Groundlaying: Kant's Search for the Highest Principle of Morality

Summary of Paragraphs
in
Kant's Groundlaying toward the Metaphysics of Morals
emended second edition (1786v)

Pages  Paragraphs

Paragraph 1

Section: Preface
Page and Line: iii.2  [4:387]
Kant's German: Die alte griechische Philosophie theilte sich...
Scholar translation: Ancient Greek philosophy was divide...
Student translation: Ancient Greek philosophy was divide...
Summary:Ancient Greek philosophy was appropriately, but without a guiding principle, divided into three sciences: physics, ethics, and logic.

Paragraph 2

Section: Preface
Page and Line: iii.12  [4:387]
Kant's German: Alle Vernunfterkenntniß ist entweder ma-...
Scholar translation: All rational cognition is either ...
Student translation: All rational knowledge is either ...
Summary:All rational knowledge (including philosophy) is either material (e.g., physics and ethics) and concerned with objects or formal (e.g., logic) and concerned with thinking in general.

Paragraph 3

Section: Preface
Page and Line: iv.9  [4:387-388]
Kant's German: Die Logik kann keinen empirischen Theil...
Scholar translation: Logic can have no empirical part, i...
Student translation: Logic can have no empirical part. T...
Summary:Logic has no empirical part; physics and ethics each have an empirical part.

Paragraph 4

Section: Preface
Page and Line: v.4  [4:388]
Kant's German: Man kann alle Philosophie, so fern sie...
Scholar translation: One can name all philosophy, so far...
Student translation: All philosophy, so far as it is bas...
Summary:Not belonging to empirical philosophy, metaphysics and logic are pure (a priori) philosophy founded only on a priori principles. Logic is not concerned with objects; it is merely formal. Metaphysics deals with objects, but only with objects of the faculty of understanding.

Paragraph 5

Section: Preface
Page and Line: v.12  [4:388]
Kant's German: Auf solche Weise entspringt die Idee einer...
Scholar translation: In such way the idea of a twofold m...
Student translation: Because of these various conceptual...
Summary:Metaphysics has two parts: metaphysics of nature and metaphysics of morals. These are the rational parts of physics and ethics, respectively. The empirical part of ethics is practical anthropology; the rational part, morals.

Paragraph 6

Section: Preface
Page and Line: v.20  [4:388]
Kant's German: Alle Gewerbe, Handwerke und Künste,...
Scholar translation: All trades, crafts and arts have ga...
Student translation: All trades, crafts and arts, have g...
Summary:Perhaps philosophy, too, may benefit from a division of labor in which the rational and empirical parts are kept separate. If this separation is maintained, the metaphysical parts conceptually precede the empirical parts of physics and ethics.

Paragraph 7

Section: Preface
Page and Line: vii.18  [4:388-389]
Kant's German: Da meine Absicht hier eigentlich auf die...
Scholar translation: Since my purpose here is properly d...
Student translation: Since my aim here is squarely direc...
Summary:The ordinary ideas of moral duty and moral laws, which represent those duties and laws as universal and necessary, show that we must work out (and that there is) a pure moral philosophy.

Paragraph 8

Section: Preface
Page and Line: ix.1  [4:389-390]
Kant's German: Also unterscheiden sich die moralischen Ge-...
Scholar translation: Thus the moral laws together with t...
Student translation: So moral laws, together with their ...
Summary:All moral philosophy is based on its pure part. Experience is needed only for distinguishing applications and implementation.

Paragraph 9

Section: Preface
Page and Line: ix.20  [4:389-390]
Kant's German: Eine Metaphysik der Sitten ist also un-...
Scholar translation: A metaphysics of morals is therefor...
Student translation: A metaphysics of morals is therefor...
Summary:So a metaphysics of morals is necessary, and it is also necessary in order to avoid moral corruption. Conformity to moral law is not sufficient; actions must be done for the sake of the moral law.

Paragraph 10

Section: Preface
Page and Line: xi.5  [4:390]
Kant's German: Man denke doch ja nicht, daß man das,...
Scholar translation: Let one nevertheless certainly not ...
Student translation: You would be way off base to think ...
Summary:Wolff's moral philosophy does not give us a metaphysics of morals; it does not distinguish a pure will from a human will and does not distinguish pure (a priori and moral) motives from empirical motives.

Paragraph 11

Section: Preface
Page and Line: xiii.11  [4:391]
Kant's German: Im Vorsatze nun, eine Metaphysik der...
Scholar translation: In the intention at present to deli...
Student translation: Having the intention to publish som...
Summary:A critique of pure practical reason is the proper foundation for a metaphysics of morals, but for three reasons I now offer this Groundlaying as a preliminary foundation. The first two reasons are: unlike theoretical or speculative reason, practical reason is already on the right track; preparing a complete, proper foundation would risk confusing the reader.

Paragraph 12

Section: Preface
Page and Line: xiv.17  [4:391-392]
Kant's German: Weil aber drittens auch eine Metaphysik...
Scholar translation: Because, however, thirdly, a metaph...
Student translation: But in the third place, because a m...
Summary:The third reason to offer this subtle preliminary foundation now is to avoid detracting from the popularity of a future metaphysics of morals.

Paragraph 13

Section: Preface
Page and Line: xv.3  [4:392]
Kant's German: Gegenwärtige Grundlegung ist aber...
Scholar translation: The present groundlaying is, howeve...
Student translation: The present groundlaying, however, ...
Summary:The purpose of the Groundlaying is only to find and establish the highest principle of morality. Applications of the principle are not included because applications do not offer any justification.

Paragraph 14

Section: Preface
Page and Line: xvi.1  [4:392]
Kant's German: Ich habe meine Methode in dieser Schrift...
Scholar translation: I have taken my method in this writ...
Student translation: I have selected a method for this b...
Summary:The method used in the Groundlaying is first analytic and then synthetic, resulting in three sections.

Paragraph 15

Section: One
Page and Line: 1.5  [4:393]
Kant's German: Es ist überall nichts in der Welt, ja überhaupt...
Scholar translation: It is possible to think nothing any...
Student translation: There is nothing at all in the worl...
Summary:Only a good will is good without qualification. Various talents, qualities, and gifts of fortune can be good, but they can also become bad if not guided by a good will.

Paragraph 16

Section: One
Page and Line: 2.12  [4:393-394]
Kant's German: Einige Eigenschaften sind sogar diesem guten Wil-...
Scholar translation: Some qualities are even favorable t...
Student translation: Some qualities are even helpful to ...
Summary:Some qualities can help a good will, but they can also be misused.

Paragraph 17

Section: One
Page and Line: 3.4  [4:394]
Kant's German: Der gute Wille ist nicht durch das, was er be-...
Scholar translation: The good will is not through that w...
Student translation: The good will is good only through ...
Summary:A good will is good only through its willing, not by its effects or by what it accomplishes.

Paragraph 18

Section: One
Page and Line: 4.3  [4:394-395]
Kant's German: Es liegt gleichwohl in dieser Idee von dem abso-...
Scholar translation: There is, nevertheless, in this ide...
Student translation: There is, however, something very s...
Summary:Because this idea of an absolutely good will is so strange, we must test it.

Paragraph 19

Section: One
Page and Line: 4.14  [4:394-395]
Kant's German: In den Naturanlagen eines organisirten, d. i....
Scholar translation: In the natural predispositions of a...
Student translation: In the natural makeup of an organiz...
Summary:If happiness were the purpose of a rational will, then instinct would be the ideal director of the will.

Paragraph 20

Section: One
Page and Line: 5.21  [4:395]
Kant's German: In der That finden wir auch, daß, je mehr eine...
Scholar translation: In fact we also find that the more ...
Student translation: In fact, we also find that the more...
Summary:Cultivation of reason actually reduces happiness. Rational wills do not exist to pursue happiness.

Paragraph 21

Section: One
Page and Line: 6.25  [4:395-396]
Kant's German: Denn da die Vernunft dazu nicht tauglich genug...
Scholar translation: For since reason for that purpose i...
Student translation: For since reason is not sufficientl...
Summary:So a rational will has been given (practical) reason in order to make a good will, the highest good, not in order to achieve happiness, and this is consistent with nature.

Paragraph 22

Section: One
Page and Line: 8.4  [4:396-397]
Kant's German: Um aber den Begriff eines an sich selbst hochzuschä-...
Scholar translation: In order, however, to explicate the...
Student translation: The concept of a good will already ...
Summary:The notion of an absolutely good will needs further explanation. Investigating the concept of duty, which contains the concept of a good will, will illuminate the concept of a good will.

