of reason.
And in this way categorical imperatives are Reason contains the law of the world of understanding
possible, by this, that the idea of freedom makes me in reason's idea of freedom and so I will also have
into a member of an intelligible world, whereby, if I to recognize that I am subject as an intelligence to
were only such, all my actions +would+ always be in the autonomy of the will. Consequently, I will have
conformity with the autonomy of the will, but since I to look at the laws of the world of understanding as
intuit myself at the same time as a member of the imperatives for me and have to look at the actions
world of sense, +ought+ to be in conformity with, that are in conformity with this principle as duties.
which +categorical+ ought represents a synthetic And it is in this way that categorical imperatives are
proposition a priori, by this, that to my will possible. They are possible because the idea of freedom
affected by sensuous eager desires still is added the turns me into a member of an intelligible world by
idea of just the same will, but belonging to the world which, if I were only such a member, all my actions
of understanding, pure, and for itself practical, +would+ always be in conformity with the autonomy of
the will. But, since I at the same time intuit myself
111 [4:453-454] as a member of the world of sense, my actions +ought+
always to conform with the autonomy of the will. This
[Scholar Translation: Orr] +categorical+ ought represents a synthetic proposition
a priori because to my will that is affected by sensuous
eager desires is added the idea of just the same will,
but pure, in itself practical, and belonging to the
world of understanding.
111 [4:453-454]
[Student Translation: Orr]
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which contains the highest condition of the first This pure will contains, according to reason, the highest
according to reason; approximately in the way that condition of the first, the sensuously affected, will.
concepts of the understanding, that for themselves This addition is approximately like the way in which
signify nothing but lawful form in general, are added concepts of the understanding, which in themselves
to the intuitions of the world of sense and by this signify nothing but lawful form in general, are added
make possible synthetic propositions a priori, on to the intuitions of the world of sense. By their addition
which all cognition of a nature rests. to intuitions, these concepts of the understanding
The practical use of common human reason confirms make synthetic propositions a priori possible, and
the correctness of this deduction. There is no one, it is on such propositions that all knowledge of a
even the most wicked miscreant, if he is only nature rests.
otherwise accustomed to use reason, who, when one puts The practical use of common human reason confirms the
before him examples of honesty in purposes, of correctness of this deduction. There is no one, even
steadfastness in observance of good maxims, of the most vile miscreant as long as she is otherwise
compassion and of general benevolence (and connected accustomed to using reason, who, when you present her
moreover with great sacrifices of advantages and with examples of honesty in intentions, of steadfastness
convenience), does not wish, that he also might be so in obeying good maxims, of compassion and of common
disposed. He can, however, only because of his kindness (and joined moreover with great sacrifices
inclinations and impulses, not well bring it about in of advantages and convenience), does not wish that
himself; by which he nevertheless at the same time she might also be so disposed. But, only because of
wishes to be free from such inclinations burdensome to her inclinations and impulses, she cannot bring these
himself. He shows by this, therefore, that he, with a examples fully about in herself; although she does
will that is free from impulses of sensibility, not do well in realizing the examples in herself, she
transfers himself in thought into an altogether still wishes to be free of such inclinations that are
different order of things than that of his eager burdensome to her. She proves by this wish, therefore,
desires in the field of sensibility, because he can that she, with a will that is free from impulses of
expect from that wish no satisfaction of eager sensibility, transfers herself in thought into an order
desires, therefore no satisfactory condition for any of things entirely different from that of her eager
of his actual or otherwise desires in the field of sensibility. This is proved
because from that wish she expects no satisfaction
112 [4:454] of her eager desires and so expects for all of her
actual or otherwise
[Scholar Translation: Orr]
112 [4:454]
[Student Translation: Orr]
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imaginable inclinations (for by this even the idea imaginable inclinations no satisfying condition (for
which coaxes the wish from him would lose its by this even the idea which coaxes the wish from her
preeminence), but only a greater inner worth of his would lose its preeminence); instead, she can expect
person. This better person he believes, however, to be only a greater inner worth of her person. She believes
when he transfers himself to the standpoint of a herself to be this better person when she transfers
member of the world of understanding, to which the herself into the standpoint of a member of the world
idea of freedom, i.e. independence from +determining+ of understanding. It is to this standpoint that she
causes of the world of sense, involuntarily is involuntarily necessitated by the idea of freedom,
necessitates him, and in which he is himself conscious that is, independence from the +determining+ causes
of a good will that for his bad will as a member of of the world of sense. And it is in this standpoint
the world of sense according to his own admission that she, according to her own admission, is conscious
constitutes the law, of whose authority he knows of a good will that constitutes the law for her bad
during the time that he transgresses it. The moral will as a member of the world of sense. She is acquainted
ought is thus one's own necessary willing as a member with the authority of this law whenever she transgresses
of an intelligible world and is thought only by it as the law. So the moral ought is one's necessary willing
ought so far as it considers itself at the same time as a member of an intelligible world, and the moral
as a member of the world of sense. ought is only thought by a member of an intelligible
world as an ought insofar as she at the same time considers
++Of++ herself to be a member of the world of sense.
++the extreme boundary++
+of all practical philosophy.+ ++Of++
++the extreme boundary++
All human beings think themselves as regards the +of all practical philosophy.+
will as free. From this come all judgments about
actions as such that +ought+ have been +done+, All human beings think of themselves as having a free
although they +were not done+. Nevertheless, this will. It is from this thought that all judgments about
freedom is not a concept of experience and it also actions, as actions that +ought+ to have been +done+
cannot be, because it always remains, although although they +were not done+, come. But this freedom
experience shows the opposite is not a concept of experience, and also cannot be
such a concept, because the concept of freedom always
113 [4:454-455] remains even though experience shows the opposite
[Scholar Translation: Orr] 113 [4:454-455]
[Student Translation: Orr]
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of those demands that are represented as necessary of those demands that are represented as necessary under
under presupposition of it. On the other side, it is the presupposition of freedom. From a different point
just in this way necessary that everything that of view, it is just as necessary that everything that
happens according to natural laws is unfailingly happens be determined without exception according to
determined, and this natural necessity is also not a natural laws, and this natural necessity is also not
concept of experience, just because it carries with a concept of experience precisely because the concept
itself the concept of necessity, therefore of a of natural necessity carries with it the concept of
cognition a priori. But this concept of a nature is necessity and therefore of a cognition a priori. But
confirmed through experience and must itself this concept of a nature is confirmed by experience
unavoidably be presupposed, if experience, i.e. and must itself be unavoidably presupposed if experience,
cohering cognition of objects of the senses according that is, coherent cognition of objects of sense in
to universal laws, is to be possible. Therefore, accordance with universal laws, is to be possible.
freedom is only an +idea+ of reason, whose objective Freedom is therefore only an +idea+ of reason, and
reality is in itself doubtful, nature, however, a the idea's objective reality is in itself doubtful.
+concept of the understanding+, which proves and Nature, however, is a +concept of the understanding+,
necessarily must prove its reality in examples of and this concept proves, and must necessarily prove,
experience. its reality in examples from experience.
Although now out of this a dialectic of reason A dialectic of reason now arises from this since, as
arises, since in view of the will the freedom regards the will, the freedom attributed to the will
attributed to it appears to stand in contradiction appears to stand in contradiction to natural necessity
with the necessity of nature, and, with this parting and since, with this parting of the ways, reason finds,
of the ways, reason finds in +speculative purpose+ the +for purposes of intellectual curiosity+, the way of
way of natural necessity much more worn and more natural necessity much more traveled and usable than
useful than that of freedom: in this way the footpath the way of freedom. Although this dialectic arises,
of freedom is in +practical purpose+ still the only the footpath of freedom is still, +for practical purposes+,
one on which it is possible to make use of one's the one path on which it is possible to make use of
reason in our doing and letting; hence it is for the one's reason in our conduct. So it is just as impossible
most subtle for the most subtle
114 [4:455-456] 114 [4:455-456]
[Scholar Translation: Orr] [Student Translation: Orr]
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philosophy just as impossible as for the most common philosophy as for the most common human reason to argue
human reason to argue away freedom. This must thus away freedom. So this philosophy must indeed presuppose
indeed presuppose: that no true contradiction will be the following: that no true contradiction will be found
found between freedom and natural necessity of the between freedom and natural necessity of the very same
very same human actions, for it can just as little human actions, for philosophy can give up the concept
give up the concept of nature as that of freedom. of nature no more than it can give up the concept of
Meanwhile, this apparent contradiction must at freedom.
least be destroyed in a convincing fashion, even While we wait for no true contradiction to be found,
though one could never comprehend how freedom is this apparent contradiction must at least be dissolved
possible. For, if even the thought of freedom in a convincing way, even if we could never understand
contradicts itself, or of nature, which is just as how freedom is possible. For, if even the thought of
necessary, then it, as opposed to natural necessity, freedom contradicts itself or contradicts the thought
would have to be given up completely. of nature, which is just as necessary, then freedom,
It is, however, impossible to evade this as opposed to natural necessity, would have to be given
contradiction, if the subject, which imagines itself up completely.
free, were to think itself +in the same sense+, or +in But it is impossible to escape this contradiction, if
just the same relation+, when it names itself free as the subject who imagines itself free thought of itself
when it assumes itself in respect of the same action +in the same sense+ or +in the same relation+ when
subject to the natural law. Hence, it is an it calls itself free as it did when it assumes itself
inescapable problem of speculative philosophy: at subject to natural laws with respect to the same action.
least to show that its illusion with regard to the So it is an inescapable task of speculative philosophy
contradiction rests in this, that we think the human to show at least the following things. First, speculative
being in a different sense and relation when we name philosophy must show that philosophy's deception about
it free than when we consider it as a piece of nature the contradiction rests in our thinking the human being
subject to this in a different sense and relation when we call the
human being free than we do when we hold the human
115 [4:456] being to be a piece of nature
[Scholar Translation: Orr] 115 [4:456]
[Student Translation: Orr]
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its laws, and that both +can+ not only quite well subject to nature's laws. Second, speculative philosophy
subsist together, but also must be thought +as must show that these two senses and relations +can+
necessarily united+ in the same subject, because exist together not only quite well but must also be
otherwise a ground could not be assigned why we should thought +as necessarily united+ in the same subject;
trouble reason with an idea, that, although it allows for, if not necessarily united in the same subject,
itself to be united +without contradiction+ with a no justification could be given why we should burden
different one, sufficiently established, nevertheless reason with an idea that, although the idea can be
involves us in a business in which reason in its united +without contradiction+ with a different sufficiently
theoretical use is put in a very tight spot. This established idea, nevertheless ensnares us in a task
duty, however, is incumbent only on speculative that puts reason in its theoretical use in a bind.
philosophy, so that it provides a clear path for This duty, however, is incumbent only on speculative
practical philosophy. Thus it is not put at the philosophy, so that speculative philosophy might prepare
discretion of the philosopher whether he wants to a clear path for practical philosophy. Thus it is not
remove the apparent conflict or leave it untouched; at the discretion of the philosopher to decide whether
for in the latter case the theory about this is bonum she wants to remove the apparent contradiction or wants
vacans, into the possession of which the fatalist can to leave the apparent contradiction untouched; for,
put itself with ground and can expel all morals from if left untouched, the theory about this is bonum vacans
its alleged property possessed without title. and the fatalist can justifiably take possession of
Yet one can here not yet say that the boundary of the property, driving all morals out of morals' alleged
practical philosophy begins. For that settlement of property which morals has no title to occupy.
the controversy belongs not at all to it, but it Nevertheless, you can not yet say that the boundary
demands only from speculative reason that this bring of practical philosophy begins here. For that settlement
to an end the discord in which it in theoretical of the controversy does not belong to practical philosophy;
questions entangles itself, so that practical reason instead, practical philosophy demands only of speculative
has rest and security against external attacks that reason that speculative reason bring to an end the
for it could make contentious the ground on which it discord into which speculative philosophy involves
wants to establish itself. itself in theoretical questions. If speculative reason
can bring this discord to an end, then practical reason
116 [4:456-457] might have rest and security against external attacks
that could make contentious the ground on which practical
[Scholar Translation: Orr] reason wants to establish itself.
