prioriihre Lehren vorträgt, reine Philosophie
a priori, pure philosophy. The latter, if it is merely formal, is called logic; if, however, it is limited to determinate objects of the understanding, then it is called metaphysics.
a priorischöpfe, es mag übri-
a priori, whether the latter task is conducted by all teachers of morals (whose name is legion) or only by some who feel a calling to it.
a priorilediglich in Begriffen
a priorionly in concepts of pure reason, and that every other prescription which is grounded on principles of mere experience, and even a prescription universal in a certain respect, so far as it is based in the least part, perhaps only as regards a motive, on empirical grounds, can to be sure be called a practical rule, never however a moral law.
a priori,die freylich noch durch
in concretowirksam zu machen.
a prioriin unserer Vernunft liegen-
a priori, which of course still require a power of judgment sharpened through experience, in order partly to distinguish in which cases they have their application, partly to secure them entry into the will of the human being and vigor for their practice, since this, as itself affected with so many inclinations, is no doubt capable of the idea of a practical pure reason, but not so easily able of making it
in concretoeffective in its conduct of life.
a prioriin our reason,
a priori,bestimmt werde, und den man
a priori, and which one could call a pure will, but willing in general with all actions and conditions, which belong to it in this general sense, and by this it differs from a metaphysics of morals, just in this way as general logic differs from transcendental philosophy,
a priori. For the metaphysics of morals is to investigate the idea and the principles of a possible pure will and not the actions and conditions of human willing in general, which for the most part are drawn from psychology. That in the universal practical philosophy (although contrary to all authorization) moral laws and duty are also spoken of, constitutes no objection opposed to my assertion. For the authors of that science remain true to their idea of it also in this; they do not distinguish the motives which, as such, are represented completely
a priorimerely through reason and are properly moral from the empirical, which the understanding raises merely through comparison of experiences to universal concepts, but consider them without paying attention to the difference
a posterioristattfinden, gar nicht ur-
a priorior merely
steriori,welche materiell ist, gleichsam auf einem Schei-
a priori, which is formal, and between its incentive
a posteriori, which is material, as if at a crossroads, and since it must still be determined by something, it must be determined by the formal principle of willing in general, if an action is done from duty, since every material principle has been withdrawn from it.
a prioriaus reiner, aber practi-
a priorivon sittlicher Vollkommenheit entwirft,
a priorifrom pure, but practical reason?
a prioriof moral perfection and inseparably connects with the concept of a free will. Imitation has in the moral
a priorifeststehen, im allge-
in abstracto) vorzutragen, wofern das Erkennt-
a priori, in general (
in abstracto), provided that the cognition is to differ from the common and is to be called philosophical. But in our times this might well be necessary. For if one collected votes, whether pure rational cognition separated from everything empirical, therefore metaphysics of morals, or popular practical philosophy is preferred, then one soon guesses on which side the preponderance will fall.
priori,frey von allem Empirischen, schlechterdings in
a prioribestehend seyn müssen, aus solchen aber, wie für jede
a priori, free from everything empirical, simply in pure concepts of reason and nowhere else not even in the least part, to form the plan rather to separate off completely this examination as pure practical philosophy, or (if one may use such a decried name) as metaphysics*) of morals, to bring it by itself alone to its full completeness and to put off the public, which demands popularity, until the close of this undertaking.
a priori, out of such, however, as for each rational nature, therefore also for the human, practical rules must be able to be derived.
a prioriin der Vernunft ihren Sitz und
a prioriin reason their seat and origin and this to be sure in the commonest human reason just as much as that in the highest degree speculative; that they can be abstracted from no empirical and hence merely contingent cognition; that in this purity of their origin precisely lies their dignity, so as to serve us as highest practical principles; that each time so much as one adds something empirical, so much also one subtracts from their genuine influence and the unlimited worth of actions; that it not only demands the greatest necessity in theoretical purpose, when it is merely a matter of speculation,
a prioribey jedem Menschen voraussetzen kann, weil
a priorican presuppose in the case of every human being because it belongs to its essence. Now, one can name the skill in the choice of means to one's own greatest well-being prudence*) in the narrowest sense. Therefore,
consilia) als Gebote
praecepta) der Vernunft zu halten sind, daß die Auf-
consilia) rather than as commands (
praecepta) of reason, that the problem: to determine surely and universally which action will promote the happiness of a rational being is completely insoluble, and therefore no imperative in view of it is possible which in the strict sense would command doing what makes us happy, because happiness is not an ideal of reason, but of imagination, which merely rests on empirical grounds from which one futilely expects that they should determine an action by which the totality of an
a priorizu untersuchen haben,
a priori, since here the advantage does not come in useful for us that its actuality is given in experience and therefore that the possibility would be necessary not for the establishment, but merely for the explanation. So much is nevertheless provisionally to be seen: that the categorical imperative alone
a priori, und da
a priori,mithin noth-
a priori, and since to look into the possibility of propositions of this kind has so much difficulty in theoretical cognition, it can be readily gathered that in the practical it will not have less.