Paragraph 23

Section: One
Page and Line: 8.17  [4:396-397]
Kant's German: Ich übergehe hier alle Handlungen, die schon als...
Scholar translation: I here pass over all actions which ...
Student translation: I here pass over all actions that a...
Summary:This shopkeeper who charges the same price to all customers acts neither from duty nor from direct inclination; she acts from self-interest.

Paragraph 24

Section: One
Page and Line: 9.21  [4:397-398]
Kant's German: Dagegen sein Leben zu erhalten, ist Pflicht, und über-...
Scholar translation: On the other hand, to preserve one'...
Student translation: On the other hand, to preserve your...
Summary:It is a duty, and everyone has a direct inclination, to survive. If a person with a death wish preserves her life only from duty, then her maxim has moral content.

Paragraph 25

Section: One
Page and Line: 10.9  [4:398]
Kant's German: Wohlthätig seyn, wo man kann, ist Pflicht, und...
Scholar translation: To be beneficent, where one can, is...
Student translation: To be beneficent where you can is a...
Summary:Being beneficent is a duty, and some people satisfy an inclination by helping others. Their beneficent action has no moral worth. But the beneficent action of someone who has lost compassion, or who has by nature no sympathy, and so acts from no inclination, does have moral worth.

Paragraph 26

Section: One
Page and Line: 11.25  [4:398-399]
Kant's German: Seine eigene Glückseligkeit sichern, ist Pflicht, (we-...
Scholar translation: To secure one's own happiness is a ...
Student translation: To secure your own happiness is a d...
Summary:Securing happiness is a duty, and everyone has an inclination for it, though it is impossible to say precisely what happiness is. Promoting one's happiness has moral worth if it is done not from inclination but from duty.

Paragraph 27

Section: One
Page and Line: 13.4  [4:399-400]
Kant's German: So sind ohne Zweifel auch die Schriftstellen zu ver-...
Scholar translation: In this way we are without doubt al...
Student translation: No doubt, it is also in this way th...
Summary:Only practical (willed) love can be commanded, as in "love your neighbor." Pathological love, based in sensibility, cannot be commanded.

Paragraph 28

Section: One
Page and Line: 13.14  [4:399-400]
Kant's German: Der zweyte Satz ist: eine Handlung aus Pflicht...
Scholar translation: The second proposition is: an actio...
Student translation: The second proposition is this: an ...
Summary:The second proposition is that an action done from duty has moral worth from its maxim. Neither the purposes of actions nor the effects of actions have moral worth; so the moral worth can come only from the principle of the will.

Paragraph 29

Section: One
Page and Line: 14.13  [4:400]
Kant's German: Den dritten Satz, als Folgerung aus beiden vori-...
Scholar translation: The third proposition, as a consequ...
Student translation: I would express the third propositi...
Summary:The third proposition, following from the previous two, is that duty is the necessity of acting out of respect (which is subjective) for the law, for nothing else can command respect.

Paragraph 30

Section: One
Page and Line: 15.11  [4:400-401]
Kant's German: Es liegt also der moralische Werth der Handlung...
Scholar translation: Thus the moral worth of the action ...
Student translation: So the moral worth of an action doe...
Summary:Effects have no moral worth because they could be brought about without willing. The highest and unconditional good is found only in a will; the conception or representation of a law that determines or directs a will can only be found in a rational will; nothing else in the will or influencing it (e.g., expected effects, purposes, inclinations, etc.) can be the source of the highest good; so this conception is the source of the highest good.

Paragraph 31

Section: One
Page and Line: 17.1  [4:402]
Kant's German: Was kann das aber wol für ein Gesetz seyn, des-...
Scholar translation: What kind of law though can that re...
Student translation: But what kind of law can that reall...
Summary:The law is not a particular law, but rather conformity to law in general: act only in such a way that you can will your maxim as a universal law.

Paragraph 32

Section: One
Page and Line: 18.1  [4:402]
Kant's German: Die Frage sey z.B. darf ich, wenn ich im Ge-...
Scholar translation: The question is for example, may I,...
Student translation: The question might be, for instance...
Summary:A lying or false promise cannot be willed as a universal law, for then there would be no promises.

Paragraph 33

Section: One
Page and Line: 19.26  [4:402-403]
Kant's German: Was ich also zu thun habe, damit mein Wollen...
Scholar translation: What I therefore have to do, in ord...
Student translation: What I therefore have to do so that...
Summary:No special skill is needed to ask whether a maxim can be willed as a universal law and so no special skill is needed to do what is necessary in order to have a good will.

Paragraph 34

Section: One
Page and Line: 20.21  [4:403-404]
Kant's German: So sind wir denn in der moralischen Erkenntniß...
Scholar translation: In this way, then, we have reached ...
Student translation: We have, then, in the moral knowled...
Summary:So we have found the highest principle of morality. Knowing duty is accessible to ordinary people, not only to philosophers and scientists. Practical judgment has an advantage over theoretical judgment; it tends not to fall into error when it excludes the sensuous. So perhaps philosophy should not meddle in morality.

Paragraph 35

Section: One
Page and Line: 22.21  [4:404-405]
Kant's German: Es ist eine herrliche Sache um die Unschuld, nur...
Scholar translation: There is a magnificent thing about ...
Student translation: Innocence is a magnificent thing, b...
Summary:A natural dialectic — a skepticism about the correctness of the commands of duty — and an ensuing corruption of the commands, arise from inclinations and desires. These inclinations and desires form a counterweight to the commands of duty.

Paragraph 36

Section: One
Page and Line: 23.20  [4:405]
Kant's German: So wird also die gemeine Menschenvernunft...
Scholar translation: Thus in this way common human r...
Student translation: Because of this destructive tendenc...
Summary:By providing a critical examination of reason, philosophy can defuse this dialectic.

Paragraph 37

Section: Two
Page and Line: 25.6  [4:406]
Kant's German: Wenn wir unsern bisherigen Begriff der Pflicht aus...
Scholar translation: If we have drawn our previous conce...
Student translation: Even if we have drawn our previous ...
Summary:The concept of duty is not a concept of experience. It may be that the disposition to act from duty has never existed. Moral duties, though, may still exist even if humans are too weak to live up to them.

Paragraph 38

Section: Two
Page and Line: 26.7  [4:406-407]
Kant's German: In der That ist es schlechterdings unmöglich, durch...
Scholar translation: In fact it is absolutely impossible...
Student translation: In fact, it is absolutely impossibl...
Summary:It is impossible for experience to provide certain evidence of a real example of acting from duty, for we might not be able to detect all the motivational sources of our actions.

Paragraph 39

Section: Two
Page and Line: 27.1  [4:407]
Kant's German: Man kann auch denen, die alle Sittlichkeit, als...
Scholar translation: One can also for those, who laugh a...
Student translation: There are some people who ridicule ...
Summary:Even if no one has ever acted from duty, it is important that we emphasize that the source of moral laws is reason and not experience. Failure to emphasize the rational source of morality renders us vulnerable to the dangers of believing that morality is not real, and that mistaken belief can lead us to fall away from our ideas of duty and fall instead into immorality.

Paragraph 40

Section: Two
Page and Line: 28.16  [4:407-408]
Kant's German: Setzet man hinzu, daß, wenn man dem Begriffe...
Scholar translation: If one adds that, if one does not w...
Student translation: Unless you want to deny entirely to...
Summary:The laws of morality are universal and necessary. Experience cannot provide evidence of the universal and necessary. So the laws of morality cannot be based on experience but instead must have their source in reason.

Paragraph 41

Section: Two
Page and Line: 29.10  [4:408-409]
Kant's German: Man könnte auch der Sittlichkeit nicht übler rathen,...
Scholar translation: One could also advise morality not ...
Student translation: You also could not advise morality ...
Summary:Examples or parables, which are drawn from experience, cannot justify morality; for the examples must first be judged by already-established moral principles or standards before the examples can be legitimately used to illustrate morally correct behavior. Examples can only play a non-justificatory role (e.g., to provide encouragement) in morality.

Paragraph 42

Section: Two
Page and Line: 30.8  [4:409]
Kant's German: Wenn es denn keinen ächten obersten Grundsatz...
Scholar translation: If there is then no genuine highest...
Student translation: If, then, there is no genuine highe...
Summary:It is necessary to discuss morality more generally or abstractly because popular moral philosophy (which uses concrete examples) does not keep rational knowledge separated from the empirical. A metaphysics of morals does maintain this separation.

Paragraph 43

Section: Two
Page and Line: 30.22  [4:409]
Kant's German: Diese Herablassung zu Volksbegriffen ist allerdings...
Scholar translation: This condescension to folk concepts...
Student translation: This descent into folk concepts is ...
Summary:Only after morality has been given a firm foundation in pure reason should it be expressed in a more popular and accessible style.