116 [4:456-457]
[Student Translation: Orr]
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The rightful claim, however, even of common human But the rightful claim, even of common human reason,
reason to freedom of the will grounds itself on the to freedom of the will is grounded on the consciousness
consciousness and the granted presupposition of the and the granted presupposition of the independence
independence of reason from merely of reason from merely subjectively determining causes.
subjective-determinate causes which collectively These causes together constitute what belongs merely
constitute that which only belongs to sensation, to sensation and so what belongs under the general
therefore under the general naming of sensibility. The name of sensibility. The human being considers herself
human being, who considers itself in such a way as an in such a way as an intelligence; by doing so, she
intelligence, puts itself by this in a different order puts herself in a different order of things and in
of things and in a relation to determining grounds of a relation to determining grounds of a quite different
a quite different kind when it thinks itself as an kind when she thinks of herself as an intelligence
intelligence endowed with a will, consequently with endowed with a will and consequently as endowed with
causality, than when it perceives itself as a causality than she does when she perceives herself
phenomenon in the world of sense (which it actually as a phenomenon in the world of sense (which she actually
also is) and subjects its causality, as regards is, too) and subjects her causality, according to external
external determination, to natural laws. Now, it soon determination, to natural laws. Now, she soon becomes
becomes aware that both at the same time can take aware that both ways of thinking of herself can, and
place, indeed even must. For that a +thing in the indeed even must, take place at the same time. For
appearance+ (that belonging to the world of sense) is the following does not contain the least contradiction:
subject to certain laws, of which just the same +as that a +thing as an appearance+ (that belonging to
thing+ or being +in itself+ is independent, contains the world of sense) is subject to certain laws while
not the least contradiction; that it, however, must the very same +as a thing+ or being +in itself+ is
represent and think itself in this twofold way, rests, independent of those laws. But that she must imagine
as concerns the first, on the consciousness of itself and think herself in this twofold way rests on different
as an object affected through senses, as regards the kinds of awareness. First, as a thing as an appearance,
second, on the consciousness of itself as an her thinking rests on the consciousness of herself
intelligence, i.e. as independent in the use of reason as an object affected by the senses. Second, as a thing
of sensuous impressions (therefore as belonging to the in itself, her thinking rests on the consciousness
world of understanding). of herself as an intelligence, that is, as independent
of sensuous impressions in the use of reason (and therefore
117 [4:457] as belonging to the world of understanding).
[Scholar Translation: Orr] 117 [4:457]
[Student Translation: Orr]
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Hence it happens that the human being presumes a So it happens that the human being claims for herself
will that lets nothing come to its account which a will that does not let what belongs merely to her
merely belongs to its eager desires and inclinations, eager desires and inclinations enter into her accountability.
and on the contrary thinks actions through itself as On the contrary, she thinks of actions as possible — indeed
possible, indeed even as necessary, that can be done even as necessary — through herself, actions that can
only with disregard of all eager desires and sensuous be done only by disregarding all eager desires and
incitements. Their causality lies in it as sensuous impulses. The causality of these actions lies
intelligence and in the laws of effects and actions in her as an intelligence and in the laws of effects
according to principles of an intelligible world of and actions according to principles of an intelligible
which it indeed knows nothing further than that in world. She certainly knows nothing of this intelligible
this only reason and, to be sure, pure reason world except that in this intelligible world only reason — and,
independent of sensibility gives the law, also since for sure, pure reason independent of sensibility — gives
it is in that very place only as an intelligence its the law. Also, since in this intelligible world she
proper self (as a human being, on the other hand, only is only as an intelligence her proper self (as a human
an appearance of itself), those laws apply to it being, in contrast, only an appearance of herself),
immediately and categorically, so that, to what those laws apply to her immediately and categorically.
inclinations and impulses (therefore the whole nature Because those laws apply to her directly and without
of the world of sense) incite, cannot infringe the exception, her inclinations and impulses (and so the
laws of its willing as an intelligence, so entirely, whole nature of the world of sense), no matter what
that it for the first does not answer and does not they prod her to do, cannot infringe the laws of willing
ascribe to its proper self, i.e. to its will, as an intelligence. This insulation of those laws from
certainly, however, does ascribe the indulgence that infringement is so thorough that she does not answer
it likes to bear for them, if it allowed them to the for the inclinations and impulses and does not ascribe
detriment of rational laws of the will influence on them to her proper self, that is, to her will. She
its maxims. does, however, ascribe to her will the indulgence that
By this, that practical reason +thinks+ itself she would show the inclinations and impulses if she,
into a world of understanding, it oversteps not at all to the disadvantage of the rational laws of the will,
its boundaries, but certainly would if it wanted to permitted the inclinations and impulses influence on
+look+ or +feel+ itself +into+ it. The former is only her maxims.
a negative By +thinking+ itself into a world of understanding,
practical reason does not overstep its bounds at all.
118 [4:457-458] But practical reason certainly would overstep its bounds
if it wanted to +look+ or +feel+ itself +into+ such
[Scholar Translation: Orr] a world. The former, merely thinking itself into a
world of understanding, is only a negative
118 [4:457-458]
[Student Translation: Orr]
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thought in view of the world of sense which gives thought with regard to the world of sense. This negative
reason no laws in determination of the will, and only thought is that the world of sense gives no laws to
in this single point positive, that that freedom, as reason for controlling the will. The thought is positive
negative determination, at the same time is connected only in this one point: that that freedom, as a negative
with a (positive) capacity and even with a causality determinant or controller, is combined at the same
of reason, which we name a will, to act in this way, time with a (positive) capacity and even with a causality
that the principle of actions is in accordance with of reason, which we call a will; this capacity or causality
the essential character of a rational cause, i.e. the of reason is a capacity to act in such a way that the
condition of the universal validity of the maxim as a principle of actions is in accordance with the essential
law. Were it, however, still to fetch an +object of character of a rational cause as a law, that is, with
the will+, i.e. a motive, from the world of the condition of the universal validity of the maxim.
understanding, then it would overstep its boundaries But, if practical reason were still to fetch an +object
and presume to know something of which it knows of the will+, that is, a motive, from the world of
nothing. The concept of a world of understanding is understanding, then practical reason would overstep
thus only a +standpoint+, that reason sees itself its bounds and presume to be acquainted with something
necessitated to take outside the appearances, +in which it knows nothing about. So the concept of a world
order to think itself as practical+, which, if the of understanding is only a +standpoint+ which reason
influences of sensibility were determining for the sees itself necessitated to take outside of the appearances
human being, would not be possible, which, however, is +in order to think of itself as practical+. Thinking
still necessary insofar as the consciousness of itself of itself as practical would not be possible if the
as an intelligence, therefore as a rational cause influences of sensibility had control of the human
active through reason, i.e. free acting, is not to be being. But thinking of itself as practical is still
denied it. This thought brings about, of course, the necessary if the consciousness of itself as an intelligence
idea of a different order and lawgiving than that of and therefore as a cause that is rational and active
the nature mechanism, which concerns the world of through reason, that is, is free acting, is not to
sense, and makes the concept of an intelligible world be denied to the human being. This thought, of course,
(i.e. the totality of rational beings, as things in brings about the idea of a different order and lawgiving
themselves) than the idea of a mechanism of nature which concerns
the world of sense. This thought also makes the concept
119 [4:458] of an intelligible world (that is, the whole of rational
beings as things in themselves)
[Scholar Translation: Orr]
119 [4:458]
[Student Translation: Orr]
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necessary, but without the least presumption to think necessary, but without the least presumption to think
here further than merely according to its +formal+ further here than merely in accordance with the +formal+
condition, i.e. in conformity to the universality of condition of the intelligible world. That is to say,
the maxim of the will as law, therefore to autonomy of the concept of an intelligible world is made necessary
the latter, which alone can subsist with its freedom; just by thinking in conformance with the universality
while, on the other hand, all laws that are determined of the maxims of the will as laws and therefore with
on an object give heteronomy, which can only be found the autonomy of the will, that autonomy alone being
in natural laws and also can only concern the world of able to coexist with the freedom of the will. While,
sense. on the other hand, all laws that are specified by an
But then reason would overstep all its boundary, object give heteronomy which can only be found in natural
if it itself attempted to +explain+ ++how++ pure laws and which also can only concern the world of sense.
reason can be practical, which would be fully one and But then reason would overstep its entire boundary if
the same with the problem of explaining +how freedom it attempted to +explain+ ++how++ pure reason can be
is possible+. practical, which would be exactly the same as the problem
For we can explain nothing except what we can of explaining +how freedom is possible+.
trace back to laws whose object can be given in some For we can explain nothing except what we can trace
possible experience. Freedom, however, is a mere idea back to laws whose object can be given in some possible
whose objective reality can in no way be set forth experience. But freedom is a mere idea whose objective
according to natural laws, therefore also not in any reality can in no way be set forth according to natural
possible experience, which thus can never be laws and cannot, therefore, be set forth in any possible
comprehended or even only seen into because underneath experience. So the idea's objective reality can never
it itself an example may never be put according to any be comprehended or even glimpsed precisely because
analogy. It holds only as a necessary presupposition an example along the lines of an analogy may never
of reason in a being that believes itself to be be put underneath freedom itself. The idea of freedom
conscious of a will, i.e. of a capacity still holds only as a necessary presupposition of reason
different from the mere faculty of desire, (namely to in a being that believes itself to be conscious of
determine itself to action as an intelligence, a will, that is, of a capacity still different from
therefore according to laws of reason independently of the mere faculty of desire. (This capacity is, in particular,
the capacity to resolve to act as an intelligence and
120 [4:458-459] therefore according to laws of reason, independently
of
[Scholar Translation: Orr]
120 [4:458-459]
[Student Translation: Orr]
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natural instincts). Where, however, determination natural instincts.) But where the determination of natural
according to natural laws ceases, there ceases also laws stops, all +explanation+ stops, too, and nothing
all +explanation+, and there remains nothing left but remains except +defense+, that is, repelling the objections
+defense+, i.e. repulsion of the objections of those of those who pretend to have seen deeper into the essence
who pretend to have seen deeper into the essence of of things and, because of that alleged insight, audaciously
things and on that account boldly pronounce freedom to declare freedom to be impossible. You can only point
be impossible. One can only show them that the out to them that the contradiction that they supposedly
contradiction supposedly discovered by them in it lies have discovered in freedom lies nowhere else than in
nowhere else than in this, that, since they, in order this: that they, in order to make the natural law hold
to make the natural law hold in view of human actions, with regard to human actions, had to consider the human
had to consider the human being necessarily as an being necessarily as an appearance; and now, since
appearance and now, since one demands of them that you demand of them that they should think of the human
they should think it as an intelligence also as a being as an intelligence also as a thing in itself,
thing in itself, they still consider it always in they go on considering the human being in this (i.e.,
this, too, as an appearance, where, in that case as a thing in itself), too, as an appearance. Of course,
admittedly, the separation of its causality (i.e. of in this case, where a thing in itself is confused with
its will) from all natural laws of the world of sense an appearance, the separation of the human being's
in one and the same subject would stand in causality (i.e., its will) from all natural laws of
contradiction, which, however, falls away, if they the world of sense in one and the same subject would
wanted to reflect and, as is reasonable, confess that give rise to a contradiction. But this contradiction
behind the appearances still the things in themselves would fall away if they wanted to reflect and, as is
(although hidden) must lie as ground, of which laws of reasonable, to admit that behind the appearances there
working one cannot demand that they should be of the must still lie as a ground the things in themselves
same sort with those under which their appearances (although hidden). You cannot demand that the laws
stand. governing the working of the things in themselves should
The subjective impossibility of +explaining+ be the same as those laws under which the appearances
freedom of the will is one and the same with the of the things in themselves stand.