a priori, therefore necessarily (although only objectively, i.e. under the idea of a reason that had complete power over all subjective motives). This is therefore a practical proposition which analytically derives the willing of an action not from another, already presupposed (for we have no such perfect will), but connects with the concept of the will as of a rational being immediately, as something that is not contained in it.
antagonismus) wodurch die Allgemeinheit des Princips
universalitas) in eine bloße Gemeingültigkeit (
litas) verwandelt wird, dadurch das practische Vernunft-
antagonismus), by which the universality of the principle (
universalitas) is changed into a mere generality (
generalitas), and by this means the practical principle of reason is to meet with the maxim halfway. Now, although this cannot be justified in our own impartially employed judgment, in this way it yet shows that we actually acknowledge the validity of the categorical imperative and permit ourselves (with all respect for it) only a few,
a priorizu beweisen, daß
a priorito prove, that the same imperative actually occurs, that there is a practical law which absolutely and without any incentives commands for itself, and that the following of this law is duty.
a prioritheir source and with this at the same time their commanding authority:
a priori) schon mit dem Begriffe des Willens eines ver-
a priori) be connected already with the concept of the will of a rational being in general. In order, however, to discover this connection, one must, however much one resists, take a step out, namely into metaphysics, although in a region of it which is different from that of speculative philosophy, namely into the metaphysics of morals. In a practical philosophy, where it is not our concern to assume grounds of that which happens, but laws of that which ought to happen, although it never happens, i.e. objective-practical laws: there we have no need to undertake investigation of the grounds why something pleases or displeases, how the enjoyment of mere sensation is different from taste, and whether the latter is different from a universal satisfaction of reason; upon what feeling of pleasure and displeasure rests, and how from here eager desires and inclinations, from these, however, through cooperation of reason, maxims
a priorithun muß.
quod tibi non vis
fieri &c.zur Richtschnur oder Princip dienen könne. Denn es ist,
what you do not
want done to you etc.can serve as a rule of conduct or principle. For it is, although with various limitations, only derived from that one; it can be no universal law, for it does not contain the ground of duties to oneself, not of duties of love to others (for many would gladly agree that others ought not benefit him if only he might be excused from showing them kindness), finally not of duties owed to one another; for the criminal would from this ground argue against his punishing judges, and so on.
mundus intelligibilis) als ein Reich der Zwecke
mundus intelligibilis) as an empire of ends is possible and undoubtedly through the individual lawgiving of all persons as members. Accordingly, any rational being must in this way act, as if it were through its maxims always a lawgiving member in the universal empire of ends. The formal principle of these maxims is:
a priorimuß dieser syn-
a priori, this business, however, does not belong in the present
a priorimöglich und warum er nothwendig sey, ist eine
a prioriis possible and why it is necessary, is a problem whose solution lies no longer within the boundaries of the metaphysics of morals, also we have its truth here not maintained, much less presumed to have a proof of it in our power. We showed only through development of the once generally in vogue going concept of morality: that an autonomy of the will attaches to it in an unavoidable way, or rather lies as ground. Who, therefore, holds morality to be something, and not to be a chimerical idea without truth, must at the same time admit its above-cited principle. This
a priorischlechterdings nothwendig ist, erfodert
a prioriabsolutely necessary, requires a possible synthetic use of pure practical reason, which we, however, may not venture upon without sending on before a critique of this rational faculty itself, of which we in the last section have to present the leading features sufficient for our purpose.
a priorieine Idee haben,
a priorian idea, lets itself here right now not yet be shown, and to make comprehensible the deduction of the concept of freedom from pure practical reason, with it also the possibility of a categorical imperative, but requires still some preparation.