Paragraph 44

Section: Two
Page and Line: 31.22  [4:409-410]
Kant's German: Man darf nur die Versuche über die Sittlichkeit...
Scholar translation: One needs only look at the attempts...
Student translation: You only need to look at the attemp...
Summary:Popular moral philosophy contains an impure mixture of ingredients from both experience and reason: human nature, rational nature, perfection, happiness, moral feeling, fear of God. Popular moral philosophy does not consider that moral principles are not to be found in human nature and does not see the need to complete a metaphysics of morals first.

Paragraph 45

Section: Two
Page and Line: 32.18  [4:410]
Kant's German: Es ist aber eine solche völlig isolirte Metaphy-...
Scholar translation: Such a completely isolated metaphys...
Student translation: But a metaphysics of morals that is...
Summary:A metaphysics of morals is needed not only for acquiring moral knowledge but also for living morally; for the purity of a metaphysics of morals anchors the mind in such a way that the ideas of pure reason can overcome the empirical influences (such as desires and feelings) that contribute to immoral behavior.

Paragraph 46

Section: Two
Page and Line: 34.5  [4:411]
Kant's German: Aus dem angeführten erhellet: daß alle sittliche...
Scholar translation: From the foregoing it is evident: t...
Student translation: The following is evident from what ...
Summary:Summarizing the previous paragraphs, moral principles must be derived a priori from the universal concept of a rational being, not empirically from anthropological examples of humans.

Paragraph 47

Section: Two
Page and Line: 36.1  [4:412]
Kant's German: Um aber in dieser Bearbeitung nicht bloß von...
Scholar translation: In order, however, to advance in th...
Student translation: By natural steps we have already pr...
Summary:In the First Section, we transitioned from ordinary morality to philosophical morality. In this Second Section, we have just seen that popular moral philosophy is inadequate and that a metaphysics of morals is needed. In order to advance in this Groundlaying to this needed metaphysics of morals, we must now examine the rules that govern practical reason and figure out how the concept of duty arises from those rules.

Paragraph 48

Section: Two
Page and Line: 36.16  [4:412]
Kant's German: Ein jedes Ding der Natur wirkt nach Gesetzen....
Scholar translation: Each thing in nature works accordin...
Student translation: Each thing in nature works accordin...
Summary:The will is practical reason, the ability to make choices or to act according to principles or laws. If reason always fully guides the will in its choosing, then the rational being which has that pure will always acts in a morally correct way; for this kind of rational being, commands are not appropriate. But if other factors (e.g., inclinations) besides reason also guide the will, as happens in fact with human beings, then the rational being which has that impure will must be commanded to do what is morally correct.

Paragraph 49

Section: Two
Page and Line: 37.16  [4:412-413]
Kant's German: Die Vorstellung eines objectiven Princips, so-...
Scholar translation: The representation of an objective ...
Student translation: The representation of an objective ...
Summary:An imperative is a formula or way of expressing a command.

Paragraph 50

Section: Two
Page and Line: 37.20  [4:412-413]
Kant's German: Alle Imperativen werden durch ein Sollen ausge-...
Scholar translation: All imperatives are expressed throu...
Student translation: All imperatives are expressed throu...
Summary:All imperatives tell an impure will that it ought to do something or not do something. The imperatives come from reason and so hold good for all rational beings.

Paragraph 51

Section: Two
Page and Line: 39.1  [4:414]
Kant's German: Ein vollkommen guter Wille würde also eben so-...
Scholar translation: A perfectly good will would thus st...
Student translation: So a completely good will would sta...
Summary:Imperatives do not apply to or command either a divine will (e.g., God) or a holy will (e.g., an angel) because these rational beings, though subject to moral laws, have perfectly pure wills and so already always make correct moral choices.

Paragraph 52

Section: Two
Page and Line: 39.15  [4:414]
Kant's German: Alle Imperativen nun gebieten entweder hypo-...
Scholar translation: Now, all imperatives comma...
Student translation: Now, all imperatives comma...
Summary:An imperative is either hypothetical or categorical. The difference between them is that only in the hypothetical is there a specification of a means to some other end.

Paragraph 53

Section: Two
Page and Line: 39.23  [4:414]
Kant's German: Weil jedes practische Gesetz eine mögliche Hand-...
Scholar translation: Because each practical law represen...
Student translation: Because each practical law represen...
Summary:All imperatives specify that a good action is necessary. If the action is good only as a means, then the imperative is hypothetical. If the action is good in itself, then the imperative is categorical.

Paragraph 54

Section: Two
Page and Line: 40.9  [4:414-415]
Kant's German: Der Imperativ sagt also, welche durch mich mög-...
Scholar translation: The imperative thus says which acti...
Student translation: So the imperative says which action...
Summary:So an imperative instructs a will that does not always perform those actions which are good. Non-good actions are done either because the rational being with the will does not know that the actions are good or because the rational being has maxims that are opposed to the good that practical reason identifies.

Paragraph 55

Section: Two
Page and Line: 40.17  [4:414-415]
Kant's German: Der hypothetische Imperativ sagt also nur, daß...
Scholar translation: The hypothetical imperative thus sa...
Student translation: So the hypothetical imperative only...
Summary:An imperatives holds as one of three kinds of practical principle. Hypothetical imperatives hold as either problematic (possible) or assertoric (actual) practical principles while the categorical imperative holds as an apodictic (absolutely necessary) principle.

Paragraph 56

Section: Two
Page and Line: 41.1  [4:415]
Kant's German: Man kann sich das, was nur durch Kräfte irgend...
Scholar translation: One can conceive what is possible o...
Student translation: Something that is only possible thr...
Summary:Rational beings with wills can have possible purposes or ends which they try to achieve through principles of action. The imperatives which specify the actions or means to achieve these possible ends, with no attention paid to the goodness of the possible ends, are imperatives of skill.

Paragraph 57

Section: Two
Page and Line: 42.3  [4:415-416]
Kant's German: Es ist gleichwol ein Zweck, den man bey allen...
Scholar translation: There is nevertheless one ...
Student translation: There is, nevertheless, one...
Summary:If the end to be achieved is happiness, which is an actual end for all imperfect rational beings, then the imperative which specifies the means to personal happiness is a precept of prudence.

Paragraph 58

Section: Two
Page and Line: 43.6  [4:416]
Kant's German: Endlich giebt es einen Imperativ, der, ohne...
Scholar translation: Finally, there is an imperative, wh...
Student translation: Finally, there is an imperative whi...
Summary:If the imperative, because it does not specify any other end, does not specify any action that is a means to an end, and if the imperative is instead concerned only with the willed principle of the action, then the imperative is categorical and belongs to morality.

Paragraph 59

Section: Two
Page and Line: 43.16  [4:416]
Kant's German: Das Wollen nach diesen dreyerley Principien wird...
Scholar translation: The willing according to these thre...
Student translation: Willing according to these three ki...
Summary:These imperatives may more suitably also be called rules of skill (or technical imperatives), counsels of prudence (or pragmatic imperatives), or commands of morality (or moral imperatives). This classification helps to emphasize that only the last kind expresses an unconditioned necessity of action.

Paragraph 60

Section: Two
Page and Line: 44.13  [4:416-417]
Kant's German: Nun entsteht die Frage: wie sind alle diese Impe-...
Scholar translation: Now the question arises: how are al...
Student translation: The question now arises: how are al...
Summary:How can we best understand the nature of the obligation or necessitation of will that these imperatives express? The necessity in imperatives of skill are easy to understand because such imperatives are analytic: whoever wills the end also wills the means that can be done and that are needed to achieve the end.

Paragraph 61

Section: Two
Page and Line: 45.24  [4:417]
Kant's German: Die Imperativen der Klugheit würden, wenn es...
Scholar translation: The imperatives of prudence would, ...
Student translation: The imperatives of prudence would, ...
Summary:Because the concept of happiness is very mixed-up, based in empirical imagination rather than in reason, there is no way to know what would in general make a rational being happy. So the imperatives of prudence are really only counsels of prudence. But if the concept of happiness could be straightened out, then the necessity involved in imperatives of prudence could be understood in the same way that the necessity in imperatives of skill is understood; for the imperatives would then differ only in the possibility or actuality of the end that is willed.

Paragraph 62

Section: Two
Page and Line: 48.14  [4:419]
Kant's German: Dagegen, wie der Imperativ der Sittlichkeit mög-...
Scholar translation: On the other hand, how the imperati...
Student translation: On the other hand, the question of ...
Summary:Because the imperative of morality is a categorical rather than hypothetical imperative, the necessity involved in it is more difficult to understand. Because it is not hypothetical (though it may sometimes appear to be), the necessity or obligation imposed on the will does not depend on any condition or empirical incentive such as a desire. So examples drawn from experience cannot be used to show how the necessity is to be thought.