impossibility of discovering and making comprehensible The subjective impossibility of +explaining+ the freedom
an of the will is one and the same with the impossibility
121 [4:459] 121 [4:459]
[Scholar Translation: Orr] [Student Translation: Orr]
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+interest*)+, which the human being can take in moral of discovering and making understandable an +interest+*
laws; and nevertheless it actually takes an interest which the human being might take in moral laws. Though
in them, of which the foundation in us we name moral it is impossible to understand, the human being nevertheless
feeling, which has falsely been given out by some as actually does take an interest in moral laws, and moral
the standard gauge of our moral judgment, since it feeling is what we call the foundation in us of this
rather must be looked at as the +subjective+ effect interest. This moral feeling has been falsely given
that the law exercises on the will to which reason by some people as the measuring stick for our moral
alone delivers the objective grounds. judgment. Moral feeling is a false measuring stick
In order to will that for which reason alone for moral judgment since moral feeling must instead
prescribes the ought to the sensuously-affected be seen as the +subjective+ effect that the law exercises
rational being, to that belongs of course a faculty of on the will, while reason alone provides the will with
reason +to instill+ a +feeling of pleasure+ or of the objective grounds of the law.
satisfaction in the fulfillment of duty, therefore a In order to will what reason alone prescribes that the
causality sensuously-affected rational being ought to do, a faculty
of reason is of course required. This faculty must
*) Interest is that by which reason becomes +instill+ a +feeling of pleasure+ or of satisfaction
practical, i.e. a cause determining the will. in the fulfillment of duty; so a causality
Hence one says only of a rational being that
it takes an interest in something, unreasoning * Interest is that by which reason becomes
creatures feel only sensuous impulses. Reason practical, that is, becomes a cause determining
takes an immediate interest only then in or directing the will. For this reason, you
the action when the universal validity of can only say of a rational being that it
the maxim of it is a sufficient ground of takes an interest in something, creatures
determination of the will. Such an interest without reason feeling only sensuous impulses.
is alone pure. If it, however, can determine Reason takes an immediate interest in an
the will only by means of another object action only when the universal validity of
of desire, or under the presupposition of the maxim of the action is a sufficient ground
a special feeling of the subject, then reason of determination of the will. Only such an
takes only a mediate interest in the action, interest is pure. But if reason can direct
and since reason can discover for itself the will only by means of another object
alone without experience neither objects of desire or by means of a special feeling
of the will, nor a special feeling underlying of the subject, then reason takes only a
it as ground, in this way the latter interest mediate interest in the action; and, since
would only be empirical and not a pure rational reason by itself alone, without experience,
interest. The logical interest of reason can discover neither objects of the will
(to advance its insights) is never immediate, nor a special feeling underlying the will
but presupposes purposes of its use. as the will's ground, the latter, mediate,
interest would only be empirical and not
122 [4:459-460] a pure rational interest. The logical interest
of reason (to advance its insights) is never
[Scholar Translation: Orr] immediate; instead, that logical interest
presupposes purposes for its use.
122 [4:459-460]
[Student Translation: Orr]
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of it to determine sensibility in accordance with its to configure sensibility according to rational principles
principles. It is, however, completely impossible to must belong to reason. It is, however, completely impossible
look into, i.e. to make a priori comprehensible, how a to figure out, that is, to make a priori understandable,
mere thought, which itself contains nothing sensuous how a mere thought that contains nothing sensuous in
in itself, produces a sensation of pleasure or itself could produce a sensation of pleasure or displeasure.
displeasure; for that is a special kind of causality Such a priori understanding is impossible because the
of which, as of all causality, we can determine production of a sensation from such a thought is a
nothing at all a priori but about which we must special kind of causality about which, as with all
consult experience alone. Since this, however, can kinds of causality, we can specify nothing at all a
provide no relation of cause to effect, except between priori; instead, to say anything about such a production,
two objects of experience, but here pure reason we must consult experience alone. But since experience
through mere ideas (which furnish no object at all for can provide no relation of cause to effect except between
experience) is to be the cause of an effect that two objects of experience and since here pure reason
admittedly lies in experience, so the explanation, how is through mere ideas (which furnish no object at all
and why the +universality of the maxim as law+, for experience) to be the cause of an effect which
therefore morality, interests us, is for us human admittedly lies in experience, it is completely impossible
beings completely impossible. This much only is for us human beings to explain how and why the +universality
certain: that it does not have validity for us of a maxim as law+, and therefore morality, interests
+because it interests+ us (for that is heteronomy and us. Only this much is certain: it is not +because the
dependence of practical reason on sensibility, namely moral law interests us+ that the moral law is valid
on a feeling lying as the ground, by which it never for us (for that is heteronomy and dependence of practical
could be morally lawgiving), but that it interests us reason on sensibility, in particular, dependence on
because it holds for us as human beings, since it has a feeling lying as the ground of practical reason,
arisen from our will as intelligence, therefore from in which case practical reason could never be morally
our proper self; +what, however, belongs to mere lawgiving); instead, it is because the moral law is
appearance is subordinated by reason necessarily to valid for us as human beings that the moral law interests
the constitution of the thing in itself+. us, since the moral law arose from our will as an intelligence
and therefore from our genuine self. +But what belongs
123 [4:460-461] merely to appearance is necessarily subordinated by
reason to the make-up of the thing in itself+.
[Scholar Translation: Orr]
123 [4:460-461]
[Student Translation: Orr]
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The question thus: how a categorical imperative So the question of how a categorical imperative is possible
is possible, can be answered, to be sure, so far as can for sure be answered so far as you can provide
one can declare the sole presupposition under which it the sole presupposition under which the imperative
alone is possible, namely the idea of freedom, also so is possible. That sole presupposition is the idea of
far as one can look into the necessity of this freedom. Also, the question can be answered so far
presupposition, which is sufficient for the +practical as you can see into the necessity of this presupposition,
use+ of reason, i.e. for the conviction of the which is sufficient for the +practical use+ of reason,
+validity of this imperative+, therefore also of the that is, for confidence in the +validity of this imperative+
moral law, but how this presupposition itself is and so also for confidence in the moral law. But how
possible can never be looked into by any human reason. this presupposition itself is possible is an insight
Under the presupposition of freedom of the will of an that can never be grasped by any human reason. Under
intelligence, however, its +autonomy+, as the formal the presupposition of the freedom of the will of an
condition under which it alone can be determined, is a intelligence, though, the will's +autonomy+, as the
necessary consequence. To presuppose this freedom of formal condition under which the will can alone be
the will is also not only (without falling into guided, is a necessary consequence. To presuppose this
contradiction with the principle of natural necessity freedom of the will is also not only (without falling
in the connection of appearances of the world of into contradiction with the principle of natural necessity
sense) very well +possible+ (as speculative philosophy in the connection of appearances of the world of sense)
can show), but also it is practically, i.e. in the entirely +possible+ (as speculative philosophy can
idea, to put underneath all its voluntary actions as a show), but it is also practically +necessary+. That
condition, +necessary+ without further condition for a is to say, putting freedom, as an idea and as a condition
rational being that is conscious of its causality of action, underneath all voluntary actions of a rational
through reason, therefore of a will (which is distinct being is necessary without further condition for a
from eager desires). But now +how+ pure reason without rational being who is conscious of its causality through
other incentives that might be taken from somewhere reason and therefore conscious of a will (which is
else can be practical for itself, i.e. how the mere distinct from eager desires). But now +how+ pure reason,
+principle of universal+ without other incentives that might be taken from somewhere
else, can be practical by itself is beyond the capability
124 [4:461] of any human reason to comprehend. That is to say,
how the mere +principle of the universal+
[Scholar Translation: Orr]
124 [4:461]
[Student Translation: Orr]
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+validity of all its maxims as laws+ (which admittedly +validity of all of the will's maxims as laws+ (which
would be the form of a pure practical reason) without of course would be the form of a pure practical reason),
any matter (object) of the will, in which one in without any matter (object) of the will, in which you
advance may take some interest, for itself can furnish may in advance take some interest, can by itself provide
an incentive and produce an interest which would be an incentive and produce an interest which would be
called purely +moral+, or in other words: +how pure called purely +moral+ is beyond the capability of any
reason can be practical+, all human reason is human reason to explain. Or, in other words: all human
completely incapable of explaining that, and all reason is completely incapable of explaining +how pure
effort and labor to seek an explanation of this is reason can be practical+, and all effort and labor
lost. spent in searching for an explanation is wasted.
It is just the same as if I sought to fathom how It is just the same as if I were trying to figure out
freedom itself as causality of a will is possible. For how freedom itself is possible as causality of the
there I leave the philosophical ground of explanation will. For in such an attempt I leave the philosophical
and have no other. To be sure, I could now swarm about ground of explanation and have no other ground. Now,
in the intelligible world that still remains over to of course, I could bumble around in the intelligible
me, in the world of intelligences; but although I have world that remains to me, in the world of intelligences;
an +idea+ of it, which has its good ground, so I have but, although I have an +idea+ of such a world and
still not the least +knowledge+ of it and can also although the idea has its good ground, I still have
never arrive at this through all effort of my natural not the least +knowledge+ of that world and also can
rational faculty. It signifies only a something that never arrive at this knowledge through any effort of
there remains over when I have excluded from the my natural rational faculty. The idea only signifies
grounds of determination of my will everything that a something that remains when I have excluded from
belongs to the world of sense merely in order to limit the grounds directing my will everything that belongs
the principle of motives from the field of to the world of sense; I exclude everything in the
sensibility, by this, that I bound it and show that it world of sense merely in order to limit the principle
contains in itself not everything in everything, but of motives from the field of sensibility, and I bring
that beyond it is still more; this more, however, about this limitation by confining the field and by
showing that the field does not contain everything
125 [4:461-462] in itself but rather that there is still more outside
of the field. But I do know anything further about
[Scholar Translation: Orr]
125 [4:461-462]
[Student Translation: Orr]
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I know not further. Of the pure reason which thinks this 'more' that is outside of the field. After separation
this ideal, nothing remains over to me after of all matter, that is, cognition of objects, nothing
separation of all matter, i.e. cognition of objects, remains to me of the pure reason which thinks this
but the form, namely the practical law of the ideal except the following two items. First, the form,
universal validity of maxims, and, in accordance with namely, the practical law of the universal validity
this, to think reason in reference to a pure world of of maxims, remains to me. Second, it also remains to
understanding as a possible efficient cause, i.e. as me to think, in accordance with this practical law,
determining the will; the incentive must here be of reason with reference to a pure world of understanding
completely missing; this idea of an intelligible world as a possible efficient cause, that is, as a cause
itself would then have to be the incentive or that one determining the will. Here, in these two items that
in which reason originally would take an interest; remain to me, the incentive must be completely absent.
which, however, to make comprehensible is precisely If the incentive were not absent, then this idea of
the problem that we are not able to solve. an intelligible world itself would have to be the incentive
Here, then, is the highest boundary of all moral or would have to be that in which reason originally
inquiry; which, however, to determine is also already took an interest; but to make understandable how the
of great importance for this reason, so that reason idea could be the incentive or how reason could originally
hunts not on the one side around in the world of sense take an interest in the idea is precisely the problem
in a way damaging to morals for the highest motive and which we are not able to solve.
for a comprehensible, but empirical interest, on the This, then, is where the highest boundary of all moral
other side, however, so that it also not powerlessly inquiry is. To specify this boundary, however, is also
swings its wings in the space, empty for it, of already of the greatest importance for these reasons:
transcendent concepts under the name of the so that reason, on the one hand, does not hunt around
intelligible world, without moving from the spot, and in the world of sense, in a way detrimental to morals,
loses itself among phantoms. Furthermore, the idea of for the highest motive and for an understandable but
a pure world of understanding as a whole of all empirical interest; but, on the other hand, so that
intelligences, to which we ourselves as rational reason does not powerlessly, without moving from the
beings (although on the other side at the same time place, flap it wings in a space of transcendent concepts,
members of the world of sense) belong, remains always a space that is empty for reason and that goes by the
a useful and permitted idea for the purpose of a name of the intelligible world; and so that reason
does not lose itself among phantoms. Yet another reason
126 [4:462] for specifying the boundary is that the idea of a pure
world of understanding as a whole of intelligences
[Scholar Translation: Orr] to which we ourselves belong as rational beings (although
on the other side at the same time members of the world
of sense) always remains a useful and permitted idea
for the purpose of a
126 [4:462]
[Student Translation: Orr]
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rational faith, although all knowledge has at its rational faith. This idea of a pure world of understanding
border an end, in order to effect a lively interest in remains useful and permitted, even though all knowledge
the moral law in us through the magnificent ideal of a ends at the boundary of the idea, in order to produce
universal empire of +ends in themselves+ (of rational a lively interest in the moral law that is in us. The
beings), to which we only then can belong as members idea produces this interest through the magnificent
when we carefully conduct ourselves according to ideal of a universal empire of +ends in themselves+
maxims of freedom, as if they were laws of nature. (of rational beings), an empire to which we can belong
only when we carefully conduct ourselves according
++Concluding Remark.++ to maxims of freedom, as if the maxims were laws of
nature.