a prioridargethan werden kann,) sondern man
a priori), but one must prove it as belonging to the activity of rational beings in general endowed with a will. I say now: Any being, that can act not otherwise than under the idea of freedom, is just for that reason, in practical regard, actually free, i.e. all laws that are inseparably joined with freedom hold for it, just in this way, as if its will also in itself, and validly in theoretical philosophy, would be declared as free*). Now I maintain: that we, to each
a prioriwirkende Ursachen denken, nicht einen
a prioriefficient causes, do not take in a different standpoint than when we represent ourselves according to our actions as effects that we see before our eyes.
a priori,sondern empirisch bekömmt, so ist natür-
a prioribut empirically, in this way it is natural that it can also draw in information of itself through the inner sense and
a priorivorstellt, dadurch, daß über meinen
a priori, by this, that to my will affected by sensuous eager desires still is added the idea of just the same will, but pure, belonging to the world of understanding, and for itself practical,
a priori, on which all cognition of a nature rests.
a priori,bey sich
a priori. But this concept of a nature is confirmed through experience and must itself unavoidably be presupposed, if experience, i.e. coherent cognition of objects of sense according to universal laws, is to be possible. Therefore, freedom is only an idea of reason, whose objective reality is in itself doubtful, nature, however, a concept of the understanding, which proves and necessarily must prove its reality in examples of experience.
bonum vacans, into the possession of which the fatalist can put itself with ground and can expel all morals from its alleged property possessed without title.
a prioribegreiflich zu machen, wie ein bloßer Ge-
a prioricomprehensible, how a mere thought, which itself contains nothing sensuous in itself, produces a sensation of pleasure or displeasure; for that is a special kind of causality of which, as of all causality, we can determine nothing at all
a prioribut about which we must consult experience alone. Since this, however, can provide no relation of cause to effect, except between two objects of experience, but here pure reason through mere ideas (which furnish no object at all for experience) is to be the cause of an effect that admittedly lies in experience, so the explanation, how and why the universality of the maxim as law, therefore morality, interests us, is for us human beings completely impossible. This much only is certain: that it does not have validity for us because it interests us (for that is heteronomy and dependence of practical reason on sensibility, namely on a feeling lying as the ground, by which it never could be morally lawgiving), but that it interests us because it holds for us as human beings, since it has arisen from our will as intelligence, therefore from our proper self; what, however, belongs to mere appearance is subordinated by reason necessarily to the constitution of the thing in itself.
Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten
Groundlaying toward the Metaphysics of Morals
|Vorrede||iii - xvi [4:387 - 392]||Preface|
|Erster Abschnitt||1 - 24 [4:393 - 405]||First Section|
von der gemeinen sittlichen Vernunfterkennt-
niß zur philosophischen.
|1 - 24 [4:393 - 405]||Transition|
from the common moral rational cognition
to the philosophical.
|Zweyter Abschnitt||25 - 96 [4:406 - 445]||Second Section|
von der populären sittlichen Weltweisheit
Metaphysik der Sitten
|25 - 96 [4:406 - 445]||Transition|
from popular moral philosophy
metaphysics of morals
|Die Autonomie des Willens|
oberstes Princip der Sittlichkeit
|87 - 88 [4:440]||The autonomy of the will|
highest principle of morality
|Die Heteronomie des Willens|
als der Quell aller unächten Principien
|88 - 89 [4:440 - 441]||The heteronomy of the will|
as the source of all spurious principles
aller möglichen Principien der Sittlichkeit
|89 - 96 [4:441 - 445]||Division|
of all possible principles of morality
assumed basic concept
|Dritter Abschnitt||97 - 128 [4:446 - 463]||Third Section|
Metaphysik der Sitten zur Critik
der reinen practischen Vernunft
|97 - 128 [4:446 - 463]||Transition|
metaphysics of morals to the critique
of pure practical reason
|Der Begriff der Freyheit|
Schlüssel zur Erklärung der Autonomie
|97 - 99 [4:446 - 447]||The concept of freedom|
key to the explanation of the autonomy
of the will
muß als Eigenschaft des Willens
aller vernünftigen Wesen
|99 - 101 [4:447 - 448]||Freedom|
must be presupposed as a quality of the will
of all rational beings
|Von dem Interesse,|
welches den Ideen der Sittlichkeit
|101 - 110 [4:448 - 453]||Of the interest|
which attaches to the ideas of morality
|Wie ist ein categorischer Imperativ|
|110 - 113 [4:453 - 455]||How is a categorical imperative|
der äußersten Grenze
aller practischen Philosophie
|113 - 127 [4:455 - 463]||Of|
the extreme boundary
of all practical philosophy
|Schlußanmerkung||127 - 128 [4:463]||Concluding Remark|