Paragraph 63

Section: Two
Page and Line: 49.20  [4:419-420]
Kant's German: Wir werden also die Möglichkeit eines categori-...
Scholar translation: We will thus have to investigate th...
Student translation: So we will have to investigate the ...
Summary:So the necessity involved in the categorical imperative will have to be explained and established by a priori methods, not by experience. But we know at least this much already: that of the three kinds of imperatives, only the categorical imperative is a practical law because only it expresses an unconditional command.

Paragraph 64

Section: Two
Page and Line: 50.11  [4:420]
Kant's German: Zweytens ist bey diesem categorischen Imperativ...
Scholar translation: Secondly, with this categorical imp...
Student translation: Secondly, in the case of this categ...
Summary:We may note second that the categorical imperative is a synthetic a priori practical proposition, and the possibility of any synthetic a priori proposition is difficult to establish.

Paragraph 65

Section: Two
Page and Line: 51.1  [4:420-421]
Kant's German: Bey dieser Aufgabe wollen wir zuerst versuchen, ob...
Scholar translation: With this problem we want first inq...
Student translation: In tackling this problem of the pos...
Summary:We will first examine the concept of a categorical imperative; from this concept alone we may be able to get a formula for the categorical imperative. We will put off until the Third Section the task of showing how the absolute command expressed in the categorical imperative is possible.

Paragraph 66

Section: Two
Page and Line: 51.9  [4:420-421]
Kant's German: Wenn ich mir einen hypothetischen Imperativ über-...
Scholar translation: If I conceive a hypothetical...
Student translation: If I think of a hypothetical...
Summary:The concept of a categorical imperative contains only the law and the necessity that the will's maxim conform to the law. Because the law is unconditioned and universal, the maxim cannot conform to any condition but only to the universality of the law. The imperative expresses the necessity of this conformity.

Paragraph 67

Section: Two
Page and Line: 52.3  [4:421]
Kant's German: Der categorische Imperativ ist also nur ein einziger,...
Scholar translation: The categorical imperative is thus ...
Student translation: So there is only one categorical im...
Summary:So there is only one categorical imperative: act only according to a maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law.

Paragraph 68

Section: Two
Page and Line: 52.7  [4:421]
Kant's German: Wenn nun aus diesem einigen Imperativ alle Im-...
Scholar translation: If now from this single imperative ...
Student translation: Now, if all imperatives of duty can...
Summary:If all imperatives of duty can be derived from this one categorical imperative, then the concept of duty will at least be meaningful and understood, even if no duties really exist.

Paragraph 69

Section: Two
Page and Line: 52.14  [4:421]
Kant's German: Weil die Allgemeinheit des Gesetzes, wornach Wir-...
Scholar translation: Because the universality of the law...
Student translation: Because the universality of the law...
Summary:Since universal laws govern nature, the categorical imperative may also be expressed like this: act as if your maxim could become through your will a universal law of nature.

Paragraph 70

Section: Two
Page and Line: 52.23  [4:421]
Kant's German: Nun wollen wir einige Pflichten herzählen, nach...
Scholar translation: Now we want to enumerate some dutie...
Student translation: Now we will list some duties accord...
Summary:We list some perfect and imperfect duties to ourselves and to others.

Paragraph 71

Section: Two
Page and Line: 53.3  [4:421-422]
Kant's German: 1) Einer, der durch eine Reihe von Uebeln, die...
Scholar translation: 1) One, who, through a series of mi...
Student translation: 1) A person, who is disgusted with ...
Summary:Not committing suicide is a perfect duty to oneself.

Paragraph 72

Section: Two
Page and Line: 54.6  [4:422]
Kant's German: 2) Ein anderer sieht sich durch Noth gedrungen,...
Scholar translation: 2) Another sees himself forced by n...
Student translation: 2) Another person sees herself forc...
Summary:Not making false promises is a perfect duty to others.

Paragraph 73

Section: Two
Page and Line: 55.9  [4:422-423]
Kant's German: 3) Ein dritter findet in sich ein Talent, welches...
Scholar translation: 3) A third finds in himself a talen...
Student translation: 3) A third person finds in herself ...
Summary:Developing one's talents is an imperfect duty to oneself.

Paragraph 74

Section: Two
Page and Line: 56.4  [4:423]
Kant's German: Noch denkt ein vierter, dem es wohl geht, indessen...
Scholar translation: Yet a fourth, for whom it ...
Student translation: Yet a fourth, for whom thi...
Summary:Benevolence is an imperfect duty to others.

Paragraph 75

Section: Two
Page and Line: 57.3  [4:423-424]
Kant's German: Dieses sind nun einige von den vielen wirklichen...
Scholar translation: These, then, are some of the many a...
Student translation: These, then, are some of the many a...
Summary:The previous four examples illustrate how all duties depend on the categorical imperative in one of two ways: the maxims of the corresponding violations of duty either cannot be thought or cannot be willed consistently.

Paragraph 76

Section: Two
Page and Line: 57.24  [4:423-424]
Kant's German: Wenn wir nun auf uns selbst bey jeder Uebertre-...
Scholar translation: If we now pay attention to ourselve...
Student translation: If we now pay attention to ourselve...
Summary:When we violate our acknowledged duty, we do not will our (violating or non-conforming) maxim as a universal law; for this is impossible. Instead, we exempt ourselves from the universalized (moral or conforming) maxim in order to satisfy our inclination. There is no contradiction in our will when this happens because we are seen from two standpoints: the will guided by reason and the will influenced by inclination. Though there is no contradiction, there is an antagonism between inclination and reason. This antagonism unjustifiably changes universality into mere generality.

Paragraph 77

Section: Two
Page and Line: 59.3  [4:424-425]
Kant's German: Wir haben so viel also wenigstens dargethan, daß,...
Scholar translation: We have this much thus at least sho...
Student translation: So we have at least shown as much a...
Summary:We have shown two things so far: first, if the concept of duty is real, then it can only be expressed in categorical imperatives; second, the content of the imperative is the law itself and the necessity that a maxim conform to the law. We have not yet proved a priori that such an imperative actually exists.

Paragraph 78

Section: Two
Page and Line: 59.17  [4:424-425]
Kant's German: Bey der Absicht, dazu zu gelangen, ist es von der...
Scholar translation: With the aim of arriving at this, i...
Student translation: With the aim of obtaining this ...
Summary:This sought-for proof that the categorical imperative exists cannot be based on human nature, for the moral law is to hold for all rational beings and is not to be merely a maxim that holds for humans.

Paragraph 79

Section: Two
Page and Line: 60.17  [4:425-426]
Kant's German: Hier sehen wir nun die Philosophie in der That auf...
Scholar translation: Here we now see philosophy put in f...
Student translation: Here we now see philosophy put in f...
Summary:So philosophy is in a difficult position: the sought-for proof that philosophy seeks must depend neither on the supernatural nor on the natural. The proof must show that the source and authority of the categorical imperative is a priori in reason, based only in the law itself and in respect for the law.

Paragraph 80

Section: Two
Page and Line: 61.6  [4:426]
Kant's German: Alles also, was empirisch ist, ist, als Zuthat zum...
Scholar translation: Thus everything which is empirical,...
Student translation: So everything that is empirical is ...
Summary:The contingent or accidental grounds which only experience can provide blemish the purity of morals. Because human reason is weary, we must always be on guard to ensure that virtue is not compromised by the empirical.

Paragraph 81

Section: Two
Page and Line: 62.1  [4:426-427]
Kant's German: Die Frage ist also diese: ist es ein nothwendiges Ge-...
Scholar translation: Thus the question is this: is it a ...
Student translation: So the question is this: is it a ne...
Summary:Discovering the a priori connection between the categorical imperative and the concept of the will of a rational being requires a metaphysics of morals; for if reason alone determines conduct, then it must do so a priori. All questions of empirical psychology are excluded.

Paragraph 82

Section: Two
Page and Line: 63.13  [4:427]
Kant's German: Der Wille wird als ein Vermögen gedacht, der...
Scholar translation: The will is thought as a capacity t...
Student translation: The will is thought as a capacity t...
Summary:A will, as a power to determine itself to action according to the representation of a certain law, only exists in rational beings. A purely rational end provides the will of a rational being with a reason for acting (i.e., a principled motive) that holds for all rational beings and so is an objective end. An end that is grounded in desires is a subjective, material, and relative end and can only support an hypothetical imperative which specifies the means to the relative end which is to satisfy a desire subjectively grounded in an incentive.