The speculative use of reason +in view of nature+
leads to absolute necessity of some highest cause +of ++Concluding Remark.++
the world+; the practical use of reason +with regard
to freedom+ also leads to absolute necessity, but only The speculative use of reason, +with respect to nature+,
+of laws of actions+ of a rational being as such. Now leads to the absolute necessity of some highest cause
it is an essential +principle+ of all use of our +of the world+; the practical use of reason, +with
reason to drive its cognition up to the consciousness regard to freedom+, also leads to absolute necessity,
of its +necessity+ (for without this it would not be but only to absolute necessity +of laws of actions+
cognition of reason). It is, however, also an equally of a rational being as such. Now, it is an essential
essential +limitation+ of the very same reason that it +principle+ of all use of our reason to push reason's
can see into neither the +necessity+ of what exists, cognition up to the consciousness of a cognition's
or what happens, nor of what ought to happen, unless a +necessity+ (for without this necessity the cognition
+condition+, under which it exists, or happens, or would not be a cognition of reason). But it is also
ought to happen, is laid as ground. In this way, an equally essential +limitation+ of the very same
however, through the constant inquiry for the reason that reason can see into neither the +necessity+
of what exists, what happens, or of what ought to happen,
127 [4:462-463] unless a +condition+ is made the ground under which
what exists exists, what happens happens, or what ought
[Scholar Translation: Orr] to happen happens as it ought to happen. In this way,
however, because of the constant inquiry after the
127 [4:462-463]
[Student Translation: Orr]
Groundlaying · Third Section · emended 1786 2nd ed. Groundlaying · Third Section · emended 1786 2nd edition
condition, the satisfaction of reason is only further condition, the satisfaction of reason is only further
and further postponed. Hence it seeks restlessly the and further postponed. So reason searches restlessly
unconditioned-necessary and sees itself necessitated for the unconditioned-necessary and sees itself necessitated
to assume it without any means of making it to assume the unconditioned-necessary without any means
comprehensible to itself; lucky enough, if it can of making the unconditioned-necessary comprehensible
discover only the concept which is compatible with to reason. Reason is lucky enough if it can just find
this presupposition. It is thus no shortcoming of our the concept that is compatible with this presupposition
deduction of the highest principle of morality, but a of the unconditioned-necessary. So it is no shortcoming
reproach that one would have to make of human reason of our deduction of the highest principle of morality,
in general, that it cannot make comprehensible an but instead an objection that you would have to make
unconditional practical law (of such kind the against human reason in general, that reason cannot
categorical imperative must be) as regards its make comprehensible the absolute necessity of an unconditional
absolute necessity; for that it wants to do this not practical law (which is the kind of law that the categorical
through a condition, namely by means of some interest imperative must be); for reason cannot be blamed for
laid as ground, can it not be blamed, because it would not wanting to make this absolute necessity comprehensible
then not be a moral law, i.e. highest law of freedom. through a condition, namely, by means of an interest
And in this way we comprehend, to be sure, not the that is made the ground of the necessity. Reason cannot
practical unconditional necessity of the moral be blamed because, if the necessity of the practical
imperative, we comprehend, though, at least its law were based on an interest, then the law would not
+incomprehensibility+, which is all that can fairly be be a moral law, that is, the highest law of freedom.
demanded of a philosophy that strives up to the And so we certainly do not comprehend the practical
boundary of human reason in principles. unconditional necessity of the moral imperative; we
do, though, at least comprehend the +incomprehensibility+
____________________________ of that necessity, and that is all that can fairly
be demanded of a philosophy that strives to reach up
128 [4:463] to the boundary of human reason in principles.
[Scholar Translation: Orr]
_____________________________
128 [4:463]
[Student Translation: Orr]
____________________________________________________________
Table of Contents
Sections (Xs)
Pages (Xp)
Paragraphs (Xpar)
Footnotes (Xf)
Propositions (Xpro)
Formulas (Xfor)
Examples (Xe)
Assertions (Xa)
Headings (Xh)
Index (Xi)
Sections (Xs)
Preface [iii - xvi]
First Section [1 - 24]
Transition from common moral rational cognition to philosophical [1 - 24]
Second Section [25 - 96]
Transition from popular moral philosophy to the metaphysics of morals [25 - 96]
The autonomy of the will as the highest principle of morality [87 - 88]
The heteronomy of the will as the source of all spurious principles of morality [88 - 89]
Division of all possible principles of morality from the assumed basic concept of heteronomy [89 - 96]
Third Section [97 - 128]
Transition from the metaphysics of morals to the critique of pure practical reason [97 - 128]
The concept of freedom is the key to the explanation of the autonomy of the will [97 - 99]
Freedom must be presupposed as a quality of the will of all rational beings [99 - 101]
Of the interest which attaches to the ideas of morality [101 - 110]
How is a categorical imperative possible? [110 - 113]
Of the extreme boundary of all practical philosophy [113 - 127]
Concluding Remark [127 - 128]
Pages (Xp)
Preface
iii iv v vi vii viii ix x xi xii xiii xiv xv xvi
First Section
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
Second Section
25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36
37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49
50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62
63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75
76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88
89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96
Third Section
97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106
107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117
118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128
Paragraphs (Xpar)
Preface
1. Ancient Greek philosophy was divided into three sciences: [iii.2]
2. All rational cognition is either +material+ and considers [iii.12]
3. Logic can have no empirical part, i.e. one [iv.9]
4. One can name all philosophy, so far as [v.4]
5. In such way the idea of a twofold [v.12]
6. All trades, crafts and arts have gained through [v.20]
7. Since my purpose here is properly directed to [vii.18]
8. Thus the moral laws together with their principles [ix.1]
9. A metaphysics of morals is therefore indispensably necessary, [ix.20]
10. Let one nevertheless certainly not think that what [xi.5]
11. In the intention at present to deliver someday [xiii.11]
12. Because, however, thirdly, a metaphysics of morals, in [xiv.17]
13. The present groundlaying is, however, nothing more than [xv.3]
14. I have taken my method in this writing [xvi.1]
First Section (Paragraphs)
1. (15) It is possible to think nothing anywhere in [1.5]
2. (16) Some qualities are even favorable to this good [2.12]
3. (17) The good will is not through that which [3.4]
4. (18) There is, nevertheless, in this idea of the [4.3]
5. (19) In the natural predispositions of an organized being, [4.14]
6. (20) In fact we also find that the more [5.21]
7. (21) For since reason for that purpose is not [6.25]
8. (22) In order, however, to explicate the concept of [8.4]
9. (23) I here pass over all actions which are [8.17]
10. (24) On the other hand, to preserve one's life [9.21]
11. (25) To be beneficent, where one can, is a [10.9]
12. (26) To secure one's own happiness is a duty [11.25]
13. (27) In this way we are without doubt also [13.4]
14. (28) The second proposition is: an action from duty [13.14]
15. (29) The third proposition, as a consequence from both [14.13]
16. (30) Thus the moral worth of the action lies [15.11]
17. (31) What kind of law though can that really [17.1]
18. (32) The question is e.g. may I, when I [18.1]
19. (33) What I therefore have to do, in order [19.26]
20. (34) In this way, then, we have reached in [20.21]
21. (35) There is a magnificent thing about innocence, only [22.21]
22. (36) Thus in this way +common human reason+ is [23.20]
Second Section (Paragraphs)
1. (37) If we have drawn our previous concept of [25.6]
2. (38) In fact it is absolutely impossible to make [26.7]
3. (39) One can also for those, who laugh at [27.1]
4. (40) If one adds that, if one does not [28.16]
5. (41) One could also advise morality not more badly [29.10]
6. (42) If there is then no genuine highest ground [30.8]
7. (43) This condescension to folk concepts is certainly very [30.22]
8. (44) One needs only look at the attempts concerning [31.22]
9. (45) Such a completely isolated metaphysics of morals that [32.18]
10. (46) From the foregoing it is evident: that all [34.5]
11. (47) In order, however, to advance in this treatment [36.1]
12. (48) Each thing in nature works according to laws. Only [36.16]
13. (49) The representation of an objective principle, insofar as [37.16]
14. (50) All imperatives are expressed through an +ought+ and [37.20]
15. (51) A perfectly good will would thus stand just [39.1]
16. (52) Now, all +imperatives+ command either +hypothetically+ or +categorically+. The [39.15]
17. (53) Because each practical law represents a possible action [39.23]
18. (54) The imperative thus says which action possible through [40.9]
19. (55) The hypothetical imperative thus says only that the [40.17]
20. (56) One can conceive what is possible only through [41.1]
21. (57) There is nevertheless +one+ end which one can [42.3]
22. (58) Finally, there is an imperative, which, without laying [43.6]
23. (59) The willing according to these three kinds of [43.16]
24. (60) Now the question arises: how are all these [44.13]
25. (61) The imperatives of prudence would, if only it [45.24]
26. (62) On the other hand, how the imperative of [48.14]
27. (63) We will thus have to investigate the possibility [49.20]
28. (64) Secondly, with this categorical imperative or law of [50.11]
29. (65) With this problem we want first inquire whether [51.1]
30. (66) If I conceive a +hypothetical+ imperative in general, [51.9]
31. (67) The categorical imperative is thus only a single [52.3]
32. (68) If now from this single imperative all imperatives [52.7]
33. (69) Because the universality of the law, according to [52.14]
34. (70) Now we want to enumerate some duties according [52.23]
35. (71) 1) One, who, through a series of misfortunes [53.3]
36. (72) 2) Another sees himself forced by need to [54.6]
37. (73) 3) A third finds in himself a talent [55.9]
38. (74) Yet a +fourth+, for whom it goes well [56.4]
39. (75) These, then, are some of the many actual [57.3]
40. (76) If we now pay attention to ourselves during [57.24]
41. (77) We have this much thus at least shown, [59.3]
42. (78) With the aim of arriving at this, it [59.17]
43. (79) Here we now see philosophy put in fact [60.17]
44. (80) Thus everything which is empirical, is, as an [61.6]
45. (81) Thus the question is this: is it a [62.1]
46. (82) The will is thought as a capacity to [63.13]
47. (83) Granted, however, there were something, +whose existence in+ [64.15]
48. (84) Now I say: the human being and in [64.21]
49. (85) If, then, there is thus to be a [66.4]
50. (86) So as to stay with the previous examples, [67.3]
51. (87) +Firstly+, in accordance with the concept of necessary [67.4]
52. (88) +Secondly+, what concerns the necessary or obliged duty [67.23]
53. (89) +Thirdly+, in view of the contingent (meritorious) duty [68.16]
54. (90) +Fourthly+, in reference to the meritorious duty to [69.10]
55. (91) This principle of humanity and of each rational [69.23]
56. (92) All maxims are rejected according to this principle, [70.23]
57. (93) The imperatives according to the previous way of [71.5]
58. (94) For if we think one such, then, although [72.1]
59. (95) Thus the +principle+ of each human will, as [72.10]
60. (96) It is now no wonder, when we look [73.5]
61. (97) The concept of any rational being which must [74.5]
62. (98) I understand, however, under an +empire+ the systematic [74.11]
63. (99) For rational beings all stand under the +law+ [74.23]
64. (100) A rational being, however, belongs as a +member+ [75.9]
65. (101) The rational being must consider itself always as [75.14]
66. (102) Morality thus consists in the reference of all [75.22]
67. (103) The practical necessity to act according to this [76.15]
68. (104) In the empire of ends everything has either [77.3]
69. (105) What refers to general human inclinations and needs [77.9]
70. (106) Now, morality is the condition under which alone [77.18]
71. (107) And what is it now, then, which justifies [78.25]
72. (108) The three ways cited above to represent the [79.20]
73. (109) 1) a +form+, which consists in universality, and [80.3]
74. (110) 2) a +matter+, namely an end, and here [80.7]
75. (111) 3) +a complete determination+ of all maxims through [80.12]
76. (112) We can now here end from where we [81.9]
77. (113) Rational nature excludes itself from the rest by [82.3]
78. (114) Now follows from this incontestably: that each rational [83.9]
79. (115) One can from the recent foregoing now easily [86.12]
80. (116) Autonomy of the will is the characteristic of [87.10]
81. (117) If the will +anywhere else+ than in the [88.11]
82. (118) Human reason has here, as everywhere in its [89.19]
83. (119) All principles, which one might take from this [89.24]
84. (120) +Empirical principles+ are not at all fit to [90.8]
85. (121) Among the +rational+ or reason-grounds of morality is [91.19]
86. (122) If I, however, had to choose between the [92.22]
87. (123) For the rest, I believe to be able [93.7]
88. (124) Everywhere, where an object of the will must [93.18]
89. (125) The absolutely good will, whose principle must be [95.3]
90. (126) +How such a synthetic practical proposition a priori+ [95.13]
Third Section (Paragraphs)
1. (127) The +will+ is a kind of causality of [97.10]
2. (128) The above-cited explanation of freedom is +negative+ and, [97.18]
3. (129) If, therefore, freedom of the will is presupposed, [98.21]