Paragraph 83

Section: Two
Page and Line: 64.15  [4:427-428]
Kant's German: Gesetzt aber, es gäbe etwas, dessen Daseyn an...
Scholar translation: Granted, however, there were someth...
Student translation: Suppose, however, that there were s...
Summary:Only something that has absolute worth, that is an end in itself, can ground or be the basis for a categorical imperative.

Paragraph 84

Section: Two
Page and Line: 64.21  [4:427-428]
Kant's German: Nun sage ich: der Mensch, und überhaupt jedes ver-...
Scholar translation: Now I say: the human being and in g...
Student translation: Now I say: the human being and in g...
Summary:Rational beings are persons because they are ends in themselves; unlike things, persons may never be used merely as means. Persons are objective ends with absolute value for which no other ends may be substituted because if all value were conditioned (as, for example, inclinations are) then there would be nothing of absolute value.

Paragraph 85

Section: Two
Page and Line: 66.4  [4:428-429]
Kant's German: Wenn es denn also ein oberstes practisches Prin-...
Scholar translation: If, then, there is thus to be a hig...
Student translation: So if there is to be a highest prac...
Summary:The highest practical principle must be an objective principle constituted from the representation of what is necessarily an end for everyone because it is an end in itself. Subjectively, a person necessarily thinks of herself as an end in itself, for rational beings are ends in themselves. But since every other rational being thinks in this same way for the same reason, it is also an objective principle that all persons are ends in themselves. So the categorical imperative may also be formulated like this: act so that the humanity in yourself and others is treated always as an end and never merely as a means.

Paragraph 86

Section: Two
Page and Line: 67.3  [4:429]
Kant's German: Um bey den vorigen Beyspielen zu bleiben, so wird...
Scholar translation: So as to stay with the previous exa...
Student translation: If we stay with the previous exampl...
Summary:We illustrate this new formulation with the same examples as before.

Paragraph 87

Section: Two
Page and Line: 67.4  [4:429]
Kant's German: Erstlich, nach dem Begriffe der nothwendigen...
Scholar translation: Firstly, in accordance wit...
Student translation: Firstly, as regards the co...
Summary:Committing suicide is not consistent with using humanity as an end in itself. The same goes for mutilation and injury. So avoidance of these are necessary duties to oneself.

Paragraph 88

Section: Two
Page and Line: 67.23  [4:429]
Kant's German: Zweytens, was die nothwendige oder schuldige...
Scholar translation: Secondly, what concerns th...
Student translation: Secondly, as concerns the ...
Summary:Making false promises, as well as attacking the freedom and property of others, uses others merely as means because the others, being ends in themselves, cannot consent to this treatment. So avoidance of these are necessary duties to others.

Paragraph 89

Section: Two
Page and Line: 68.16  [4:429-430]
Kant's German: Drittens, in Ansehung der zufälligen (verdienstli-...
Scholar translation: Thirdly, in view of contin...
Student translation: Thirdly, with regard to th...
Summary:Failing to develop one's talents, although not in conflict with using humanity in oneself as an end in itself, does not promote the perfection of that end. So avoiding this failure is a contingent duty to oneself.

Paragraph 90

Section: Two
Page and Line: 69.10  [4:430-431]
Kant's German: Viertens, in Betreff der verdienstlichen Pflicht...
Scholar translation: Fourthly, in reference to ...
Student translation: Fourthly, with regard to m...
Summary:Failing to contribute to the happiness of others, harmonizing only negatively with treating humanity as an end in itself, does not indicate a sharing of ends between persons. So avoiding this failure is a contingent or meritorious duty to others.

Paragraph 91

Section: Two
Page and Line: 69.23  [4:430-431]
Kant's German: Dieses Princip der Menschheit und jeder vernünf-...
Scholar translation: This principle of humanity and of e...
Student translation: This principle of humanity and of e...
Summary:The principle that all rational beings are ends in themselves is not borrowed from experience. This is so for two reasons: first, experience cannot say anything definite about all rational beings; second, the principle presents humanity as an objective, not subjective, end and so must come from pure reason. From the first two principles follows the third principle: the will of every rational being is a universally legislative will.

Paragraph 92

Section: Two
Page and Line: 70.23  [4:431]
Kant's German: Alle Maximen werden nach diesem Princip ver-...
Scholar translation: All maxims are rejected according t...
Student translation: According to this third practical p...
Summary:The will itself gives the law and so is subject to the law.

Paragraph 93

Section: Two
Page and Line: 71.5  [4:431-432]
Kant's German: Die Imperativen nach der vorigen Vorstellungsart,...
Scholar translation: The imperatives according to the pr...
Student translation: Up to now, imperatives have been mo...
Summary:This third formula of the categorical imperative is the first to make it clear (but still not proved) that in willing from duty all interest is renounced.

Paragraph 94

Section: Two
Page and Line: 72.1  [4:432]
Kant's German: Denn wenn wir einen solchen denken, so kann, ob-...
Scholar translation: For if we think one such, then, alt...
Student translation: For if we think of such a will, the...
Summary:A highest universally legislating will cannot depend on any interest because such a dependent will would require yet another law that would restrict that interest.

Paragraph 95

Section: Two
Page and Line: 72.10  [4:432]
Kant's German: Also würde das Princip eines jeden menschlichen...
Scholar translation: Thus the principle of each...
Student translation: So the principle of every ...
Summary:So if the categorical imperative exists, its authority comes only from a universally legislating will; for only this kind of will depends on no interest and therefore only this kind of will gives unconditional imperatives.

Paragraph 96

Section: Two
Page and Line: 73.5  [4:432-433]
Kant's German: Es ist nun kein Wunder, wenn wir auf alle bishe-...
Scholar translation: It is now no wonder, when we look b...
Student translation: It is now not surprising, when we l...
Summary:All previous attempts to find the principle of morality failed because they did not see the possibility of a self-legislating will but only of a will subject to law; to have authority over the subject the law then required an interest so that the law was conditioned (on the interest) rather than unconditional. All these failed principles prior to this principle of the autonomy of the will are heteronomy.

Paragraph 97

Section: Two
Page and Line: 74.5  [4:433]
Kant's German: Der Begriff eines jeden vernünftigen Wesens, das...
Scholar translation: The concept of any rational being w...
Student translation: The concept of any rational being w...
Summary:The conception of a universally legislating will supports the conception of an empire of ends.

Paragraph 98

Section: Two
Page and Line: 74.11  [4:433]
Kant's German: Ich verstehe aber unter einem Reiche die systema-...
Scholar translation: I understand, however, under an ...
Student translation: But, by an empire, I under...
Summary:An empire is a union of rational beings living under common laws. Because laws specify ends that are universally valid, by abstraction it is possible to think of an empire of ends.

Paragraph 99

Section: Two
Page and Line: 74.23  [4:433]
Kant's German: Denn vernünftige Wesen stehen alle unter dem Ge-...
Scholar translation: For rational beings all stand under...
Student translation: For rational beings all stand under...
Summary:Because rational beings are obligated to treat themselves and each other as ends in themselves, an empire of ends arises. This empire is only an ideal.

Paragraph 100

Section: Two
Page and Line: 75.9  [4:433-434]
Kant's German: Es gehört aber ein vernünftiges Wesen als Glied...
Scholar translation: A rational being, however, belongs ...
Student translation: A rational being, however, belongs ...
Summary:A member of the empire of ends both gives laws and is subject to the laws. A sovereign or head of the empire of ends gives laws but is not subject to any other will.

Paragraph 101

Section: Two
Page and Line: 75.14  [4:433-434]
Kant's German: Das vernünftige Wesen muß sich jederzeit als gesetz-...
Scholar translation: The rational being must consider it...
Student translation: The rational being must always cons...
Summary:The sovereign must also be a totally independent being with no needs; it must possess all the power that is required in order to carry out its willing.

Paragraph 102

Section: Two
Page and Line: 75.22  [4:433-434]
Kant's German: Moralität besteht also in der Beziehung aller Hand-...
Scholar translation: Morality thus consists in the refer...
Student translation: So morality consists in the relatio...
Summary:So morality is to be found in the relation between actions and the universal legislation of wills in an empire of ends. Moral duty applies equally to all members of the empire of ends. But moral duty does not apply to the sovereign or head because the sovereign's will and maxims are necessarily in agreement with the universal legislation.

Paragraph 103

Section: Two
Page and Line: 76.15  [4:434]
Kant's German: Die practische Nothwendigkeit nach diesem Prin-...
Scholar translation: The practical necessity to act acco...
Student translation: The practical necessity of acting a...
Summary:Duty is not based on feelings, impulses and inclinations; it is based on the relation between rational beings as ends in themselves, as legislators for themselves and each other. So reason, working from the idea of the dignity of these self-legislators, refers every maxim of the will as universally lawgiving to every other will and to every action toward oneself.

Paragraph 104

Section: Two
Page and Line: 77.3  [4:434-435]
Kant's German: Im Reiche der Zwecke hat alles entweder einen...
Scholar translation: In the empire of ends everything ha...
Student translation: In the empire of ends everything ha...
Summary:In the empire of ends, everything has a price or dignity. The difference is that only things that have a price are replaceable.

Paragraph 105

Section: Two
Page and Line: 77.9  [4:434-435]
Kant's German: Was sich auf die allgemeinen menschlichen Neigungen...
Scholar translation: What refers to general human inclin...
Student translation: What refers to general human inclin...
Summary:Things that have only a relative worth either are based on inclination or needs, and so have a market price, or are based on taste and so have an affective price. But what alone makes an end in itself possible is something that also has inner worth and so has dignity and not just a price.

Paragraph 106

Section: Two
Page and Line: 77.18  [4:434-435]
Kant's German: Nun ist Moralität die Bedingung, unter der al-...
Scholar translation: Now, morality is the condition unde...
Student translation: Now, morality is the condition unde...
Summary:Only morality and (moral) humanity have dignity. Dutiful actions have intrinsic worth because the maxims on which their worth depends cannot be replaced by, for instance, nature. The purity of these moral maxims and the resultant actions allows their intrinsic worth to be seen as dignity.

Paragraph 107

Section: Two
Page and Line: 78.25  [4:435]
Kant's German: Und was ist es denn nun, was die sittlich gute...
Scholar translation: And what is it now, then, which jus...
Student translation: And now, then, what is it that just...
Summary:The law determines the value of everything. So law-making must have unconditional worth or absolute value; that is, it must have dignity. So rational beings, insofar as they share in the making of universal laws, are ends in themselves and have a dignity grounded in their autonomy.

Paragraph 108

Section: Two
Page and Line: 79.20  [4:435-436]
Kant's German: Die angeführten drey Arten, das Princip der Sitt-...
Scholar translation: The three ways cited above to repre...
Student translation: The three ways above, however, of r...
Summary:The above three ways of representing the principle of morality are actually expressions or formulas of the same law. The subjective difference between them is how closely they approach feelings. All maxims have the following three features.

Paragraph 109

Section: Two
Page and Line: 80.3  [4:436]
Kant's German: 1) eine Form, welche in der Allgemeinheit besteht,...
Scholar translation: 1) a form, which consists ...
Student translation: 1) a form, which consists ...
Summary:All maxims have a form, which consists in their universality.

Paragraph 110

Section: Two
Page and Line: 80.7  [4:436]
Kant's German: 2) eine Materie, nemlich einen Zweck, und da sagt...
Scholar translation: 2) a matter, namely an end...
Student translation: 2) a matter, namely an end...
Summary:All maxims have a matter, which is an end limited by the unconditioned end, a rational being, which is itself a limiting condition on all relative ends.

Paragraph 111

Section: Two
Page and Line: 80.12  [4:436]
Kant's German: 3) eine vollständige Bestimmung aller Maxi-...
Scholar translation: 3) a complete determination...
Student translation: 3) a complete determination...
Summary:All maxims have a complete determination in which the unity of the form (universality) and the multiplicity of the matter (ends) harmonize in a total system of ends. If we are trying to make moral judgments, it is best to use the strictest method, which is the universal law formulation of the categorical imperative. If we are also trying to get more people to adopt a moral way of life, then it is best to see actions in the light of all three formulations.

Paragraph 112

Section: Two
Page and Line: 81.9  [4:436-437]
Kant's German: Wir können nunmehr da endigen, von wo wir im...
Scholar translation: We can now here end from where we i...
Student translation: We can now end where we began, name...
Summary:We can now understand in terms of a categorical imperative our initial concept of an absolutely good will; it is a will whose maxims have, as objects, themselves (i.e., the maxims) as universal laws.

Paragraph 113

Section: Two
Page and Line: 82.3  [4:437-438]
Kant's German: Die vernünftige Natur nimmt sich dadurch vor den...
Scholar translation: Rational nature excludes itself fro...
Student translation: Rational nature distinguishes itsel...
Summary:Because in the idea of an absolutely good will there is complete abstraction from every end as an effect, the end of the will must be independent. So the end must only be thought of negatively, as something that ought never to be acted against, and so must be regarded never as merely a means. So this end is the absolutely good will itself. The first two formulations of the categorical imperative are thus seen to be essentially the same.

Paragraph 114

Section: Two
Page and Line: 83.9  [4:438]
Kant's German: Nun folgt hieraus unstreitig: daß jedes vernünf-...
Scholar translation: Now follows from this incontestably...
Student translation: From what has been said above, thes...
Summary:Because being a legislator of universal law marks a being as an end in itself, it follows from the status of a rational being as an end in itself (established in the previous paragraph) that a rational being must be regarded as the legislator of any universal laws to which it is subject. It also follows that the dignity of such rational beings implies they are legislators and therefore persons. As legislators of willed laws that are analogous to externally necessitated laws of nature, these persons can make possible an empire of ends analogous to the empire of nature. Although the two empires are different, the former merely an ideal in which goodness and happiness are always found together, the laws of an empire of ends still must always be followed because they are categorical. Their categorical force underlies the paradox that it is merely an ideal that guides our conduct in the actual and real empire of nature. But even if the empire of ends were to become real as well, its dignity would not increase; for the worth arises only from acting from duty as commanded by the universal laws legislated by the autonomous will.

Paragraph 115

Section: Two
Page and Line: 86.12  [4:439-440]
Kant's German: Man kann aus dem kurz vorhergehenden sich es...
Scholar translation: One can from the recent foregoing n...
Student translation: You can now easily explain from wha...
Summary:This autonomy of the will also explains how to reconcile subjection with sublimity and dignity, both of which are associated with duty.

Paragraph 116

Section: Two
Page and Line: 87.10  [4:440]
Kant's German: Autonomie des Willens ist die Beschaffenheit des...
Scholar translation: Autonomy of the will is the charact...
Student translation: Autonomy of the will is the charact...
Summary:The principle of autonomy is a synthetic a priori proposition. Its proof therefore requires a critique of pure practical reason and is not a part of this section. But mere analysis of the concept of morality does reveal that the principle is the sole principle of morals, for this analysis shows that the principle must be a categorical imperative which commands autonomy.

Paragraph 117

Section: Two
Page and Line: 88.11  [4:440-441]
Kant's German: Wenn der Wille irgend worin anders, als in...
Scholar translation: If the will anywhere else ...
Student translation: If the will seeks what is to guide ...
Summary:Heteronomy always results if the will seeks the law in any of the will's objects rather than in the will itself. The heteronomous relation between will and its object can admit only hypothetical imperatives. Categorical imperatives abstract from all objects so that the objects have no influence on the will.

Paragraph 118

Section: Two
Page and Line: 89.19  [4:441]
Kant's German: Die menschliche Vernunft hat hier, wie...
Scholar translation: Human reason has here, as everywher...
Student translation: Human reason has here, as everywher...
Summary:Only after a critical examination has reason finally found the right way to ground morality.

Paragraph 119

Section: Two
Page and Line: 89.24  [4:441]
Kant's German: Alle Principien, die man aus diesem Gesichts-...
Scholar translation: All principles, which one might tak...
Student translation: All principles that you might take ...
Summary:Heteronomous empirical principles are all built on the principle of happiness, on physical or moral feeling. Heteronomous rational principles are all built on the principle of perfection, on the concept of perfection understood as an effect of our will or understood as God's will.

Paragraph 120

Section: Two
Page and Line: 90.8  [4:441-442]
Kant's German: Empirische Principien taugen überall nicht dazu,...
Scholar translation: Empirical principles are n...
Student translation: Empirical principles are n...
Summary:The universality and necessity of moral laws are lost if the laws are built on empirical principles of human nature and its circumstances; so such principles cannot serve as the foundation for moral laws. Among the many reasons for rejecting the principle of happiness, the most decisive is that it bases morality on incentives and motives that are non-moral and that therefore undermine morality. Though moral feeling or moral sense does not make this decisive mistake, it still must be rejected because it misconstrues morality as a matter of feeling and because it cannot provide a uniform standard of judgment.