4. (130) It is not enough that we ascribe to [99.23]
5. (131) We have at last traced the determinate concept [101.21]
6. (132) There flowed, however, from the presupposition of these [102.8]
7. (133) It appears, therefore, as if in the idea [103.4]
8. (134) Of course we very well find that we [103.24]
9. (135) There appears here, one must freely admit it, [104.19]
10. (136) One recourse, however, remains over to us still, [105.9]
11. (137) It is a remark which to post quite [105.15]
12. (138) The reflective human being must draw a conclusion [107.14]
13. (139) Now the human being actually finds in itself [107.24]
14. (140) For this reason a rational being must look [108.20]
15. (141) As a rational being, therefore as belonging to [109.5]
16. (142) Now is the suspicion that we above made [109.16]
17. (143) The rational being classes itself as intelligence with [110.10]
18. (144) And in this way categorical imperatives are possible, [111.16]
19. (145) The practical use of common human reason confirms [112.8]
20. (146) All human beings think themselves as regards the [113.20]
21. (147) Although now out of this a dialectic of [114.17]
22. (148) Meanwhile, this apparent contradiction must at least be [115.8]
23. (149) It is, however, impossible to evade this contradiction, [115.15]
24. (150) Yet one can here not yet say that [116.19]
25. (151) The rightful claim, however, even of common human [117.1]
26. (152) Hence it happens that the human being presumes [118.1]
27. (153) By this, that practical reason +thinks+ itself into [118.24]
28. (154) But then reason would overstep all its boundary, [120.9]
29. (155) For we can explain nothing except what we [120.14]
30. (156) The subjective impossibility of +explaining+ freedom of the [121.25]
31. (157) In order to will that for which reason [122.10]
32. (158) The question thus: how a categorical imperative is [124.1]
33. (159) It is just the same as if I [125.11]
34. (160) Here, then, is the highest boundary of all [126.13]
35. (161) The speculative use of reason +in view of+ [127.10]
Footnotes (Xf)
First Section
1. A +maxim+ is the subjective principle of willing; [15.23]
2. One could reproach me, as if I sought [16.8]
Second Section
3. One can, if one wants, (just as pure [32.20]
4. I have a letter from the deceased excellent [33.19]
5. The dependence of the faculty of desire on [38.12]
6. The word prudence is taken in a twofold [42.19]
7. It appears to me, the proper meaning of [44.21]
8. I connect with the will, without a presupposed [50.19]
9. A +maxim+ is the subjective principle of acting [51.19]
10. One must here note well that I wholly [53.18]
11. To behold virtue in its proper form is [61.25]
12. This proposition I set forth here as a [66.24]
13. Let one not think that here the trivial: [68.18]
14. I can here be excused from citing examples [72.23]
15. Teleology considers nature as an empire of ends, [80.22]
16. I class the principle of moral feeling with [91.21]
Third Section
17. This way, to assume, as sufficient to our [100.20]
18. Interest is that by which reason becomes practical, [122.15]
Propositions (Xpro)
1. The "First" Proposition 8 - 13
2. The Second Proposition 13.14
3. The Third Proposition 14.13
Formulas (Xfor)
1. Universal Law 52.3 (17.10 76.3 81.3 81.15 83.26)
2. Universal Law of Nature 52.19 (80.5 81.25)
3. Humanity 66.21 (74.23 80.8 82.20 83.3)
4. Autonomy 70.18 (71.24 72.10 76.5 82.23 87.13)
5. Empire of Ends 74.5 (83.23 84.23)
Examples (Xe)
1. You ought not lie viii.9
2. Intelligence, humor, power of judgment 1.8
3. Courage, decisiveness, perseverance 1.10
4. Power, wealth, honor, health, happiness 1.17
5. Moderation, self-control, reflection 2.18
6. The cold-blooded villain 2.26
7. Like a jewel 3.19
8. The shopkeeper and his inexperienced buyers 9.6
9. The unlucky one who wishes for death 10.3
10. The compassionately attuned souls 10.10
11. The inclination to honor 10.19
12. The friend of the human being 10.25
13. The man with little sympathy 11.9
14. The gouty person 12.17
15. Scriptural passages 13.4
16. A false promise 18.1
17. Pure honesty in friendship 28.9
18. The doctor and the poisoner 41.14
19. Parents and their children 41.20
20. Dividing a line into two equal parts 45.13
21. Diet, thrift, courtesy, reserve 47.11
22. You ought promise nothing deceitfully 48.24
23. The four examples (first appearance) 53.3
24. The four examples (second appearance) 67.3
25. The amputation of limbs 67.19
26. The four examples ("third" appearance) 72.23
27. Skill and diligence in work 77.23
28. Wit, imagination and humor 77.24
29. Fidelity in promising 78.2
30. Benevolence from ground propositions 78.2
31. I ought not lie 88.24
32. To promote others' happiness 89.7
33. Different fractions of equal value 105.6
34. The most wicked miscreant 112.10
Assertions (Xa)
Preface
1. Material philosophy is twofold. [iii.18]
2. Logic can have no empirical part. [iv.9]
3. Natural and moral philosophy can have an empirical part. [iv.17]
4. Physics has its empirical and rational parts. [v.15]
5. It is of the most extreme necessity to work out a pure moral philosophy. [vii.21]
6. The ground of obligation must be sought in concepts of pure reason. [viii.13]
7. Every prescription that rests on empirical grounds can never be called a moral law. [viii.17]
8. All moral philosophy rests completely on its pure part. [ix.5]
9. Moral philosophy gives a priori laws to the human being. [ix.9]
10. Power of judgement sharpened by experience is still required. [ix.10]
11. A metaphysics of moral is indispensably necessary. [ix.20]
12. Morals remain subject to all kinds of corruption. [x.2]
13. What is to be morally good must also be done for the sake of the law. [x.5]
14. Conformity alone is very contingent and precarious. [x.9]
15. Pure philosophy (metaphysics) must come first. [x.16]
16. Without metaphysics there can be no moral philosophy at all. [x.17]
First Section (Assertions)
1. Nothing but a good will can be considered good without qualifications. [1.7]
2. The good will is good through willing alone. [3.4]
3. The true function of reason must be to produce a will good in itself. [7.7]
4. The good will must be the highest good. [7.12]
5. The good will must be the condition of everything else. [7.14]
6. The concept of duty contains the concept of a good will. [8.11]
7. To secure one's own happiness is a duty. [11.25]
8. All human beings have the most powerful and intimate inclination for happiness. [12.5]
9. The human being can make no determinate and secure concept of happiness. [12.10]
10. Practical love alone can be commanded. [13.13]
11. An action from duty has its moral worth only in its maxim. [13.14]
12. Intentions and effects can give no unconditional and moral worth. [13.21]
13. The moral worth of an action can only lie in the principle of the will. [14.2]
14. Duty is the necessity of an action out of respect for the law. [14.14]
15. Only the mere law in itself can be an object of respect and thus a command. [15.1]
16. Only the law can objectively determine the wii. [15.6]
17. Pure respect for the practical law subjectively determines the will. [15.6]
18. The moral worth of action does not lie in the effects. [15.11]
19. Only the representation of the law in itself constitutes the moral good. [15.21]
20. The mere conformity to law in general must serve the will as a principle. [17.12]
21. Duty is the condition of a will good in itself. [20.18]
22. Common human reason, in order to know what to do, does not require philosophy. [21.7]
23. Out of practical grounds, common human reason is driven to philosophy. [23.24]
Second Section (Assertions)
1. It is impossible to make out by experience with certainty whether an action is done from duty. [26.7]
2. When the issue is moral worth, what matters are inner principles of actions, which are not seen. [26.24]
3. Duty lies before all experience in the idea of a reason determining the will through a priori grounds. [28.13]
4. The law must hold for all rational beings in general. [28.21]
5. The law must hold with absolute necessity. [28.23]
6. Examples serve only as encouragement and can never justify. [30.1]
7. A completely isolated metaphysics of morals is an indispensable substrate of all securely established theoretical knowledge of duties. [32.18]
8. A completely isolated metaphysics of morals is a desideratum of the greatest importance for the actual fulfillment of its prescriptions. [32.18]
9. The pure representation of duty has a powerful influence on the human heart through reason alone. [33.7]
10. Reason can get control over incentives. [33.11]
11. All moral concepts have their seat and origin completely a priori in reason. [34.5]
12. No moral concepts can be abstracted from empirical cognitions. [34.9]
13. The dignity of all moral concepts lies in the purity of their origin. [34.11]
14. So far as one adds the empirical, one also detracts from the genuine influence of moral principles and from the unlimited worth of actions. [34.13]
15. It is of the greatest practical importance to derive moral laws from the universal concept of a rational being in general. [35.1]
16. For its application to human beings, morality requires anthropology. [35.14]
17. Without presenting morals as metaphysics, it is impossible to ground morals on its genuine principles and in so doing to bring about pure moral dispositions. [35.14]
18. Each thing in nature works according to laws. [36.16]
19. Only a rational being has the capacity to act according to the representation of laws, i.e., according to principles, or has a will. [36.17]
20. The will is nothing other than practical reason. [36.20]
21. Necessitation is the determination of a will that is not in itself fully in accord with reason. [37.6]
22. The representation of an objective principle, insofar as it is necessitating for a will, is called a command (of reason), and the formula of the command is called an imperative. [37.16]
23. All imperatives are expressed through an ought. [37.20]
24. No imperatives hold for the divine will and in general for a holy will. [39.6]
25. All imperatives command either hypothetically or categorically. [39.15]
26. The hypothetical imperative only says that an action would be good for some possible or actual purpose. [40.17]
27. The pursuit of happiness is one end which one can presuppose as actual for all rational beings. [42.3]
28. The imperative which refers to the choice of means to your own happiness is hypothetical. [43.1]
29. That imperative is categorical which, without laying down as a condition for the imperative's basis some other purpose that is to be achieved by that conduct, commands the conduct immediately. [43.6]
30. Whoever wills the end, wills also the indispensable means, that are in his power. [44.20]
31. The concept of happiness is an indeterminate concept. [46.6]
32. One cannot act according to determinate principles in order to be happy. [47.8]
33. The imperative of morality is not at all hypothetical. [48.14]
34. Only the categorical imperative reads as a practical law. [49.26]
35. The categorical imperative is a synthetic practical proposition a priori. [50.14]
36. There is only one categorical imperative. [52.3]
37. Some actions are constituted in such a way that their maxim cannot without contradiction even be thought as a universal law of nature. [57.9]
38. We really do acknowledge the validity of the categorical imperative. [58.25]
39. Duty, if it is to be genuine, can only be expressed in categorical imperatives, never in hypothetical imperatives. [59.4]
40. Duty must hold for all rational beings. [59.23]
41. Everything empirical is highly damaging to the purity of morals themselves. [61.6]
42. The purity of morals consists just in this, that the principle of action is free from all influences of contingent grounds that only experience can provide. [61.10]
43. If there is a necessary law for all rational beings, then it must (completely a priori) already be connected with the concept of the will of a rational being in general. [62.1]
44. The will is thought as a capacity to determine itself to act according to the representation of certain laws. [63.13]
45. Rational beings are called persons because their nature already marks them out as ends in themselves. [65.15]
46. The human being necessarily conceives of its own existence as an end in itself. [66.12]
47. The principle of humanity must arise from pure reason. [70.11]
48. The human being is subject only to its own, but universal, lawgiving. [73.11]
49. In the empire of ends everything has either a price or a dignity. [77.3]
50. Morality and humanity, so far as it is capable of it, alone have dignity. [77.21]
51. Lawgiving itself must have a dignity. [79.12]
52. Autonomy is the ground of the dignity of human nature and of all rational nature. [79.17]
53. The three ways above of representing the principle of morality are at bottom only so many formulas of the very same law. [79.20]
54. All maxims have a form, a matter, and a complete determination of all maxims. [80.2]
55. That will is absolutely good which cannot be bad and therefore whose maxim, if the maxim is made into a universal law, can never conflict with itself. [81.11]
56. Rational nature distinguishes itself from the others by setting an end for itself. [82.3]
57. The end here must be thought not as one to be produced but rather as a self-sufficient end. [82.10]
58. Any rational being must so act as if it were through its maxims always a lawgiving member in the universal empire of ends. [83.23]
59. An empire of ends would actually come into existence through maxims whose rule the categorical imperative prescribes to all rational beings, if the maxims were universally followed. [84.11]
60. Autonomy of the will is the characteristic of the will by which the will is a law to itself. [87.10]
61. If the will seeks the law that is to determine it in the character of any of its objects, then heteronomy always results. [88.11]
62. Empirical principles are not at all fit to be the ground of moral laws. [90.8]
63. The principle of personal happiness is the most objectionable. [90.16]
64. Moral feeling, this supposed special sense, remains closer to morality. [91.4]
65. If I had to choose between the concept of moral sense and that of perfection in general, then I would decide for the latter. [92.22]
66. The absolutely good will contains merely the form of willing in general as autonomy. [95.3]
67. Whoever holds morality to be something must admit the principle of autonomy. [95.23]
Third Section (Assertions)
1. The will is a kind of causality of living beings. [97.10]