Paragraph 121

Section: Two
Page and Line: 91.19  [4:442-443]
Kant's German: Unter den rationalen, oder Vernunftgründen der...
Scholar translation: Among the rational or reas...
Student translation: Among the rational grounds...
Summary:The ontological concept of perfection is unacceptable because it is indeterminate and circular. Even more unacceptable is the theological concept of perfection; it cannot be intuited and can be derived only circularly from our own concepts, leaving it only characterizations and representations of desires and fears to use, mistakenly, as a basis for morality.

Paragraph 122

Section: Two
Page and Line: 92.22  [4:443]
Kant's German: Wenn ich aber zwischen dem Begriff des moralischen...
Scholar translation: If I, however, had to choose betwee...
Student translation: But if I had to choose between the ...
Summary:But basing morality on the concept of perfection in general is preferable to basing it on moral feeling because perfection does not base morality on feeling and because it retains the idea of a good will.

Paragraph 123

Section: Two
Page and Line: 93.7  [4:443-444]
Kant's German: Uebrigens glaube ich einer weitläuftigen Widerle-...
Scholar translation: For the rest, I believe to be able ...
Student translation: Regarding the remaining rational gr...
Summary:Refuting all heteronomous principles would be superfluous; for their refutations are easy and well-understood.

Paragraph 124

Section: Two
Page and Line: 93.18  [4:443-444]
Kant's German: Allenthalben, wo ein Object des Willens zum Grun-...
Scholar translation: Everywhere, where an object of the ...
Student translation: In all cases in which an object of ...
Summary:Whenever an object is referenced in order to guide the will, there is heteronomy and the associated imperative is hypothetical. This is so whether the object guides the will with inclination or with reason; in either case, the will is not guiding itself by its conception of the action but rather is influenced by the expected effect of the action. So the action is conditioned upon the expected effect; then there must be a law by which this expected effect is willed, and so on. This influence on the will depends on our nature and so the law by which the expected effect is willed also comes from nature; consequently, this law could only be known by experience and only be contingent.

Paragraph 125

Section: Two
Page and Line: 95.3  [4:444-445]
Kant's German: Der schlechterdings gute Wille, dessen Princip ein...
Scholar translation: The absolutely good will, whose pri...
Student translation: So the absolutely good will, whose ...
Summary:An absolutely good will disregards objects and instead contains merely the form of willing as autonomy.

Paragraph 126

Section: Two
Page and Line: 95.13  [4:444-445]
Kant's German: Wie ein solcher synthetischer practischer Satz...
Scholar translation: How such a synthetic practical ...
Student translation: How such a synthetic practical ...
Summary:We have not proved the principle of autonomy. We have only established the hypothesis that if morality is real, then autonomy of the will must be morality's foundation. So Sections One and Two have been analytic in method. In the Third Section, we outline the critical examination of reason that must precede a proof of the principle of autonomy.

Paragraph 127

Section: Three
Page and Line: 97.10  [4:446]
Kant's German: Der Wille ist eine Art von Caußalität lebender We-...
Scholar translation: The will is a kind of caus...
Student translation: The will is a kind of caus...
Summary:The will is a kind of causality. Freedom (of the will) is a property of this causality.

Paragraph 128

Section: Three
Page and Line: 97.18  [4:446]
Kant's German: Die angeführte Erklärung der Freyheit ist negativ,...
Scholar translation: The above-cited explanation of free...
Student translation: The above explanation of freedom is...
Summary:The concept of causality involves the concept of laws. So freedom is not lawless. But freedom's laws are not natural laws; so freedom of the will is autonomy.

Paragraph 129

Section: Three
Page and Line: 98.21  [4:446-447]
Kant's German: Wenn also Freyheit des Willens vorausgesetzt wird,...
Scholar translation: If, therefore, freedom of the will ...
Student translation: If, therefore, freedom of the will ...
Summary:The concept of freedom contains the concept of morality. But the principle of morality (i.e., a good will always acts from a universalizable maxim) is a synthetic proposition: the concept of a good will does not contain the concept of a will's acting from a consistent universalizable maxim. The concept of freedom supplies the third cognition which synthetically links the concepts of a good will and a universalizable maxim.

Paragraph 130

Section: Three
Page and Line: 99.23  [4:447]
Kant's German: Es ist nicht genug, daß wir unserem Willen, es...
Scholar translation: It is not enough that we ascribe to...
Student translation: It is not enough that we ascribe, f...
Summary:Morality must be derived only from the property of freedom. So there must be a rational way to attribute freedom to all rational beings. A being that can act only under the idea of freedom is practically free because all rational beings with wills have the idea of freedom and reason must regard itself as free.

Paragraph 131

Section: Three
Page and Line: 101.21  [4:448-449]
Kant's German: Wir haben den bestimmten Begriff der Sittlich-...
Scholar translation: We have at last traced the determin...
Student translation: We have at last traced the specific...
Summary:It has been established that, to think of a being as rational and as having a will, the being's freedom must be presupposed but cannot be shown to be actual.

Paragraph 132

Section: Three
Page and Line: 102.8  [4:449]
Kant's German: Es floß aber aus der Voraussetzung dieser Ideen...
Scholar translation: There flowed, however, from the pre...
Student translation: But from the presupposition of thes...
Summary:Freedom of the will (for a rational but sensuous being) brings with it a consciousness of being obligated by practical necessity. But it is not clear how this obligation arises. It cannot arise through an interest, and yet such beings do take an interest in the obligation (i.e., it concerns them; fulfilling obligations is important to them).

Paragraph 133

Section: Three
Page and Line: 103.4  [4:449-450]
Kant's German: Es scheint also, als setzten wir in der Idee der...
Scholar translation: It appears, therefore, as if in the...
Student translation: So it appears as if we actually onl...
Summary:So it seems that in presupposing freedom, the moral law has also been presupposed and so not justified. Some questions therefore remain unanswered.

Paragraph 134

Section: Three
Page and Line: 103.24  [4:449-450]
Kant's German: Zwar finden wir wol, daß wir an einer persönli-...
Scholar translation: Of course we very well find that we...
Student translation: We surely do find that we can take ...
Summary:In particular, it is still not clear how such beings can be obligated apart from an interest.

Paragraph 135

Section: Three
Page and Line: 104.19  [4:450]
Kant's German: Es zeigt sich hier, man muß es frey gestehen, eine...
Scholar translation: There appears here, one must freely...
Student translation: You must freely admit that there ap...
Summary:There is a circle from which there appears to be no escape. Freedom and self-legislation of the will are both autonomy.

Paragraph 136

Section: Three
Page and Line: 105.9  [4:450-451]
Kant's German: Eine Auskunft bleibt uns aber noch übrig, nem-...
Scholar translation: One recourse, however, remains over...
Student translation: But one way out of the circle still...
Summary:A possible way of escape is to recognize two standpoints: thinking of ourselves, through freedom, as a priori efficient causes; thinking of ourselves, according to our actions, as effects.

Paragraph 137

Section: Three
Page and Line: 105.15  [4:450-451]
Kant's German: Es ist eine Bemerkung, welche anzustellen eben...
Scholar translation: It is a remark which to post quite ...
Student translation: No subtle reflection at all is requ...
Summary:There is a world of sense with variable appearances and a world of understanding with unchanging things in themselves. A rational being with a will occupies both worlds.

Paragraph 138

Section: Three
Page and Line: 107.14  [4:451-452]
Kant's German: Dergleichen Schluß muß der nachdenkende Mensch...
Scholar translation: The reflective human being must dra...
Student translation: A reflective human being must draw ...
Summary:Reflective people with ordinary understanding accept the existence of these two worlds, but they misguidedly try to sense the world of understanding.

Paragraph 139

Section: Three
Page and Line: 107.24  [4:451-452]
Kant's German: Nun findet der Mensch in sich wirklich ein Vermö-...
Scholar translation: Now the human being actually finds ...
Student translation: Now, the human being actually finds...
Summary:The faculty of reason, unlike the faculty of understanding, has pure spontaneity and requires no objects from sensibility. Reason distinguishes the two worlds.

Paragraph 140

Section: Three
Page and Line: 108.20  [4:452]
Kant's German: Um deswillen muß ein vernünftiges Wesen sich...
Scholar translation: For this reason a rational being mu...
Student translation: Because of this distinction that re...
Summary:So a rational being, having the faculty of reason, regards itself as belonging to both worlds.

Paragraph 141

Section: Three
Page and Line: 109.5  [4:452-453]
Kant's German: Als ein vernünftiges, mithin zur intelligibelen...
Scholar translation: As a rational being, therefore as b...
Student translation: As a rational being, and therefore ...
Summary:As an intelligence, a rational being thinks of itself as belonging to the world of understanding and so thinks of itself as free from the kind of causality operative in the world of sense.

Paragraph 142

Section: Three
Page and Line: 109.16  [4:452-453]
Kant's German: Nun ist der Verdacht, den wir oben rege machten,...
Scholar translation: Now is the suspicion that we above ...
Student translation: The suspicion that we stirred up ea...
Summary:Reason's distinction between the two worlds provides the means of escape from the circle in the argument.

Paragraph 143

Section: Three
Page and Line: 110.10  [4:453]
Kant's German: Das vernünftige Wesen zählt sich als Intelligenz...
Scholar translation: The rational being classes itself a...
Student translation: The rational being, as an intellige...
Summary:The intelligible world contains the ground of the world of sense and laws that govern the world of sense; so the intelligible world (i.e., reason) is legislative (by laws contained in reason's idea of freedom) for the will, which will is wholly in the intelligible world. So the laws of the intelligible world are imperatives for the rational being endowed with a will and also equiped with sensibility.

Paragraph 144

Section: Three
Page and Line: 111.16  [4:453-454]
Kant's German: Und so sind categorische Imperativen möglich, da-...
Scholar translation: And in this way categorical imperat...
Student translation: And it is in this way that categori...
Summary:So synthetic a priori categorical imperatives are possible: the intuited sensible self is combined through the idea of freedom with the idea of an intelligible self.

Paragraph 145

Section: Three
Page and Line: 112.8  [4:454]
Kant's German: Der practische Gebrauch der gemeinen Menschen-...
Scholar translation: The practical use of common human r...
Student translation: The practical use of common human r...
Summary:Ordinary human reason confirms this deduction of the categorical imperative. Even the meanest villain wishes to be moral, thus revealing her intelligible self and her commitment to morality.

Paragraph 146

Section: Three
Page and Line: 113.20  [4:454-455]
Kant's German: Alle Menschen denken sich dem Willen nach als...
Scholar translation: All human beings think themselves a...
Student translation: All human beings think of themselve...
Summary:Neither freedom nor natural necessity are concepts of experience. But freedom is only an idea of reason while natural necessity is a concept of the understanding which is confirmed by experience.

Paragraph 147

Section: Three
Page and Line: 114.17  [4:455-456]
Kant's German: Ob nun gleich hieraus eine Dialectik der Vernunft...
Scholar translation: Although now out of this a dialecti...
Student translation: A dialectic of reason now arises fr...
Summary:Since freedom and natural necessity contradict each other, a dialectic of reason arises. Since neither can be jettisoned, philosophy must assume there is no real contradiction.

Paragraph 148

Section: Three
Page and Line: 115.8  [4:456]
Kant's German: Indessen muß dieser Scheinwiderspruch wenigstens...
Scholar translation: Meanwhile, this apparent contradict...
Student translation: While we wait for no true contradic...
Summary:If the apparent contradiction cannot be removed, then freedom must be given up.

Paragraph 149

Section: Three
Page and Line: 115.15  [4:456]
Kant's German: Es ist aber unmöglich, diesem Widerspruch zu entge-...
Scholar translation: It is, however, impossible to evade...
Student translation: But it is impossible to escape this...
Summary:Speculative philosophy must show that the contradiction is only apparent; otherwise fatalism can evict morality.

Paragraph 150

Section: Three
Page and Line: 116.19  [4:456-457]
Kant's German: Doch kann man hier noch nicht sagen, daß die...
Scholar translation: Yet one can here not yet say that t...
Student translation: Nevertheless, you can not yet say t...
Summary:It cannot be said that this is the boundary of practical philosophy.

Paragraph 151

Section: Three
Page and Line: 117.1  [4:457]
Kant's German: Der Rechtsanspruch aber, selbst der gemeinen Men-...
Scholar translation: The rightful claim, however, even o...
Student translation: But the rightful claim, even of com...
Summary:The two standpoints, justified by consciousness of self as affected through the senses and by consciousness of self as independent of sensuous impulses (as an intelligence, as having a will, as free) remove the contradiction.

Paragraph 152

Section: Three
Page and Line: 118.1  [4:457-458]
Kant's German: Daher kommt es, daß der Mensch sich eines Wil-...
Scholar translation: Hence it happens that the human bei...
Student translation: So it happens that the human being ...
Summary:Because the will is the proper self and the will belongs to the world of understanding, the laws of the world of understanding apply directly to the will, unimpaired by inclinations from the world of sense.

Paragraph 153

Section: Three
Page and Line: 118.24  [4:457-458]
Kant's German: Dadurch, daß die practische Vernunft sich in eine...
Scholar translation: By this, that practical reason ...
Student translation: By thinking itself into a ...
Summary:Practical reason stays within its bounds when it thinks of the intelligible world only in a formal way, in a way that does not suppose that there are in the intelligible world any objects of the will.

Paragraph 154

Section: Three
Page and Line: 120.9  [4:458-459]
Kant's German: Aber alsdenn würde die Vernunft alle ihre Grenze...
Scholar translation: But then reason would overstep all ...
Student translation: But then reason would overstep its ...
Summary:Reason goes out of bounds when it tries to specify how pure reason can be practical or, what is the same thing, how freedom is possible.

Paragraph 155

Section: Three
Page and Line: 120.14  [4:458-459]
Kant's German: Denn wir können nichts erklären, als was wir auf...
Scholar translation: For we can explain nothing except w...
Student translation: For we can explain nothing except w...
Summary:Freedom is only an idea of reason, a necessary presupposition. Contradictions arise when reason oversteps its bounds by trying to combine freedom with appearances.

Paragraph 156

Section: Three
Page and Line: 121.25  [4:459]
Kant's German: Die subjective Unmöglichkeit, die Freyheit des...
Scholar translation: The subjective impossibility of ...
Student translation: The subjective impossibility of ...
Summary:Humans take an interest in moral laws. The basis for the interest is moral feeling, and moral feeling is the subjective effect of moral law. But how this feeling arises from moral law cannot be explained, and so it is impossible to explain how we take an interest in moral laws.

Paragraph 157

Section: Three
Page and Line: 122.10  [4:459-460]
Kant's German: Um das zu wollen, wozu die Vernunft allein dem...
Scholar translation: In order to will that for which rea...
Student translation: In order to will what reason alone ...
Summary:Though reason must somehow cause an interest, this causality cannot be explained because causes can only be identified through experience and there is no experience of the idea of freedom.

Paragraph 158

Section: Three
Page and Line: 124.1  [4:461]
Kant's German: Die Frage also: wie ein categorischer Imperativ...
Scholar translation: The question thus: how a categorica...
Student translation: So the question of how a categorica...
Summary:So a categorical imperative is possible because freedom is a necessary presupposition of morality. This necessity of the presupposition is enough to establish the categorical imperative. How this presupposition (i.e., freedom) is possible remains unexplainable as does the question of how pure reason can be practical.

Paragraph 159

Section: Three
Page and Line: 125.11  [4:461-462]
Kant's German: Es ist eben dasselbe, als ob ich zu ergründen suchte,...
Scholar translation: It is just the same as if I sought ...
Student translation: It is just the same as if I were tr...
Summary:It is not possible to solve how reason alone could be an incentive for the will, for when dealing with reason alone everything from the world of sense has been excluded and there is no acquaintance with any object from the intelligible world.

Paragraph 160

Section: Three
Page and Line: 126.13  [4:462]
Kant's German: Hier ist nun die oberste Grenze aller moralischen...
Scholar translation: Here, then, is the highest boundary...
Student translation: This, then, is where the highest bo...
Summary:Legitimate moral inquiry stops just before it tries to identify the ultimate motive. There are three reasons why it is important to respect this boundary: to limit the influence of the empirical; to avoid confusion; to encourage belief and interest in the moral law in us.

Paragraph 161

Section: Three
Page and Line: 127.10  [4:462-463]
Kant's German: Der speculative Gebrauch der Vernunft, in Anse-...
Scholar translation: The speculative use of reason i...
Student translation: The speculative use of reason, ...
Summary:In seeking to know the necessary (e.g., a categorical imperative), reason seeks to know the ultimate or originating condition of the necessary (e.g., a full account of how the categorical imperative is possible); but knowing the ultimate condition is not possible because it is unconditional (e.g., not based on an interest). So the deduction of the highest principle of morality cannot be faulted for not producing the ultimate condition of its possibility; only reason in general can be faulted for wanting the impossible.

Document generation date and time: 2014-10-11 at 21:15:16.348
License: Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported License
MLA style citation:
Orr, Stephen. Paragraph Summaries of Kant's Groundlaying toward the Metaphysics of Morals.
     Groundlaying: Kant's Search for the Highest Principle of Morality.

     Google AppSpot, 11 Oct. 2014. Web. [access date].
     <http://groundlaying.appspot.com/html/gms1786v_summary.html>.