2. A free will and a will under moral laws are one and the same. [98.18]
3. Any being that can act not otherwise than under the idea of freedom is, just for that reason, in practical regard, actually free. [100.13]
4. We must attribute to each being endowed with reason and will this quality of determining itself to action under the idea of its freedom. [102.4]
5. Freedom and individual lawgiving of the will are both autonomy. [104.26]
6. This must provide a distinction between a world of sense and a world of understanding. [106.16]
7. By the knowledge the human being has of itself through inner sensation, it cannot presume to know what it is in itself. [106.22]
8. A rational being has two standpoints from which it can consider itself. [108.23]
9. With the idea of freedom the concept of autonomy is inseparably connected, but this is inseparably connected with the universal principle of morality. [109.11]
10. The world of understanding contains the ground of the world of sense, and therefore also of its laws. [111.3]
11. One must look at the laws of the world of understanding as imperatives for oneself. [111.13]
12. Categorical imperatives are possible because the idea of freedom makes me into a member of an intelligible world and I intuit myself at the same time as a member of the world of sense. [111.16]
13. The practical use of common human reason confirms the correctness of this deduction. [112.8]
14. All human beings think themselves as regards the will as free. [113.20]
15. Freedom is only an idea of reason, whose objective reality is in itself doubtful. [114.12]
16. No true contradiction will be found between freedom and natural necessity of the very same human actions. [115.3]
17. This duty, however, is incumbent only on speculative philosophy so that speculative philosophy might prepare a clear path for practical philosophy. [116.10]
18. That a thing as an appearance is subject to certain laws while the very same as a thing or being in itself is independent of those laws contains not the least contradiction. [117.17]
19. The concept of a world of understanding is only a standpoint. [119.14]
20. Reason would overstep its entire boundary if it attempted to explain how pure reason can be practical. [120.9]
21. The idea of freedom holds only as a necessary presupposition of reason. [120.23]
22. Where the determination of natural laws stops, all explanation stops, too. [121.2]
23. The subjective impossibility of explaining the freedom of the will is one and the same with the impossibility of discovering and making understandable an interest which the human being might take in moral laws. [121.25]
24. Moral feeling must be seen as the subjective effect that the law exercises on the will. [122.7]
25. The explanation of how and why the universality of a maxim as law, and therefore morality, interests us, is completely impossible for us human beings. [123.14]
26. It interests us because it is valid for us as human beings. [123.22]
27. The question of how a categorical imperative is possible can be answered so far as you can provide the sole presupposition under which the imperative is possible. [124.1]
28. Under the presupposition of the freedom of the will of an intelligence, the will's autonomy is a necessary consequence. [124.11]
29. To presuppose this freedom of the will is not only possible but also practically necessary. [124.14]
30. All human reason is completely incapable of explaining how pure reason can be practical. [125.7]
31. The idea of a pure world of understanding remains always a useful and permitted idea for the purpose of a rational faith. [126.23]
32. Reason restlessly seeks the unconditioned-necessary. [128.2]
Headings (Xh)
Preface
1. The branches of philosophy: physics, ethics, logic [iii.2]
2. All rational knowledge is material or formal; ethics is material [iii.12]
3. The empirical (practical anthropology) and rational (metaphysics of morals) parts of ethics [iv.9]
4. The need for a metaphysics of morals [v.20]
5. A metaphysics of morals differs from Wolff's philosophy [xi.5]
6. Three reasons for this Groundlaying [xiii.11]
7. The aims of this Groundlaying [xv.3]
8. The method and parts of this Groundlaying [xvi.1]
First Section (Headings)
1. Only the good will is good without qualification [1.5]
2. The good will is good in itself [3.4]
3. The practical function of reason is the establishment of a good will [4.3]
4. The concept of duty contains the concept of a good will [8.4]
5. Acting from duty [8.17]
6. Only actions from duty have a moral worth [9.21]
7. The second proposition: an action from duty has its moral worth in the principle of willing [13.14]
8. The third proposition: duty is the necessity of an action out of respect for the law [14.13]
9. The formula of universal law: mere conformity to law serves as the principle of a good will [15.11]
10. An illustration: a false promise [18.1]
11. Common human reason uses this principle of a good will [20.21]
12. Moral philosophy is still needed to avoid dialectic [22.21]
Second Section (Headings)
1. Morality cannot be drawn from experience [25.6]
2. Morality cannot be borrowed from examples [29.10]
3. Popular moral philosophy is unreliable [30.8]
4. Review of methodological conclusions [34.5]
5. Reason and its influence on the will [36.16]
6. Classification of Imperatives [37.16]
7. The hypothetical imperative [39.15]
8. The categorical imperative [43.6]
9. How hypothetical imperatives are possible [44.13]
10. How categorical imperatives are possible [48.14]
11. The formula of universal law [51.1]
12. The formula of universal law of nature [52.14]
13. Four examples [52.23]
14. Willing and thinking maxims [57.3]
15. Exceptions [57.24]
16. An a priori proof is still required [59.3]
17. Objective and relative ends [63.13]
18. The formula of humanity [64.15]
19. Four Examples [67.3]
20. The formula of autonomy [69.23]
21. The exclusion of interest [71.5]
22. Heteronomy [73.5]
23. The formula of the empire of ends [74.5]
24. Price and dignity [77.3]
25. Review of the formulas [79.20]
26. Overall review [81.9]
27. The autonomy of the will [87.7]
28. The heteronomy of the will [88.8]
29. Taxonomy of all heteronomous principles [89.14]
30. Empirical heteronomous principles: happiness and feeling [90.8]
31. Rational heteronomous principles: ontological and theological perfection [91.19]
32. The inadequacy of heteronomy in general [93.7]
33. Review and Preview: what has been proved and what is still to be proved [95.3]
Third Section (Headings)
1. Concepts of freedom: positive and negative [97.6]
2. The presupposition of freedom [99.19]
3. A vicious circle? [101.18]
4. Escaping from the vicious circle: the two standpoints [105.9]
5. How is a categorical imperative possible? [110.8]
6. A contradiction between freedom and natural necessity? [113.17]
7. Resolution of the contradiction: the two standpoints [115.15]
8. The limits of knowledge: the world of understanding [118.24]
9. The limits of explanation: the possibility of freedom [120.9]
10. The limits of explanation: moral interest [121.25]
11. Review: how is a categorical imperative possible? [124.1]
12. The highest limit of all moral inquiry [126.13]
13. Concluding remark: the limitations of reason [127.9]
Glossary (Xg)
absolute :: Kant uses 'absolute' or 'absolutely' to let us know that something is not dependent or based on some empirical, contingent condition. He frequently uses it to describe a good will, necessity, and law. So an absolutely good will is a will that is always guided by the moral law and never swayed by desires and other empirical incentives. And a moral command such as the categorical imperative expresses absolute necessity because it must be followed no matter what desires you might have. This independence from any empirical condition implies that you will not be able to excuse yourself from, or make for yourself an exception to, the moral law. []
a posteriori :: This Latin phrase is typically used in connection with concepts and incentives. It indicates availability only by means of empirical investigation and is to be understood in opposition to 'a priori'. An example of an a posteriori concept is the concept of gravity. We have the concept of gravity only through experience (e.g., of dropped objects falling to the ground rather than floating) and, in its more precise form, through the empirical investigations of experimenters like Galileo Galilei and Isaac Newton. In philosophy in general, it is knowledge justified by appeal to the senses that is typically alleged to be a posteriori. []
a priori :: This Latin phrase is frequently used in connection with concepts, principles, laws, and propositions. It signals availability without the aid of empirical investigation and so is to be understood in opposition to 'a posteriori'. Characterizing a principle as a priori, for instance, can signal that the principle can be known without the aid of empirical investigation. Kant thinks that all genuinely moral principles are a priori (and also that they are synthetic). In philosophy in general, it is knowledge that is sometimes alleged to be a priori, particularly knowledge of logical truths but also of some moral and metaphysical truths. In these contexts, we are said to know these truths a priori; that is, we can gain access to the truths without having to resort to empirical investigation. []
analytic ::
1. Kant's method of investigation is in part analytic, another part being synthetic. In this methodological context, 'analytic' refers to transitioning to higher principles (having a more general or wider scope of application) from lower principles (having a more specific or narrower scope of application) by examination of the lower principles. Other ways to think of it are to see it as a transition from conclusion to premises or assumptions, or as a process of reverse-engineering a finished product into the components from which it is assembled. Kant says (at pp. 95-6) that the first two Sections of the work exhibit this analytic approach. [xvi]
2. Kant also speaks of analytic propositions (see p. 45). Such a proposition linguistically joins together concepts that are conceptually inseparable in the sense that if you think one concept and fully probe the concept you will come across the other concept, thus merely making explicit what is already implicit in the probed concept. The usual metaphor is that one (i.e., the probed) concept contains the other concept, this containment being what makes the concepts inseparable in the specified sense. As an example, Kant says (pp. 44-5) that the proposition 'whoever wills the end also wills the indispensable means to that end' is an analytic proposition; for if we sufficiently probe the concept of willing an end we will find in it the concept of willing the indispensable means to that end. [45]
apodictic :: This unusual word indicates the absolute necessity of something such as a law or principle. For example (p. 40), the categorical imperative is an apodictic practical principle; hypothetical imperatives, on the other hand, are never apodictic because the necessity they express is always conditional (on, for instance, desires and wants) rather than absolute. []
appearance :: An appearance is an object of experience and is located in space and time. This word ('Erscheinung' in German) occurs most frequently in the Third Section (an earlier and less specific use appears on p. 28) in the context of the world of sense: appearances are what we encounter in the world of sense, in the world that is full of sensible objects such as trees and bumblebees. A closely related term is 'phenomenon' ('phenomena' being the plural, analogous to 'appearances'). An appearance (phenomenon) is to be contrasted with a thing in itself (noumenon). The appearance is supposed to be the appearing, to us in the world of sense, of the thing in itself which is not in the world of sense and which we cannot know; the unknowable thing in itself is in some way "behind" the appearance. []
assertoric :: Kant categorizes hypothetical imperatives in several ways. One of these ways is to say that the hypothetical imperative is an assertoric practical principle, by which he means that the imperative, taken as a principle, asserts that an action is appropriate for some actual or real (as opposed to some merely possible) purpose. Kant's example (p. 42) is that everyone has as an actual purpose the pursuit of happiness; the hypothetical imperative prescribing the pursuit is thus assertoric. On p. 40, Kant contrasts assertoric principles with problematic principles. []
autonomy :: Kant uses this word to refer to the capacity of the will to govern itself by formulating and following laws and principles that are based in reason. This capacity is a distinguishing feature of rational beings endowed with a will. Such beings can (but, if they are imperfect beings such as humans, do not always) make principled decisions that are the result of thinking things through using their reason; frequently, however, such beings make decisions (and then act) based chiefly on emotions, feelings, desires, wants, likes and dislikes, biases, and prejudices. Kant also speaks (p. 74) of the principle of autonomy, and in this usage he means a principle that prescribes that we should exercise this capacity of the will to act on rational principles or maxims formulable as universal laws. []
categorical :: Most generally, this signals an independence from desires, wants, and needs. So, for example, the categorical imperative is an imperative that holds independently of what you might happen to want or desire. The categorical is aligned with what is universal and absolute rather than with what is personal/individual and relative. This alignment with the universal and absolute is perhaps the chief reason why moral imperatives, which are always categorical, are not hypothetical imperatives. []
categories :: Although this word has the same root as 'categorical' in 'categorical imperative', their meanings are not closely related. The categories are pure concepts of the understanding. They are basic, very general concepts that are built-in to the structure of our minds and that play an essential role in constructing our experience of the empirical world, the world of sense. According to Kant, there are twelve of these categories; examples of these fundamental concepts include: unity, plurality, causality, and possibility. Kant discusses the categories at length in the Critique of Pure Reason (1781). In the Groundlaying, they are mostly in the background. In fact, Kant only explicitly refers to them once, on p. 80; other references are indirect such as those on p. 108 where they are the concepts that "bring sensuous representations under rules" or on p. 112 where they are the concepts that are "added" to intuitions. []
cognition :: A cognition is a kind of representation (in Kant's sense) of an object or relation between objects. A moral cognition, for instance, might be a true judgment about what our duty is in a particular situation. The German word is 'Erkenntniß' and is sometimes translated as 'knowledge' in the sense of knowing that something is the case or of holding a true proposition about something. []
concept :: A concept is a kind of representation (in Kant's sense) of a property or characteristic of something of a particular kind. For example, the concept of a rational being specifies the property or attribute of having the power or faculty of reason. Some concepts can be complex and specify more than one property; for example, the concept of a moral principle specifies, among others which Kant does not emphasize so much, the three properties of being universal, being necessary, and being absolute. []
critique :: Kant speaks several times in the Groundlaying of a critique of reason and of practical reason. These critiques are part of his so-called critical philosophy, which is the philosophy he started putting together in the 1770s and which represents his more mature views. Kant thinks these critiques of reason are necessary in order to prevent reason from exceeding its limits, which it does when it tries to claim knowledge of things that are beyond our possible experience. Examples of such claims to knowledge, from traditional metaphysics (which Kant rejects) include claims about God's abilities, claims about the immortality of the soul, and claims about how freedom is possible. (Note that although in the Groundlaying Kant says a bunch about this last, freedom, he does not say how it is possible but only that it must be presupposed.) []
dignity :: Like so many of the terms he uses, it's hard to pin down what Kant means by 'dignity', but it seems to be closely associated with autonomy. On p. 77, he seems to say that dignity is a kind of inner worth that human beings have insofar as they can be lawgivers. He later (p. 79) also seems to add that this inner worth is unconditional and incomparable. And on p. 87 Kant suggests that dignity is, or arises from, the capability of rational beings to be universal lawgivers. []
duty :: In the Groundlaying, a duty is a moral obligation. For Kant, this means that duties have several features. They are based on the moral law and so are unconditioned and specify absolutely necessary actions. We feel this necessity that they have, this obligatoriness, when we respect the moral law. These features help explain Kant's account of duty in The Third Proposition (p. 14). Kant also holds that there are different kinds (pp. 52-3) of duties and that the concept of duty contains (p. 8) the concept of a good will. []
ethics :: Ethics is one of the main branches of philosophy. As such, it is the science of morals, the methodological study of the system of duties that govern human conduct. As a branch of philosophy, ethics should be thought of as philosophical ethics or as moral or practical philosophy. Kant says (p. v) that ethics has two parts, one empirical and one rational: practical anthropology (which is the empirical part) and the metaphysics of morals (which is the purely rational part). The term should not be thought of as synonymous with 'morals' or 'morality' because ethics takes morals or morality as its object of study as, for instance, biology takes the living organism as its object of study. []
empirical ::
1. As an adjective, it usually characterizes motives, laws, or principles as in some way relying on sense experience. So, for instance, an empirical law (such as the law of gravity) is a law that is established through observation and experiment. For Kant, no genuine moral laws or principles are empirical at their foundations (but applying the laws or principles may require empirical inputs). This is so because all moral laws are synthetic a priori statements while all empirical laws are synthetic a posteriori statements. [iv]
2. As a noun (as in 'the empirical'), it refers to content obtained or generated by using the senses. So, for instance, the propositional content in the general claim that humans desire companionship is based on our repeated observations of the social behavior of others (and ourselves). The opposite of the empirical is the transcendent, what is beyond experience (and the analogous adjective is 'transcendental'). [vi]
end in itself :: By an end in itself ('Zweck an sich selbst' in German), Kant means a rational being with a will. Human beings with wills and persons count as ends in themselves. These kinds of beings are able to set goals for themselves and to have purposes which they try to fulfill by following principles of action. This conception of rational beings underlies the Humanity formulation of the categorical imperative. []
experience :: In a non-technical sense, experience is the empirical knowledge we have from our interactions with the world of sense. More technically, an experience is a judgment or statement our faculty of understanding forms from combining sensory inputs (intuitions) with the twelve categories of the understanding (such as the category of causality). Kant holds that no moral concepts, such as duty, are concepts of experience (p. 25). []
ground :: Kant uses this word very frequently in various contexts: "ground of obligation" at viii.13; "ground of the difficulty" at 50.12; "ground of desire" at 63.22; "ground of determinate laws" at 64.17; "ground of this principle" at 66.11; "ground of the dignity" at 79.18; "ground of the world of sense" at 111.4; "its good ground" at 125.17; and others. It can, in general, perhaps best be understood as an amalgam of the following: (rational) basis, foundation, cause, source, origin, reason, warrant, justification, account. []
groundlaying :: A metaphysics of morals requires a rational basis, and in this work Kant is trying to figure out such a rational basis: the content of the sequential transitions passed through in the process of this figuring out constitutes the groundlaying. Others have translated the German word, 'Grundlegung', as 'groundwork', 'fundamental principles', 'foundations', and 'grounding'. []
heteronomy :: In contrast to autonomy, heteronomy is a capacity of the will to relinquish control to empirical influences such as desires and wants. A will in this state would be a heteronomous will and is not free. Kant also speaks of principles of heteronomy, meaning by this principles, such as the principle of happiness, that prescribe that the will should let itself be governed by desires and wants rather than by reason. According to Kant, such heteronomous principles can never be genuine moral principles. []
highest good :: Kant says (p. 7) that a will that is good in itself is the highest good. Such a will is good not because of what it accomplishes but only because of the way in which it wills (i.e, willing in accordance with a universalizable maxim). The highest good should not be confused with the complete good, which (as we learn (5:110) in the Critique of Practical Reason) is a good will which is also happy because it has all the virtues that entitle it to that happiness. Note that Kant also remarks (p. 29) that we identify God as the highest good. []
hypothetical :: This is an adjective characterizing some imperatives as based on wants, desires, and needs rather than on reason. So a hypothetical imperative prescribes that you should do some action provided that you desire some result that would probably be brought about (at least in part) by performing the action. An example of a hypothetical imperative would be: I should do what my boss tells me to do or else I won't get the promotion that I want. In this example, obeying the boss is the necessary means to the unnecessary but wanted end of getting the promotion. Kant's meaning of "hypothetical" should not be confused with the dictionary definition of "hypothetical" which equates it with "imaginary" or "supposed" as in "a hypothetical case"; for Kant, hypothetical imperatives are very real, as are the desires and wants in the world of sense upon which such imperatives are based. []
idea :: Kant's use of 'idea' ('Idee' in the German) is peculiar. He typically means a representation that comes from pure reason and so which represents something transcendent and unconditional. Examples include the idea of God, the idea of duty, the idea of immortality, and the idea of freedom. He rarely, if ever, uses 'idea' in the ordinary sense of just a thought, conception, or notion. For this ordinary sense, Kant is more likely to use 'representation' ('Vorstellung' in the German). Some translators use 'Idea' for Kant's peculiar sense and 'idea' for the ordinary sense. []
incentive :: An incentive ('Triebfeder' in the German) is just about anything that can influence the will, that can move us to action through an act of willing: feelings, desires, objects of desires, the expected effect of an action, secret or hidden springs of action, etc. They are typically empirical and of a sensuous sort and as such can never be a basis for morality. But Kant leaves it open as to whether there are non-empirical, pure, or a priori incentives. He says (p. 86), for instance, that respect (which is a special kind of feeling) for the law can be an incentive. And, though he holds it out as a possibility, Kant does not claim to be able to explain how something non-sensuous (such as an idea or a thought) could be an incentive (see pp. 123-6). Kant sometimes uses 'motive' ('Bewegungsgrund') for these possible non-sensuous incentives. []
inclination :: An inclination ('Neigung' in the German) is a kind of habitual desire that arises from needs and that is stimulated by sensibility (see the footnote on p. 38). Examples would include desires, either mediate or immediate, for food, sleep, sex, companionship, self-love, and happiness. Because inclinations arise from the needs we have as embodied beings, and are therefore thoroughly empirical in nature, Kant denies that inclinations can ever be a basis for morality. []
intelligible :: The intelligible world is that world of things in themselves, including our true selves, which we cannot know or even be acquainted with. According to Kant, we cannot know, for instance, whether the intelligible world exists in space and time or whether causal laws govern the relations between the objects (if there are such) in the intelligible world. We cannot have such knowledge because the intelligible world is not presented to us through sensibility. Because causality cannot be attributed to the intelligible world, when we, as rational beings, think of our true selves as belonging to that world, we must think of ourselves as having freedom of the will. Still (and perhaps inexplicably), Kant wants to go on to say that the intelligible world and its things in themselves lie behind, and are the rational ground of, the appearances in the world of sense that we interact with as embodied beings. Furthermore, this rational ground, reason itself, is the source of morality. So, although we, as rational beings with wills, must think of ourselves as free, we are not totally undetermined; for we, as rational beings, willingly conform to reason and thus to moral law. But, at the same time, we, as also embodied beings belonging to the world of sense, find our wills obligated by these moral laws which have their source in the intelligible world. []
intuition :: An intuition ('Anschauung' in the German), in Kant's technical vocabulary, is a kind of representation which is essential to the operation of the faculty of sensibility. Intuitions can be empirical, as when we have sensuous intuitions of objects in the world of sense; examples would be the mental imagery of a patch of color, the tactile impression of a felt texture, or the auditory awareness of a singular sound. These empirical intuitions, or passively received sensory inputs with uninterpreted content, are unlike non-empirical, pure, or a priori intuitions, which are formal and have no content at all; examples of these are the intuitions of space and time. []
knowledge :: For Kant, knowledge is the outcome of the understanding's job of combining intuitions with concepts. The result of the combination is a judgment. So knowledge always occurs in the form of a judgment. Depending on the intuitions and concepts involved, the judgment or knowledge might be either empirical or non-empirical. Examples of the latter kind are the categorical imperative and the claim that every event has a cause, both of which are synthetic a priori judgments. []
law :: There are several kinds of laws. Kant refers, for instance on p. 11, to laws of nature (e.g., theoretical laws such as the law of cause and effect), laws of freedom (e.g., practical laws such as moral laws), and laws of thought (e.g., formal laws of logic). What they all have in common is that they are true, universal, absolute, and necessary. []
maxim :: A maxim is a subjective principle of willing on which a rational being with a will acts. Maxims specify the end to be achieved by the action, the means or action used to achieve the end, and the contextual circumstances of the situation. A maxim does not have to be explicitly formulated by the acting rational being. When a maxim is consistent with the moral law then it holds not just subjectively (for the acting rational being) but also objectively (for all rational beings similarly situated). For all maxims that can succeed as moral principles, Kant says (p. 80) that they have: a form, a matter, and a complete determination according to universal law. []
metaphysics :: It is a subsidiary branch of philosophy; in particular, it is the non-formal (non-logic) part of pure philosophy that deals with objects of the understanding. The knowledge we get from metaphysics is synthetic a priori because it says something about how our experience (hence synthetic) of nature or of morals must (hence a priori) be. Kant thinks this kind of knowledge is possible because our mind, our understanding in particular, is an active participant in constructing our experience. In general, for Kant, metaphysics is possible just to the extent that it helps to explain the structure of our experience. Note, however, that Kant thinks that traditional metaphysics, which goes beyond possible experience by making claims, for instance, about God, the soul, and substance, is not possible. []
metaphysics of morals :: This phrase refers to the pure, rational part of morals or ethics, the part of morals in which its principles (which are synthetic a priori propositions) are derived only from pure reason rather than also from empirical facts about the nature of human beings. The metaphysics of morals thus provides the rational basis for the system of moral duties that govern our behavior. Kant insists that morals must, for its foundations, have such a metaphysics, but he at the same time allows that morals, for its applications to human life, must have access to empirical facts about humans and their circumstances in the world of sense. []
misology :: Kant makes use of this uncommon word, which means a distrust or hatred of reason and reasoning, in arguing that reason has not been given to us specifically in order to help us obtain happiness. []
morals ::
1. Morals, in one meaning, is the system of obligations that govern how rational beings ought to behave toward each other. This is closer to the meaning of Kant's use of 'Sitten', 'Sittlichkeit', and 'Moralität' and is the meaning of 'Morals' in the English title of the work. See the first occurrence of 'morals' on page v, embedded in the phrase 'metaphysics of morals'. [v]
2. In another meaning, morals is the rational part of ethics or the rational part of the science (i.e., methodological study) of morality. This is closer to the meaning of Kant's use of 'Moral', 'Ethik', 'Moralphilosophie', and the entire phrase 'Metaphysik der Sitten'. See the second occurrence of 'morals' on page v. [v]
noumenon :: This word does not occur in the Groundlaying, but it is a synonym for 'thing in itself', which does. The opposite of 'noumenon' is 'phenomenon' or an appearance. A noumenon is unknowable because it cannot be intuited and so cannot be an object of experience. If we try to intuit a noumenon and so try to make it an object of experience, we exceed the boundary of reason. Kant is critical of those philosophers who have tried to do this, and it is because of this error that he rejects traditional (speculative) metaphysics which claims knowledge of God, immortality, and freedom. A properly critiqued reason is limited to mere ideas, not knowledge, of such features of the noumenal or intelligible world. []
objective :: Kant frequently uses 'objective' in two adjectival contexts: to qualify 'reality' and to qualify terms such as 'principle', 'law', and 'necessity'. In the former context (e.g., p. 114), Kant means that there is an actual, really existing, object for a representation (such as an idea or thought) that we have constructed of that object. In the latter context (e.g., p. 37), Kant means that the principle, law, or necessity is valid, holds for, or is applicable to all rational beings simply because they are rational, independently of any individuating characteristics such as desires, wants, or physical abilities. []
phenomenon :: A phenomenon is an appearance in the world of sense. What lies behind the phenomenon is a noumenon, or thing in itself, in the intelligible world. []
physics :: It is one of the main branches of philosophy. The term is not synonymous with present-day physics and is even broader in scope than our contemporary notion of the natural sciences as a group of disciplines. []
practical :: Not used in the sense of 'feasible', 'practical' refers to behavior, conduct, or action. Moral principles are thus practical principles because they prescribe how we should behave, conduct ourselves, and act. And practical reason is the faculty or power of reason in its capacity to issue directives to action (i.e., to determine the will). The term should be understood in contrast to the theoretical and speculative. []
practical anthropology :: It is the science of human beings with respect to customs and social behavior, in other words, the empirical part of ethics. Practical anthropology, being empirical, is not a part of the metaphysics of morals, but Kant also holds that practical anthropology is essential to the application of moral principles to human life. []
problematic :: A category of hypothetical imperative, Kant uses this word to mark out those practical principles that pertain to merely possible purposes that a rational being might happen to have. On p. 40, Kant contrasts problematic principles with assertoric principles. []
pure :: Kant typically uses this adjective to describe concepts and motives that are unmixed with empirical content; it is nearly synonymous with 'a priori'. []
rational :: This word indicates that something (e.g., a person or a principle) is not empirical or is not mixed or encumbered in some way with empirical or sensory elements. For example, 'the rational person' might refer to someone who makes decisions based on principles arrived at through reasoning instead of someone whose actions are caused by emotions or sentiment; it might also refer to the true self, the person considered from the point of view of the intelligible world rather than the world of sense. []
rational being :: This phrase refers to a special kind of being, a being with a will and so with the capacity to act on a principle. A typical human being is an example of such a being because typical humans have wills, have reason, and can (but do not always) allow their reason to guide their will. []
reason :: It is a capacity, faculty, or power of rational beings to think in a lawlike or rule-based (i.e., according to a canon of thought) way; it is thus what we use when we think logically, as when we make inferences from premises to a conclusion. It is also an original source of new and pure or a priori concepts. Kant says (p. 7) that the highest practical function of reason is to help our wills become good. This meaning of 'reason' (as a faculty or power) should be distinguished from the meaning of 'reason' as an account of why something is done or what justifies it; for something akin to these latter meanings, Kant's favorite word is perhaps 'ground'. []
representation :: Kant uses this word in a very special sense. For him, it is a generic term signifying any kind of output or object which we are mentally aware of and which our mind (in particular, our understanding) has actively processed. For example, all of the following are representations: concepts, ideas, intuitions, sensations. Representations can be of varying degrees of complexity, from the simple perception or intuition of a single patch of uniform color to the multi-layered comprehension of a proposition built up or synthesized out of several related concepts. Note, too, that representations do not have to be of actual objects; they can, for instance, be of imaginary objects such as centaurs and so do not have to represent something real. []
respect :: Respect ('Achtung' in the German) is a special kind of feeling (p. 16). This special feeling does not arise through empirical sensibility; rather, it arises when we become aware that the moral law places us under an obligation. So respect for the law is an effect that the law has on us, and it is thus not a cause of the law. []
science :: A science is any organized body of knowledge. Kant's meaning is much broader than in contemporary usage of the word which is more or less restricted to disciplines that employ rigorous experimental methodologies. []
sensation :: A sensation ('Empfindung' in the German) is the immediate or direct effect of something on the senses. There can be external and internal sensations, depending on whether the outer sense or inner sense is affected, but in any case are always empirical, never pure or a priori. For example, visually tracking a bird in flight would involve (external) sensations; consumption of alcohol might give rise to (internal) sensations associated with giddiness. Sensations are one kind of representation and furnish the material for empirical intuitions. []
sensibility :: Sensibility ('Sinnlichkeit' in the German) is the capacity, faculty, or power of having sensations and intuitions. []
speculative :: Used frequently in conjunction with 'reason', Kant emphasizes the use of the power of reason to engage in theoretical, as opposed to practical or action-based, pursuits; a first approximation might be to think of it as intellectual curiosity. Kant thinks that speculative reason can get carried away in its attempt to gain theoretical knowledge and in so doing overstep its bounds and hopelessly try to know the transcendent. []
subjective :: Something is subjective insofar as it is particular to an individual at a given time or place, is not possessed by all rational beings, or relates to the perspective of the individual. So, for instance, desires are subjective in that they can differ in various ways (e.g., duration, intensity, existence) from individual to individual and even within the same individual. The opposite of 'subjective' is 'objective'. Another example, is sensibility; it, too, is variable, some individuals having greater perceptual acuity than others, for instance. It is their subjectivity that rules out desire and sensibility as candidates for the basis or source of morality, for Kant holds that morality exhibits universality and necessity. []
synthetic ::
1. Part of Kant's method is to proceed in a synthetic fashion, that is, by transitioning from higher principles to lower principles and in so doing showing how the lower depend on the higher. For this meaning, see the last paragraph of the Preface. [xvi]
2. In another context, but in which it is still opposed to 'analytic', the word describes a particular kind of proposition in which conceptually separable concepts are joined. Kant holds that all empirical propositions are synthetic (and a posteriori), the propositions' component concepts being joined by experience (e.g., by intuitions). [45]
synthetic practical proposition a priori :: This is a practical proposition which is both synthetic and a priori. So, breaking this down further, it is first of all a practical proposition, a proposition in which at least one of its expressed concepts has to do with action or conduct. Then, second, it is synthetic so that the proposition asserts a connection between concepts that are conceptually distinct, separate, not internally linked just between themselves. Third, the linkage between concepts is a priori in that the concepts are necessarily (and so not empirically) joined together by something other than experience. In sum, it is a proposition in which action-related concepts that can be thought separately are nevertheless bound to each other in a necessary way. For an example, see the footnote on p. 50, where the concepts being connected are will and action. []
teleology :: Teleology is a theory that views processes as aiming for or striving to achieve goals or ends. The conception of nature as having purposes, for instance, is the core of teleological theory. Kant makes use (p. 80) of teleology in comparing an empire of ends with and empire of nature. Teleology also figures in his discussion (starting on p. 4) of the role of reason in the life of a rational being. []
thing in itself :: A thing in itself, also called a noumenon, is what exists in the intelligible world. We cannot know things in themselves because they cannot be intuited or represented to us and so cannot be possible objects of experience. But Kant claims that they exist and that they somehow lie behind, and provide the ground for, appearances in the world of sense. []
transcendent :: What is transcendent is what is beyond the possibility of experience; it is accordingly unknowable. The intelligible world of things in themselves, of noumena, is a transcendent realm. []
transcendental :: Kant uses this adjective to refer to what helps explain the possibility of experience. So, for instance, transcendental knowledge, such as the synthetic a priori proposition that every event has a cause, sets a condition that must be met in order for us to have any experience at all. Note that, according to Kant, transcendental knowledge is possible but that transcendent knowledge is not possible. []
understanding :: This word, a noun ('der Verstand' in German), has a special meaning in Kant's philosophy. The understanding is another of the powers, faculties, or capacities of the mind. Unlike the faculty of reason, the understanding is not a spontaneous source of new, pure (i.e., free from the impurities of the empirical) concepts. Rather, the understanding's main job is to take sensory inputs (empirical intuitions) and then process them (using schema) with the understanding's own pure concepts (the categories); the result is a cognition such as a thought or judgment. Unlike reason, the understanding needs sensory inputs or intuitions; without them, it would have nothing to do. []
will :: The will ('der Wille' being the German word for it) is an ability or power of a rational being to represent to itself a law, principle, or rule for the specific purpose of action; at one point (p. 36), Kant says that the will is practical reason. This ability (as it occurs in humans) can be compromised or weakened by non-rational empirical factors such as desires, incentives, inclinations, and impulses; a bad will, such as that of the villain, is frequently the result. It is also possible, however, that this ability is guided or determined solely by reason, in which case a good will is the result. But note that, in order for this good will actually to produce a good outcome, further steps and favorable circumstances are required; for instance, the rational being must be free to choose (i.e., must have free will or, in the German, 'die Willkür') to act on or carry out the representation of the law for action that the will has given it, and then the external circumstances must be such that the action will be efficacious. []
Index (Xi)
(Proper names and the first occurrence of uncommon words)
A
analytic 45
analytically xvi
apodictic 28
assertoric 40
autonomy 74
C
categorical 39
H
heteronomy 74
Hutcheson 91
hypophysical 33
hypothetical 39
J
Juno 61
P
problematic 40
S
Socrates 21
Sulzer 33
synthetic 45
synthetically xvi
W
Wolff xi
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Kant, Immanuel. Groundlaying toward the Metaphysics of Morals. 2nd ed. (corrected). Trans. and ed. Stephen Orr.
Groundlaying: Kant's Search for the Highest Principle of Morality. Google AppSpot,
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